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Inequality in Political Representation
In many countries the near-universal right to vote in elections has been a core attribute
of their democratic institutions for decades, and in some cases over a century. However,
the political experience of many of these very countries over the past decade have
often alternated between apathy and frustration in these democratic institutions. Stark
economic inequalities have mirrored inequalities in political influence, voters observing
that elected officials who determine policy are disproportionately from a political elite
or establishment. Why, after decades of near-universal voting rights, are only five
percent of MPs in the UK House of Commons from the working class, and only one in
four legislators in the United States are women?
There is a growing literature offering empirical evidence that the characteristics of
who we elect to office have a significant impact on the policies that are chosen. By
implication, persistent inequalities in political representation may lead to policy choices
that negatively and disproportionately impact those who are under-represented in
politics. Furthermore, the inequalities in representation among politicians are often also
seen in other professions, such as among CEOs of high-profile companies. For example,
understanding why women are under-represented in politics, as well as the effectiveness
of interventions, may provide insight into how to alleviate parallel inequalities in other
areas.
The political representation of certain group can be interpreted as a product of supply
and demand for their representation. The supply side may be characterised by the
decisions of candidates who choose to run for office, the demand side by the voters at
elections, and political parties as intermediaries who select candidates to run for them
at elections.
I address the political parties as intermediaries in the first chapter, Learning-By-
Losing: Do Political Parties Widen Representation to Win Elections? In this chapter,
I investigate how the incentive to win elections may lead to more inclusive selection by
political parties, using the case study of the Conservative Party in the aftermath of
their shock landslide defeat in 1906. I argue that political parties may use candidates
as targeted instrument to win votes across a variety of constituencies, but that parties
may be more likely experiment with different types of candidates following a defeat.
Using machine-learning classification and hand-collected biographical information, I
find that the Conservative Party responded to a greater defeat in a given constituency
by selecting a candidate less associated with the political elite in the following elections
in 1910.
The second chapter, Passing on the Baton: Positive Spillovers from the Olympics
to Female Representation in US Politics focuses on the demand-side factors and the
decisions made by voters to elect a female politician. I exploit the timing of the Summer
Olympic Games, that are held between primary and general state legislature elections
in the United States, to identify the spillovers from female success in one profession
(sport) on the decision by voters to elect women. I find evidence of a positive spillover
effect from women winning medals at the Olympics on female candidate vote shares in
their home state. Although voters do not appear to change their attitudes to women in
politics, I find increased discussion of female political representation in the news media,
and evidence suggesting that as a result some voters prioritise equality of representation
more highly.
Additionally I explore the spillover effects of a woman being elected to office on future
female representation, as well as geographical spillovers, in the third chapter Temporal
and Geographical Spillovers in Female Political Representation. I exploit quasi-random
variation in the close election or non-election of women, as well as almost fifty years
of state legislature elections. I identify a positive and significant temporal spillover in
female representation: initially driven by female incumbents running for re-election,
but in the long run driven by new female candidates. In addition, I find evidence of a
positive and persistent geographical spillover within a state legislature.
This thesis contributes in several ways to previous research concerning inequalities
in political representation, as well as inequalities in other professions. Firstly, I am
able to separate different factors that influence political representation, namely the
decisions of different political actors, which are masked when merely observing trends
vi
in the proportion of elected politicians from a certain group in society. For example, in
Chapter 1 I am able to focus on the decision of political parties in selecting candidates
through a novel historical case study, and the impact these decisions have on political
representation. A key contribution is that I find evidence suggesting that political
parties may use candidate characteristics as a means of winning elections, and its effect
on socioeconomic representation among candidates. In Chapter 2 I exploit the timing
of a positive shock to female representation between primary and general elections to
focus on voters’ decisions to vote for female candidates.
Another contribution of the thesis is its investigation of different types of spillover
effects in political representation, about which there has been relatively little research.
This may be across different professions (as in Chapter 2), geographical areas, or the
comparison of temporal spillovers to future elections in the short and long run (Chapter
3). I present evidence of a range of positive spillovers, which have implications for
under-represented groups in other professions and policy interventions to address these
inequalities.
Further, my application of machine-learning classification to biographical data con-
tributes to potential future research. Previous work largely studies inequalities in one
particular dimension (such as gender or race). However, the use of machine-learning
classification of candidates in Chapter 1 could be used to investigate inequalities in
multiple dimensions. There are many inequalities that one may be concerned about
(such as age, gender, nationality, religion, socioeconomic background). The machine-
learning classification I use could incorporate rich biographical information concerning
all of these characteristics to study changes in and factors influencing inequalities in
representation in these labour markets, in the ‘political labour market’ or beyond.
vii
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Parties Widen Representation to
Win Elections?
Abstract
Although the right to vote has long been near-universal in many countries, there are still
significant inequalities in political representation. These inequalities have implications
for policy choices and speak to labour market inequalities in other occupations outside
of politics. One contributing factor may be political parties selecting candidates to
win elections. I argue that parties may learn to be more inclusive in their selection in
the aftermath of a defeat, through a ‘learning-by-losing’ process. Using comprehensive
hand-collected biographical data and machine-learning algorithms to classify over 2,000
candidates, I find evidence of the Conservative Party choosing candidates from a wider
range of backgrounds in response to electoral defeat in the UK 1906 election. I also
find evidence of the targeted use of candidate characteristics to win votes.
1
Learning-By-Losing: Do Political Parties Widen Representation to Win
Elections?
‘The demand of the democracy is really for a free choice of doctors. Instead
of confining, as it were, those who were able to remedy their evils and cure
them to a small class, they say “We want an unlimited choice in picking
out those who suit us best".’
David Lloyd George, 10th August 19111
1.1 Introduction
Although the right to vote is near-universal in many countries, and has been so
for many years, there still remain significant inequalities in political representation.
These inequalities exist over gender, racial, and socioeconomic lines, among others.
For example, only two percent of US Members of Congress are from working-class
backgrounds, as well as only five percent of MPs in the UK House of Commons, despite
making up around half of the population in both countries (Carnes, 2012). However,
there have also been recent signs of change. For example, parties may select candidates
from a wider range of backgrounds to appeal to a wider set of voters, like the Republican
Party in the recent 2020 US congressional elections2.
Understanding the causes of such inequality in political representation may have
implications beyond politics, such as for inequalities in the labour market. A party’s
decision to select candidates mirrors the decisions made by firms hiring workers and
organisations admitting members. Firms may choose to be more inclusive in their
hiring for similar reasons that political parties decide to select candidates from a wider
range of backgrounds. I suggest that greater inclusivity may be driven by organisations
learning from failure.
Further, such inequalities in political representation may have a profound impact on
the policies that are chosen. There is extensive empirical evidence suggesting that
the characteristics of politicians influences their decisions, whether it be their race
(Beach et al., 2019; Hopkins and McCabe, 2012), gender (Bhalotra and Clots-Figueras,
2014; Clots-Figueras, 2011), and socioeconomic class (Carnes, 2012), or even whether
they smoke (Burden, 2007), serve in the military (Gelpi and Feaver, 2002), or have
1Hansard 10th August 1911 Volume 29 Columns 1365-1477 ‘Debate on the Payment of Members’
2As reported in the New York Times: ‘Republican women delivered critical victories to their
party in the election, signalling the success of their efforts to recruit and elect a more diverse




daughters (Washington, 2008). As a result, inequality of political representation may
have a significant effect on policy choices and subsequently socioeconomic outcomes,
such as inequality.
One important contributing factor to inequalities in political representation may be
the decisions made by political parties in their selection of candidates for election.
Political parties often have considerable campaigning resources and so have influence
over the selection of realistic candidates for election, effectively gatekeepers to public
office.
The main contribution of this chapter is to suggest that political parties may be
strategic about the types of candidates that they select, and how this influences
political representation, of which there is little theoretical or empirical discussion in
the economics literature. I investigate whether parties learn from a poor performance
and choose candidates from a wider range of backgrounds to win the next election,
and focus on the Conservative Party’s response to the shock landslide defeat in the
UK 1906 General Election. While examples of parties using candidate profiles to win
elections are commonplace, this setting allows for the identification of the influence of
electoral incentives on a party’s choice of candidates.
I also exploit a comprehensive range of candidate characteristics, which I hand-collect
not only from the biographies of MPs but also unsuccessful candidates. These char-
acteristics include information about the backgrounds of these candidates including
their education, their family’s backgrounds, their previous occupations, their social
connections, clubs and hobbies, and so on.
In addition, I implement machine learning algorithms (Support Vector Machine and
Latent Dirichlet Allocation) in a novel application: to sort candidates into different
socioeconomic groups. This reduces the prior judgement required and ambiguity in
the identification of candidates as political elites (for example those families have a
long history of involvement in politics) or outsiders (such as the working class), or
somewhere in between.
I use geographic variation in the Conservative vote share and control for the party’s past
performance and past candidates. I find evidence that the greater the defeat, the more
likely the Conservatives were to switch from candidates from the political elite to those
from working-class backgrounds. In the average constituency, a one standard deviation
increase in the Conservative defeat margin in 1906 is associated with a decrease of
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7.9-10.0 percent in the likelihood that the candidate in 1910 is from the political elite.
The same increase is associated with a 19.3 percent increase in the likelihood of the
Conservative candidate being from the working class.
This effect is largely driven by the replacement of candidates who lost in 1906 rather
than replacing incumbent MPs in the subsequent 1910 elections, further supporting a
learning-by-losing explanation. In addition, the Conservatives switched away from the
political elite more aggressively in constituencies where they had traditionally performed
well, where a given margin of defeat would have been perceived as a greater shock
than in other constituencies. Further, this switching is more prevalent and aggressive
in working-class constituencies. This is consistent with parties using candidates as a
targeted instrument to win votes, as explained in the conceptual framework. Finally, I
find that this targeted switching was beneficial to the Conservatives in the subsequent
elections in 1910.
Contributions to the Literature I primarily contribute to the literature analysing
political under-representation of different groups in society, and especially the causes
of such under-representation. There is relatively little work exploring political rep-
resentation across different socioeconomic groups, such as the working class. Carnes
(2012) finds that working-class legislators in the US House of Representatives tend to
mirror the economic preferences of working-class voters. In addition, their exclusion
from legislatures fuels distrust of political institutions (Barnes and Saxton, 2019) and
decreased political engagement (Heath, 2018). As for why there are relatively few
politicians from poorer socioeconomic backgrounds, Carnes (2016) argues that the
limiting factor is not lack of qualifications or any other supply-side issue, but politi-
cal parties’ low demand for candidates from a wider range of backgrounds. Further,
initiatives to increase supply, such as increases in politicians’ salaries, in fact crowd
out the working class as it increases the supply of middle and upper class candidates
(Carnes and Hansen, 2016). I also contribute to a wider literature concerning the
representation of historically under-represented groups in politics, such as women and
ethnic minorities. There is a considerable body of work that investigates both the causes
of such under-representation, such as the bias of voters (Bhalotra et al., 2018; Fulton,
2012; Kahn, 1996) and political parties (Anastasopoulos, 2016; Folke and Rickne, 2016;
Sanbonmatsu and Dolan, 2009), as well as the consequences of under-representation of
women (Bhalotra et al., 2018; Catalano Weeks, 2019; Clots-Figueras, 2011, 2012) and
ethnic minorities (Beach et al., 2019; Hopkins and McCabe, 2012) in politics.
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I add to the literature by proposing and finding empirical evidence for a different factor
impacting political representation of traditionally under-represented groups: electoral
pressures, where parties feel they need to select candidates from a wider range of
backgrounds to win an election. In addition, the relatively fixed supply of candidates
from non-elite backgrounds allows for the identification of parties’ demand for wider
representation among its candidates. Focusing on the demand-side decision of parties
selecting candidates disentangles the supply and demand for political representation
that the literature generally struggles to pull apart. Further, I use machine-learning
algorithms on comprehensive bibliographical data. As opposed to the literature which
focuses on one characteristic of a candidate (for example gender or occupation), I use
a wide array of characteristics to indicate whether a selected candidate part of the
political elite or not.
Secondly, I contribute to the literature that discusses the link between political partici-
pation and policy, and more specifically whether wider political participation leads to
more egalitarian policy. Wider political participation may mean extending the suffrage
as well as increasing political participation among those already eligible to vote. Downs
(1957) and Meltzer and Richard (1981) argue that the composition of the electorate
may have direct implications for policy, the latter suggesting that if the franchise is
extended to those with lower incomes there may be greater appetite for redistribution.
Various work has suggested that the extension of the franchise has a positive influence
on redistribution (Aidt et al., 2006; Aidt and Jensen, 2013; Boix, 2003; Kotera and
Okada, 2017), confirming the logic of Meltzer and Richard (1981). Indeed there is more
recent evidence of how political participation of other groups may influence policy:
Jensen and Yntiso (2019) find that the Jim Crow Laws leads to a larger decrease in
social spending in counties with a greater African-American population, while Bertocchi
et al. (2020) find an increase in youth participation at elections, through preregistration
laws, is associated with greater public spending on education. However, Aidt et al.
(2020) exploit structural breaks in fiscal policy and suffrage in the United Kingdom and
find little evidence of a link between franchise extension and fiscal expansion.
I contribute to this literature by providing a stepping stone between wider political
participation and policy changes: political representation. I argue that even if wider
political participation may increase demand for, say, more egalitarian policies, if it
is not matched by an increase in supply of those policies by political parties there
may be little change in policy. Given the significance of politicians’ characteristics on
5
Learning-By-Losing: Do Political Parties Widen Representation to Win
Elections?
their decision-making, wider political participation may only have a meaningful impact
on policy once there is wider representation among politicians. As I find, elections
may accelerate this process by putting pressure on parties to choose candidates from
a wider range of backgrounds. Therefore this is also a contribution to the literature
concerning political competition, for example Downs (1957) and Lindbeck and Weibull
(1987). While these papers argue that political parties compete using policy platforms,
I suggest that they may also compete with the portfolio of candidates that they select,
which they can adjust more finely at the constituency level than policy platforms at
the national level.
Chapter Layout The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 1.2 explains the conceptual
framework from which the empirical strategy is motivated; Section 1.3 outlines the
relevant institutional context surrounding the 1906 election and the Conservative
response. Section 1.4 describes the comprehensive electoral and biographical information
collected; Section 1.6 explains the baseline empirical strategy as well as the machine
learning algorithms that sort the candidates into socioeconomic groups (Support Vector
Machine and Latent Dirichlet Allocation); Section 1.7 reports the baseline results.
Section 1.8 reports further evidence of learning-by-losing; Section 1.9 shows the effect
of this strategy on outcomes in the 1910 elections; Section 1.10 concludes.
1.2 Learning-By-Losing: Using Candidates to Win
Elections
In this section, I provide a conceptual framework motivating why political parties may
use their portfolio of candidates, and their characteristics, as a targeted instrument
for winning elections. I then argue that political parties may change the portfolio of
candidates as a result of losing an election, which may widen representation among
their candidates. This provides motivation for the empirical strategy outlined in the
following sections.
1.2.1 Why do voters care about candidates?
A candidate’s profile or characteristics may influence electoral outcomes for two reasons.
The first is that voters may feel more positively about a candidate who shares some
characteristics with them. This may even be independent of the policy platform of
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the party that they represent. This is consistent with social identity theory from the
political science literature (Ashforth and Mael, 1989; Conover, 1984; Shayo, 2009; Tajfel,
1974) as well as recent empirical work, for example Ansolabehere and Puy (2016). The
concept of identity has also been discussed in the economics literature (Akerlof and
Kranton, 2000; Besley and Persson, 2019), where voters may choose a candidate or
party even if it is not in their economic interests to do so.
Secondly, voters may observe the characteristics of a candidate as a commitment to
future policy on behalf of the party that chose them. For example, if a party chooses
a candidate from the working class to run for office, it may be a signal to voters
that the party intends to propose policies that are more favourable to the working
class in the future. There is empirical evidence suggesting that the characteristics of a
politician may influence their policy preferences (Bhalotra and Clots-Figueras, 2014;
Clots-Figueras, 2011; Hopkins and McCabe, 2012). If a voter observes a candidate with
similar characteristics to them, they may interpret this as a sign that the party they
represent are more likely to choose policies that benefit them in the future.
This may be the case irrespective of current policy platform. A party may not be able
to credibly change policy platform radically, so a change in candidate profiles may
be a commitment device for a different policy platform. For instance, a party may
choose a working-class candidate to show its commitment to working-class causes in
the future, as changing the manifesto to include more economic redistribution may
not be credible as such promises may be undone overnight3. This is amplified in the
case of a significant incumbency advantage (Hainmueller et al., 2015; Lee, 2008), where
choosing a candidate opens the possibility of that candidate being re-elected in the
future, so is a credible long-term commitment.
1.2.2 Using candidates to win elections
Parties may take advantage of voter preferences by adjusting their portfolio of candidates
across constituencies. Further, this may be a targeted instrument that can be adjusted
to win votes from different types of voters. The political economics literature focuses on
parties changing their platforms to win elections (Downs, 1957; Lindbeck and Weibull,
1987), I argue that the portfolio of candidates is another part of their strategy.
3This is similar to the logic of Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) and the threat of revolution theory
of democratisation.
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Further, changing the portfolio of candidates may be a more targeted instrument of
winning votes across constituencies than the policy platforms. A policy platform may
be a national manifesto that is delivered across the country. In this case, a change in
the policy platform may lose some votes as well as win others. However, there may be
an opportunity for parties to change individual candidates and attenuate the negative
spillovers of placating one set of voters.
This provides the motivation for political parties to use the portfolio of candidates to
maximise their vote shares across many constituencies. Even if the policy platform can
be somewhat tweaked geographically, there will be an incentive to use candidates as a
more targeted instrument so long that the negative spillovers of changing a candidate
in one area on votes won in other areas relatively low. This seems reasonable as voters
are likely to care more about the candidates running in their own constituency than
candidates running in other constituencies, even those nearby.
1.2.3 Learning-By-Losing: Empirical Motivation
While political parties may choose their portfolio of candidates to maximise electoral
success across many constituencies, they may also do this by a learning process than
spans across elections4. Even if they have complete information about the characteristics
of their candidates, they may have imperfect information about voters’ preferences.
For example, they may not have perfect information about voters’ preferences for a
certain types of candidates.
As a result, political parties may undergo a learning process that may be characterised
as ‘learning-by-losing’. A party chooses a portfolio of candidates before an election. If
the party performs well at the election, they may choose a similar portfolio of candidates
for the next election. However, if they perform poorly, they may make changes.
The economics literature concerning experimentation by individuals (Keller et al.,
2005) and groups (Gieczewski, 2021; Gieczewski and Kosterina, 2020; Strulovici, 2010)
suggests that they may tend to ‘under-experiment’, whether due to risk aversion or
free-riding from others’ experimentation. If political parties also exhibit this consistent
under-experimentation, it may take especially poor election results for them to finally
experiment.
4They may also change their policy across time, but I focus on changes to the profiles of candidates.
Further, I argue in the previous sub-section why political parties may prefer to change the portfolio of
candidates rather than the policy platform.
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A political party may therefore change the type of candidate in a constituency in
response to a poor result in that constituency. The greater the defeat (compared to what
was expected), the greater the signal to the party that they should change their strategy.
If this is the case, one would expect that a poorer performance in a constituency in
one election should make changing the type of candidate at the next election more
likely. One may expect that a result of this learning-by-losing process could result in
the selection of candidates from a wider range of backgrounds, especially if the party
were initially choosing from a relatively narrow selection of characteristics.
1.3 Political Representation and the Landslide 1906
Election
In this section I outline the relevant political and historical background of British
politics between 1900 and 1910. I briefly describe the political institutions, as well as
the historical context of the four elections between 1900 and 1910. I explain why the
shock landslide defeat of the Conservative Party in 1906 provides an ideal setting to
isolate the decision of the party to select candidates from a wider range of backgrounds
in response to the electoral defeat.
1.3.1 Landslide Conservative defeat in 1906
By the beginning of the twentieth century, British politics had been dominated by
two political parties (the Conservatives and the Liberals) for decades. Partly helped
by the early popularity of the Boer War, the Conservatives won a large majority of
130 seats (in a House of Commons of 670 members5) at the 1900 election. However,
the 1906 election saw the Conservatives lose 246 seats in a landslide defeat that left
even the Prime Minister Arthur Balfour without a seat in Parliament. As Blewett
(1972) suggests, this landslide defeat was the result of a perfect storm of frustration
in the Boer War and more general concerns over poverty across the United Kingdom,
emphasised by an embryonic trade union and Labour Party movement. Further, the
Rowntree Report in 1899 brought the scale of poverty among the working class to
the attention of the political elite and the middle class, as well as reports that forty
5The United Kingdom Parliament is made up of two legislative chambers: the House of Commons
which is made up of elected officials, and the House of Lords which is made up of appointed and
hereditary peers.
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percent of recruits for the Boer War were so malnourished and unhealthy that they
were deemed physically unfit for war. Sykes (1998) suggests that the Conservatives
viewed the primary factor behind the landslide defeat in 1906 was ‘the desertion of
the Conservative working-class voter.’ The next few years would see unprecedented
redistributive policy under a Liberal government, which saw the introduction of a
welfare state system6. In contrast, the Conservatives opposed these policies, as they had
done in 1906, emphasising the trade-off between a welfare state and Britain’s ability
to fund its army and navy. The Conservative-dominated House of Lords rejected the
‘People’s Budget’ of 1909, and the Liberal government were forced to hold not one but
two elections in 1910: the first in January to show support for the Budget, while the
second in December was later called to show support for removing the House of Lords’
ability to reject budgets.
1.3.2 Elections in Britain 1900-1910
The House of Commons throughout the four relevant elections (1900, 1906, January
1910, and December 1910) consisted of 670 members. The vast majority of Members of
Parliament (MPs) were the sole representative of their constituency, with a minority of
constituencies represented by two members. In single-member constituencies, political
parties would select one candidate for the general election. As Blewett (1972) notes, the
central party organisation had considerable influence over the selection of candidates,
in particular through campaign funding.
1.3.3 Why Focus on the 1906 Election?
The shock landslide election in 1906 provides a unique opportunity to focus on the
choice of the party in selecting candidates from a wider range of backgrounds: firstly
the unexpected nature of the 1906 election result, and secondly the Conservatives’
highly centralised process of selecting candidates. These suggest that changes to the
type of candidates run in 1910 would be the result of the Conservatives learning from
6The Liberals introduced a raft of unprecedented welfare policies: the Education Act (1906)
providing new free school meals; the first nationwide state pensions and unemployment insurance
were introduced in the Old Age Pension Act (1908) and the National Insurance Acts (1911); the
Trade Boards Act (1909) set minimum wages in some trades; job centres were set up in the Labour
Exchanges Act (1909); notably the Trade Disputes Act (1906) was the first significant legislation that
provided labour unions some protection from their employers when striking.
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the 1906 election and selecting from a wider range of backgrounds to do better in the
1910 elections.
Unexpected shock of the 1906 landslide
The first advantage of this setting is the unexpected result of the 1906 election. The
Conservatives lost 246 out of their 402 seats (in a 670 seat House of Commons), after
eleven years of dominance. The popularity of the Liberal Party’s policy of radical redis-
tribution was unexpected at the 1906 election, despite the Boer War and the Rowntree
Report highlighting the extent of poverty within the United Kingdom7. However, this
was also a landslide that was indiscriminate across regions and socioeconomic classes,
in constituencies where they had previously been popular as well as those where they
were unpopular8.
Fig. 1.1 Conservative 1906 and 1900 Election Results across Constituencies
7The Rowntree report in 1899 brought the scale of poverty among the working class to the attention
of the middle class, while the Boer War (1899-1902) shone a disturbing light on the health (or lack of)
of the country: 40 percent of recruits were determined unfit for duty. Although there were many other
reasons for the Conservative defeat in 1906. Blewett (1972) provides a more detailed explanation of
the political timeline.
8This is illustrated by the fact that the swing against the Conservatives in 1906 was 12.2 per-
cent of the vote among predominantly upper class constituencies; 11.7 percent among middle class
constituencies; 13.1 percent for working class constituencies.
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This is presented in Figure 1.1, which reports the Conservative win margin (as a
proportion of total votes) in 1906 compared to that of 1900. This election result was
also a shock. All but three of the Conservative cabinet lost their parliamentary seats,
including Prime Minister Balfour himself. Had the margin of defeat been known, it
seems likely that more resources would have been thrown into assuring the re-election
of significant Conservative Party members. Unlike in the previous century, there had
been no recent extension of the franchise to new voters. Further, the swing away from
the Conservatives in 1906 (5.4 percent of total votes) was unprecedented in British
politics.
Opinion polling before the election was virtually non-existent in the early twentieth
century, with politicians relying on often idiosyncratic results of by-elections instead,
limiting the ability of the Conservatives to anticipate the result. This is echoed by
the response to the result, with The Times reporting that the Liberals ‘will realise all
that they dreamt and hoped for, but scarcely ventured to expect ... about to suffer an
embarrassment of riches.’9 This election result, in its magnitude and unexpectedness,
provide an ideal quasi-exogenous shock to the Conservative’s selection of candidates in
the subsequent elections.
Strong party control over candidate selection
The second advantage of this setting is the relatively fixed supply of candidates from
non-elite backgrounds, with selection controlled by the central party. As a result, one
can focus on the demand-side decisions of the party in response to election results.
Before the Parliament Act of 1911, Members of Parliament (MPs) are not paid and
therefore required to pay their own expenses, as well as a large proportion of their
campaign funding (Blewett, 1972). Even if more candidates from non-elite backgrounds
wanted to run for office in light of the 1906 election, they would not be able to do so
unilaterally: the supply of candidates from non-elite backgrounds is relatively fixed.
The average candidate in a contested seat spent £1,100 in campaign financing (Blewett,
1972), while the average annual income in the United Kingdom in 1900 was £46.64
(Allen, 1994). Candidates from non-elite backgrounds therefore rely on central party
funding decisions, such as the £13,940 spent by the Conservative Party on working-class
candidates in the 1910 elections.
9The Times Newspaper, 16th January 1906.
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If the result of the 1906 election prompted the selection of candidates from a wider
range of backgrounds, it is likely the consequence of increased demand for non-elite
candidates from political parties rather than supply through non-elite candidates
bankrolling themselves.
Overall, the 1906 election provides an opportunity to interpret a change in candidate
selection as a result of the Conservatives learning from losing the 1906 election. This
setting provides a unique opportunity to identify political party’s decisions in selecting
candidates to try and win elections.
1.4 Descriptive Summary of Electoral and Biograph-
ical Data
1.4.1 Electoral and Constituency Data
The unit of observation is a party-constituency-election (for example, the Conservative
Party candidate for the City of London constituency in the 1906 General Election).
The 3,938 party-constituency-election combinations cover four UK general elections
(1900, 1906, January 1910, and December 1910) in constituencies in England, Scotland,
and Wales.
The electoral data is extracted from Craig (1974) British Parliamentary Election
Results: 1885-1918. This provides the names of candidates (in some cases their title),
their party, the number of votes for each candidate, and the rate of turnout. Summary
statistics about the elections can be found in the Appendix A.1, but the most important
aspect of the electoral data is documenting the extent of the Conservative loses in
1906 (compared to 1900). In addition, information about constituency characteristics
is taken from Blewett (1972), which is presented in Table 1.1.
1.4.2 Biographical Data
I hand-collect biographical information concerning not only concerning those who won
election to the House of Commons between 1900 and 1910, but also the vast majority
of unsuccessful candidates. This provides a wider insight into whether the Conservative
party opened its doors to those outside of the establishment than only focusing on
those who were elected.
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Table 1.1 Constituency Characteristics
Population 68,377
Number of Houses 13,047
Urban 48.8%
Predominantly Upper/Middle Class 13.3%
Mixed Classes 24.6%
Predominantly Working Class 22.6%
Mixed Urban/Rural 12.0%
Mining Community 2.3%
Notes: This table reports summary statistics concerning constituency characteristics, either as the mean
value across constituencies (population and number of houses) or as a percentage of constituencies
that match the description according to Blewett (1972).
This data is compiled primarily from two biographical dictionaries. The first is Who’s
Who of British Members of Parliament (Stenton and Lees, 1979), which provides
summarising biographies of Members of Parliament from 1832 to 1945. This provides
information not only about those who sat in Parliament between 1900 and 1910 (which
is the period of interest in this chapter), but also those who ran unsuccessfully in that
period and succeeded before 1900 or after 1910. The second is the Oxford Dictionary of
National Biography, which covers many unsuccessful candidates who played a significant
role in society in other ways. Combined, these sources contribute information on 2,245
candidates across the four elections between 1900 and 1910.
The full extent of the biographical data can be explored in the Appendix A.1.1, but the
main characteristics of each candidate are their titles (honorary, military, hereditary);
their education (school and university); their previous occupations before running
for office; the occupations of their family members (often their father and father-in-
law’s). In addition, there is data on their social connections, which illustrates to what
extent the candidate was well connected to the political or social establishment. This
information includes all of the social clubs they were members of; what law houses
they practised at; the number of connections with other candidates in the sample
they had by virtue of their school, university, law houses, and social clubs; whether
they were appointed Justice of the Peace10. Using this wealth of information I am
able to assess whether the Conservative party selected candidates in 1910 who were
very different from those in 1906, as well as identify those who are from the political
elite/establishment.
10This title implied they had many connections in the local area they were appointed a JP for.
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There are inevitably some limitations associated with the data. The most important
is the lack of data for 10.7 and 11.5 percent of all and Conservative candidates,
respectively11. I discuss the potential impact of missing biographical data in Appendix
A.6.4. I report results for a wide range of assumptions about those with missing
biographical data, and still find similar results. Another issue is the incidence of two-
member constituencies, such as Plymouth and Cambridge University, as it is unclear
what the margin of loss is for a candidate or party, but this is only the case for 23
constituencies. Furthermore, biographical data is scarce for the Irish MPs (and more
so for candidates in general), so their 103 constituencies are removed.
1.5 Machine-Learning Classification of Candidates
In this section I provide motivation for the novel use of machine-learning to classify
candidates. I outline the procedures of two methods the Support Vector Machine (SVM)
and the Latent Dirchlet Allocation (LDA). These provide estimated probabilities that
a candidate is a member of a particular socioeconomic group (for example the political
elite), fully exploiting the wealth of hand-collected biographical data.
1.5.1 Machine-learning and candidate classification
While there is a wide range of biographical data available for each of the candidates, I
aggregate this information using two different machine learning methods: a Support
Vector Machine (SVM) and Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA).
Support Vector Machine (SVM)
The first method I use is the Support Vector Machine, which has been used in various
scientific fields, such as bioinformatics (Manavalan and Lee, 2017) and brain image
classification (Zhang et al., 2015). In economics, Gründler and Krieger (2016) use
a support vector machine to compile a democracy index using a range of variables,
while Ghoddusi et al. (2019) discusses its popularity in predicting energy prices and
consumption.
1110.7 percent of all party-constituency-election trios and 11.5 percent of Conservative constituency-
election pairs.
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An intuitive explanation (a technical discussion can be found in Cortes and Vapnik
(1995) and Gründler and Krieger (2016)) of the support vector machine process is as
follows:
1. Label candidates who are unambiguously part of the political ‘elite’ or unam-
biguously ‘outsiders’.
2. Assign Elite (SVM)=100 to those labelled as ‘elite’ and Elite (SVM)=0 to those
labelled as ‘outsiders’.
3. Use a support vector machine to find an optimal hyperplane that maximises the
distance (within the space of all characteristics besides those used to label the
unambiguous cases) between itself, the ‘elite’, and the ‘outsiders’.
4. Use this hyperplane to categorise unlabelled candidates (continuously from 0 to
100).
For the initial labelling, I define those who are unambiguously ‘elite’ as candidate
who have both a hereditary title in their family and a member of their family who
is involved in politics, which labels 6.7 percent of the observations. This is likely to
well identify the pinnacle of the political elite, as these candidates are likely to have
connections to both the House of Commons and the House of Lords. I define those
who are unambiguously ‘outsiders’ as those whose families were traditionally manual
workers/labourers, which labels 9.0 percent of the observations. These families are
highly unlikely to have a previous connection with Westminster politics - especially as
the trade union movement had only just begun to involve themselves in Westminster
politics at the turn of the century. While initial labelling is inherently somewhat
arbitrary, I believe this labelling is justified by the historical context. Furthermore, in
Appendix A.6.1 I alter the labelling assumptions about the unambiguously elite and
outsiders which show the robustness of the following results. The following results use
the continuous form of the estimated Elite (SVM) variable.
Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA)
To support this analysis, I also use Latent Dirichlet Allocation. This unsupervised
machine learning topic model clusters text into a number of topics, which has been
used to analyse text in a variety of scientific settings, such as grouping medical
studies (Wu et al., 2012). Latent Dirichlet Allocation has also been recently used in
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economics to analyse the transcripts of the Federal Reserve’s Open Market Committee to
analyse transparency in policy-making decisions (Hansen et al., 2018), CEO behaviour
(Bandiera et al., 2020), and political ideologies among voters Draca and Schwarz (2019).
While a thorough explanation of the method can be found in Blei et al. (2003) (and its
implementation by Bandiera et al. (2020) who explain its advantages over other methods
such as k-means clustering12), the following is a more intuitive explanation.
The LDA finds clusters of candidates across the space of characteristics, where the
number of clusters is specified. The LDA then estimates the probability that a candidate
is a member of one of the groups represented by the clusters. For example, one cluster
might be one where those whose families have hereditary titles may also be more likely
to go to Eton and then Oxford or Cambridge. Although the number of clusters are
specified, the groups returned and their characteristics are not. I assume three groups13,
but in the Appendix A.6.3 I allow for different number of groups and find similar
results14.
The LDA is agnostic about the nature of the groups it presents, so I present three
word clouds that provide some intuition. Figure 1.2 presents word clouds from each of
the three groups where the size of the word is weighted according to the number of
members15 who have that characteristic. Candidates who are likely to be members of
Group 1 have families with hereditary titles, went to fee-paying schools and went to
Oxford or Cambridge for university - potentially the political elite. Likely members of
Group 2 also are likely to go to Oxford and Cambridge, but have occupations more
focused on the professions, such as law, the civil service, and academia - potentially
the middle class. Finally, the likely members of Group 3 are overwhelmingly those who
were, as well as their family, skilled labourers - likely the working class.
As a result, I interpret the probability of a candidate being a member of group 1 as
being the probability that they are a member of the political elite, and likewise for
group 2 (middle class) and group 3 (working class).
12In Appendix A.6.2 I use k-means clustering and find similar results
13The social class hierarchy of Britain in the early twentieth century also provides motivation for
initially choosing three groups with the notion of an upper class, middle class, and working class
(Blewett, 1972).
14The driving force behind this robustness is the distinctive clustering of those who have hereditary
titles into one group and those whose families are labourers into another, even for larger group sizes.
15Members being defined as candidates whose probability of being in that particular group is greater
than any of the other probabilities of being in one of the other groups.
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Fig. 1.2 Word Cloud of Common Characteristics
This figure presents a word cloud of common characteristics within the three groups
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1.5 Machine-Learning Classification of Candidates
Elite Index Variables
The two algorithms estimate probabilities between 0 and 100 of a candidate being a
member of a group:
1. Elite (SVM): Probability that the candidate is in the political elite, according
to the SVM.
2. Elite (LDA): Probability that the candidate is in the political elite, according
to the LDA.
3. Middle (LDA): Probability that the candidate is in the middle class, according
to the LDA.
4. Working (LDA): Probability that the candidate is in the working class, accord-
ing to the LDA.
Elite (SVM) provides an indication of switching between candidates from the political
elite to those further away from the political elite, whether it be the middle class or
the working class. The variables estimated by the LDA may illustrate more nuanced
patterns of switching between the political elite to the middle class, the middle class to
the working class, and so on. I use all four of the estimated probabilities as dependent
variables in the main analysis.
1.5.2 Advantages of the LDA/SVM over other classification
methods
The main advantage of using these machine learning algorithms is that it reduces
prior judgement required in the classification of candidates. Manual classification of
candidates would either be somewhat arbitrary or make assumptions about whether
a certain characteristic belongs to one group or another. While some candidates are
fairly obviously part of the political elite or the working class, there may be many cases
where it is less obvious.
Further, the extent to which a certain characteristic makes a candidate more or less
likely to be part of a group may not be obvious. Whereas having family who were
involved in politics and have hereditary title may be an obvious characteristic of
those in the political elite, whether a candidate was involved in local politics may
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not be as obvious an indicator16. As argued by Gründler and Krieger (2016), these
machine-learning methods with endogenous weighting on different characteristics avoid
the problem of arbitrary weighting that other aggregation methods may suffer from,
while still making use of the full extent of the biographical data.
The SVM mostly only relies on fairly intuitive labelling of some observations. Further,
the LDA only requires the specification of the number of groups, which I vary in the
Appendix, especially as I include all characteristics. Draca and Schwarz (2019) outline
some advantages of using the LDA compared to other classification methods: firstly
that it allows for non-linear relationships between characteristics compared to Principal
Component Analysis (PCA) and Factor Analysis (FA) which do not. For example,
the LDA would allow for the fact that, given other characteristics, being involved in
local politics may be an indicator of being part of the political elite (because they
were influential in their local area already) or the working class (because for them it
was their primary avenue into politics). Further, compared to k-means clustering and
Latent Class Analysis, Draca and Schwarz (2019) argue that the LDA allows for mixed
membership - for example 10 percent political elite, 40 percent middle class, 50 percent
working class - rather than just a single probability that a candidate was a member of
one group.
1.6 Empirical Strategy
I use the following baseline empirical strategy to find whether the Conservatives
responded to the electoral shock of 1906 by changing the identity of the candidate for
the 1910 elections:
yi,1910 = α + β1LossMargini,1906 + β2yi,1906 + β3LossMargini,1900 + ϵi,1910, (1.1)
where yi,1906 and yi,1910 are values of the outcome variable, which is the probability
that the Conservative candidate in constituency i is a member of a certain group
which is a certain characteristic, in the 1906 and the 1910 elections, respectively;
LossMargini,1906 and LossMargini,1900 are the margins by which the Conservative
party lost the election in constituency i in the 1906 and the 1900 elections, respectively.
16For example, the political elite may be involved in local politics because they are influential in
their local area, whereas local politics may also include those from working-class backgrounds who
were elected to local councils.
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I define the variable by the loss margin so that the explanations of the results are more
intuitive: for avoidance of doubt I also include observations with negative values of
LossMargin (where the Conservative won).
I include yi,1906 so that β1 can be interpreted as the effect of the 1906 election on
candidate characteristics in 1910 relative to the candidate in 1906. The coefficient of
interest is β1 - this estimates how much the Conservative party candidate changed for the
1910 elections in response to electoral failures in 1906. I also include LossMargini,1900,
so that the variation across constituencies is how poorly the Conservatives did relative
to their past performance in 1900. One would expect that, if the Conservatives lost by
the same margin in two constituencies, the shock would be greater in the constituency
where historically they had performed well. This is robust to other controls for previous
Conservative performance, such as how many elections the Conservatives won in the
constituency between 1885 and 1900. The treatment group is effectively constituencies
where the Conservative lost by a large margin in 1906 relative to their previous
performance in 1900, the control is a loss margin in 1906 that is not as large relative
to 1900, compared to other constituencies.
Another reason for including yi,1906 and LossMargini,1900 is to control for unobserved
constituency heterogeneity. While the 1906 election was a shock to the political elite,
the geographical variation in this electoral shock, the variation in the Conservative
loss margin, may not be exogenous (although Figure 1.1 suggests that heavy losses
were experienced across seats with a wide range of 1900 performances). For example,
the LossMargini,1906 may be low in constituencies where the Conservatives have
previously performed well, which may be associated with long-incumbent Conservative
MPs who are more likely to be part of the political elite. I include these controls in
the remainder of the chapter (estimating standard errors clustered at the constituency
level), and Appendix A.5 reproduces these results without controls which lead to similar
conclusions.
1.7 Results
In this section I report the baseline results, which provides evidence of the Conservatives
responding to the 1906 election by switching representation among their candidates from
those in the political elite to those from the working class. I undertake a falsification
test which shows that the effect is unique to the Conservatives.
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1.7.1 Baseline Results
Table 1.2 reports the baseline results, and illustrates the significant effect of the
1906 defeat on the type of candidates the Conservatives fielded in 1910. Columns
1 and 2 report the effect of the 1906 loss margin on the probability of whether the
Conservative candidate in 1910 is from the political elite, as estimated by the SVM
and LDA, respectively. Columns 3 and 4 report the same effect on the probability of
the candidate being from the middle class and the working class groups as estimated
by the LDA.
Table 1.2 Baseline Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Elite (SVM) Elite (LDA) Middle (LDA) Working (LDA)
1906 Loss Margin -0.289∗∗∗ -0.255∗∗∗ 0.068 0.193∗∗∗
(0.098) (0.088) (0.081) (0.064)
1900 Loss Margin 0.046 0.009 0.069 -0.070
(0.096) (0.086) (0.078) (0.062)
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.270∗∗∗ 0.430∗∗∗ 0.351∗∗∗ 0.378∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.041) (0.047) (0.041)
Adjusted R2 0.089 0.205 0.108 0.162
N 468 468 468 468
This table reports the estimates of the effects of the 1906 loss margin in a constituency on the
type of candidate the Conservatives select in 1910. The dependent variable in Column 1 is the
probability that the candidate is a member of the political elite as defined by the Support Vector
Machine. In Columns 2, 3, and 4, the dependent variable is the probability that the candidate
is a member of the political elite, middle class, and working class, respectively, as defined by
the Latent Dirichlet Allocation. The 1900 and 1906 loss margins are the Conservative losses
to the winning party, as a percentage of total votes cast in the constituency (negative if the
Conservatives won). The lagged dependent variables are the values of the dependent variables
in 1906. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the constituency
level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
Columns 1 and 2 clearly show a significant switching away from political elite. For
every percentage point increase in the defeat that the Conservatives faced, there is
around a 0.25 to 0.3 percentage point decrease in the probability that the candidate in
the 1910 elections was from the political elite. While there is little evidence of switching
to middle-class candidates in Column 3, there is significant evidence of switching to
working-class candidates in Column 4. These results are also illustrated in Figure 1.3,
which illustrate the percentage point change in the probability of the 1910 candidate
being a member of a certain group, in response to a one standard deviation (17.3
percentage point) increase in the 1906 defeat.
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Fig. 1.3 Baseline Results
This figure illustrates the main results from Table 1.2: the effect of a one standard deviation increase
in the 1906 loss margin on the percentage probability that the candidate is from a certain group. Both
90 and 95 percent confidence intervals are illustrated.
Figure 1.3 shows that the one standard deviation increase in the 1906 defeat leads
to a 5.9 and 5.1 percentage point decrease in the probability that the candidate is
from the political elite, according to the SVM and LDA, respectively. In the average
constituency, this is a decrease of 10.0 and 7.9 percent. The same increase in the
defeat in a constituency is also associated with a 3.9 percentage point increase in the
chances of the 1910 candidate being from the working class, which is an increase of 19.3
percent in the average constituency. The baseline results provide evidence of significant
switching of candidates in response to a greater loss in the 1906 election.
I also investigate the effect of the 1906 defeat on the type of candidates the Conservatives
fielded in 1910 by focusing on individual characteristics. The results of these are
produced in the Appendix, illustrated in Figure A.4. These suggest the same conclusion:
an increase in defeat in 1906 is associated with the candidate in 1910 less likely to
have characteristics that are intuitively associated with the political elite (such as
an Oxbridge education), and more likely to have characteristics associated with the
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working class (such as having a father who was a manual labourer). The following results
in the remainder of the chapter, which use the estimated SVM/LDA probabilities as
the dependent variable, are also robust across individual characteristics, as reported in
Appendix A.4.
1.7.2 Falsification Test - Effect Unique for Conservatives?
There is historical evidence suggesting that the other significant political party, the
Liberals, had more information about voter preferences going into the 1906 election,
for example the increased appetite for more redistributive policies (Blewett, 1972). The
Liberals had made an election pact with the Labour movement in 1903. After winning
the 1906 election they proceeded to enact the introduction of the first ever statewide
pensions, unemployment benefits, free school meals, trade union protection, and so
on.
Therefore one would expect the ‘learning-by-losing’ process in 1906 and beyond to have
been unique to the Conservatives: the historical evidence suggests that an outreach to
more working-class voters was a lesson that had been learned already by the Liberals
before 1906. As a result, the Liberals provide a falsification test for the Conservative
learning-by-losing process. To undertake this falsification test, I include all candidates
from all parties (which also includes some Labour candidates among other smaller
parties), and define the loss margin as the loss margin for the party that selected the
candidate. In addition, I include an interaction between the 1906 loss margin and a
dummy variable indicating whether the candidate is from the Conservative Party or
not.
The results are shown in Figure 1.4. The right-hand side illustrates the Conservative
switching of candidates from the political elite to the working class in response to
a greater loss, as in Figure 1.3. The left-hand side of Figure 1.4 confirms that this
response to a greater loss margin is unique to the Conservatives. An increase in the
1906 loss margin for the Liberals (and other parties) does not appear to change the
type of candidates that they select for the 1910 election. This is consistent with the
learning process described above: one where the Conservatives were slower to learn
about voter preferences than other parties.
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Fig. 1.4 Including All Parties - Unique Effect for the Conservatives
This figure illustrates the main results from Table A.8: the effect of a one standard deviation increase
in the 1906 loss margin on the percentage probability that the candidate is from a certain group. Both
90 and 95 percent confidence intervals are illustrated.
1.8 Further Evidence of a ‘Learning-By-Losing’ Pro-
cess
This section provides further evidence of a learning process that the Conservatives
underwent. I exploit constituency heterogeneity: firstly by the discrete variation in
whether the Conservative candidate in 1906 won or not. Secondly, I explore variation
in the perception of the defeat. I argue that a large loss in a constituency where the
Conservatives had traditionally performed well would have been a greater signal to
change strategy. Thirdly, I explore socioeconomic variation across constituencies to
investigate whether the Conservatives used candidates as a targeted instrument, as
argued in Section 1.2.
1.8.1 Don’t Lose, Don’t Learn?
I further analyse the learning-by-losing process by investigating switching of candidates
in constituencies where the Conservatives were defeated in 1906 and those where
the Conservatives won in 1906. I argue that, in a given constituency, the signal for
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the Conservatives to change their candidate may be the margin of defeat in 1906,
controlling for previous performance.
However, one may expect a difference in the learning-by-losing process between con-
stituencies where the Conservatives won and lost in 1906. For example, a given change
in the margin may not be perceived as the same strength of signal, depending on
whether the Conservatives won or lost the election in 1906. The increase in the loss
margin from 10 to 20 may be perceived as a greater signal than the same increase
in the loss margin from -20 (where the candidate had previously won by 20 percent)
to -10. This may be because the signal may not be perfectly continuous across the
loss margin: it is easier for the Conservatives to ignore a decrease in win margin if the
candidate remains in the House of Commons, and less easy for the Conservatives to
ignore an increase in the loss margin if that seat is occupied by the Liberals.
Further, this discontinuity in response may be driven by risk aversion, and this may
influence how they change their strategy in response to a signal. Even though a
candidate has won by a smaller margin in 1906 compared to 1900, the party may be
reluctant to uproot the incumbent as the quality and popularity of the alternative
candidate is not perfectly known. Even if the signal is just as strong in constituencies
where the Conservatives won, they may be reluctant to change strategy when at the
very least the current candidate was elected into the House of Commons. To test this,
I include an interaction between the 1906 loss margin and a dummy variable indicating
whether the Conservatives lost the election in the constituency in 1906 (as well as the
dummy variable alone) to the baseline specification.
Figure 1.5 illustrates the results, which show that the switching of candidates from
the political elite to the working class (and to extent the middle class) is driven
entirely by constituencies where the Conservatives lost in 1906, depicted on the right-
hand side. While a smaller victory than before does not result in the switching of
candidates, a greater defeat results in widening representation. In constituencies where
the Conservatives lost in 1906, a one standard deviation increase in the defeat is
associated with a 11.2 or 10.0 percentage point decrease in the probability that the
candidate is from the political elite (19.0 and 15.5 percent decrease for the average
constituency) as defined by the SVM and LDA, respectively. This also increases the
probability that the candidate is from the working class by 6.9 percentage points (34
percent for the average constituency). These are significantly larger than the average
effect across all constituencies presented in the baseline results. The discontinuity of
26
1.8 Further Evidence of a ‘Learning-By-Losing’ Process
Fig. 1.5 Don’t Learn Unless They Lose - 1906 Constituency Victory or Loss
This figure illustrates the main results from Table A.9: the effect of a one standard deviation increase
in the 1906 loss margin on the percentage probability that the candidate is from a certain group. Both
90 and 95 percent confidence intervals are illustrated.
the effect reduces concerns about the baseline result being driven by long-term changes
in preferences across the country.
There may be other practical reasons for this discontinuity, such as the party’s wish
to hold onto an incumbency advantage (Hainmueller et al., 2015; Lee, 2008) or to
maintain party unity which may be disrupted by replacing an incumbent politician.
However, these results provide evidence consistent with a learning process where the
Conservatives do not learn unless they lose.
1.8.2 Conservative Strongholds: A Greater Shock?
I next investigate whether the same defeat (relative to the 1900 result) is perceived
as a stronger signal if the Conservatives were historically strong in the constituency.
For example, a given defeat may be seen as more concerning if the Conservatives had
traditionally performed well in the constituency, as it may have been a long time since
the central party had to consider a new candidate for the seat. This stronger signal may
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be more likely to result in a change in candidate, as a product of the learning-by-losing
process.
Fig. 1.6 Conservative Strongholds and the 1906 Loss Margin
This figure illustrates the main results from Table A.10: the effect of a one standard deviation increase
in the 1906 loss margin on the percentage probability that the candidate is from a certain group. Both
90 and 95 percent confidence intervals are illustrated.
I interact the 1906 loss margin with a binary variable indicating whether the Conser-
vatives had won in the constituency four or more times in the five elections before
190617 (defined as a Conservative stronghold) or not. This is a good measure of how
comfortable the Conservatives were in that seat, and therefore how much of a shock a
given 1906 result was perceived.
The results presented in Figure 1.6 suggests that there was more aggressive switching of
candidates in Conservative strongholds than in others. The left-hand side of Figure 1.6
shows the effect of the 1906 loss margin on other constituencies, and suggests switching
from the political elite to the middle/working class. However, the right-hand side shows
more aggressive switching: not only some evidence of switching from the political elite
to working-class candidates, but also switching away from middle-class candidates.
17Elections before 1885 were contested on different constituency boundaries.
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These results are consistent with a learning process where the Conservatives observe
the same defeat in 1906 as a greater signal to change their candidate if they have
traditionally performed well in the constituency.
In other words, the same defeat is perceived as a harsher lesson when the party felt
more complacent beforehand, and as a result, the response is more radical. This result
also reduces concerns about the baseline results being driven by long-term changes in
voter preferences towards working-class interests - if this were the case one would not
expect more aggressive switching of candidates in Conservative strongholds.
1.8.3 Targeting Working-Class Constituencies
Fig. 1.7 Working-Class Constituencies and Candidate Switching
This figure illustrates the main results from Table A.11: the effect of a one standard deviation increase
in the 1906 loss margin on the percentage probability that the candidate is from a certain group. Both
90 and 95 percent confidence intervals are illustrated.
In the conceptual framework in Section 1.2, I argue that parties tailor the portfolio
of candidates as targeted instruments to win votes. If such targeting occurs, one
would expect the shock of the 1906 election to have different effects on candidate
choices in 1910 depending on the type of constituency they were running in. For
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example, if working-class constituencies have a preference for working-class candidates
(whether as a commitment to a working-class platform in the future or because of some
other personal affinity as explained by social identity theory), one would expect more
aggressive switching to working-class candidates through a learning process.
I include an interaction between the Conservative’s 1906 loss margin and a dummy vari-
able indicating whether the constituency is described as a predominantly working-class
constituency by Blewett (1972). The results are illustrated in Figure 1.7. While there
is some evidence of switching away from political elite candidates to middle/working-
class candidates in other constituencies, there is far more aggressive and significant
switching in working-class constituencies. The right-hand side of Figure 1.7 illustrates
evidence of switching to solely working-class candidates in response to a greater defeat
in 1906.
1.9 A Winning Strategy? Implications for the 1910
Elections
The discussion of the results provide evidence of the political elite responding to the
1906 election by changing representation within the candidates in the Conservative
party in 1910. One following question may be whether this strategy actually benefited
them, as the previous section suggests the Conservatives may have expected by placing
more working-class candidates in working-class areas. Although I do not claim a strong
causal link in this analysis, the evidence is consistent with the response of targeted
switching of candidates being beneficial.
I investigate whether replacing candidates aided the Conservatives in the 1910 elections.
I implement a different empirical strategy which is outlined below:




+ γ1yi,1906 + γ2WinMargini,1906 + ϵi,1910
WinMargini,1910 is the proportion of the vote that the Conservatives won by in 1910
in constituency i, while yi,t is the characteristic of the Conservative candidate. I
differentiate the effect of changing the candidate by the type of constituency, where the
type of constituency C could be upper, middle, or working class (U, M, W ) as defined
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by Blewett (1972). As discussed in the conceptual framework, different constituencies
may respond differently to different types of candidates, so I include interaction terms
between the candidate characteristic and the type of constituency. I also include controls
of past performance WinMargini,1906 and past candidate characteristics yi,1906.
Fig. 1.8 Selecting Working-Class Candidates and the 1910 Elections
This figure illustrates the estimated impact of a one standard deviation change in the probability that
the candidate is from the political elite (as estimated by the SVM/LDA) on the Conservative win
margin in 1910, differentiating across constituencies.
Figure 1.8 illustrate the results, and the effect of the Conservatives moving from one
candidate to another who is one standard deviation less likely to be a candidate from
the political elite, for different types of constituencies. In upper-class constituencies, this
replacement would cost the Conservatives around 5 percent of the vote. The contrast to
middle-class and working-class constituencies is significant: the Conservatives vote share
increase by around 6 and 7 percentage points by this replacement, respectively.
As suggested in the previous section, the Conservatives appear to learn and understand
this pattern. There are some limitations to this analysis. For example, the Liberal
and Labour election pact of 1903 had somewhat broken by 1910, which because of
the plurality voting system may have aided the Conservative recovery, especially in
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working-class constituencies. However, I argue that this is not a grave concern for
two reasons. Firstly, the above analysis is concerned with vote shares and it seems
unlikely that the Conservatives would have gained votes from Liberal voters switching
to Labour candidates. Secondly, Labour and the Liberals only contested 4.5 percent
of constituencies across the 1910 elections, so is a relatively small problem. A greater
problem is whether an increase in Conservative vote share in 1910 is likely to arise
from factors that also influence the switching of candidates. While the Conservatives
kept their manifesto the same, they may have made other efforts (for example in local
politics) to ingratiate themselves with a broader set of voters. As a result, the coefficient
estimate of the effect of candidates on vote share may overestimate the impact of the
candidates themselves. However, the results reported are consistent with the targeted
switching of candidates being a successful strategy.
1.10 Concluding Remarks
There are many reasons why some groups are particularly under-represented in politics,
and persistently so. I investigate the role of parties in this under-representation, and
find evidence that their electoral considerations impact political representation. I find
that losing an election can teach parties to cast the net wider for candidates in order
to reach a wider range of voters.
These results have implications for the under-representation of other groups in politics,
and in other occupations. While there are still persistent inequalities in political
representation, these results suggests that parties can be motivated to widen political
representation through losing elections. Further work would investigate how persistent
these effects are, and how the increased inclusivity changes policy in the short and long
term. Unfortunately the much-changed political landscape of British politics at the
next election in 1918 make it difficult to make undertake this analysis18. In addition,
further work would investigate under what circumstances do political parties learn to
be more inclusive. Although this chapter provides an example of a party experimenting
with more inclusive representation, it is important to understand under what conditions
will the experiment chosen be more inclusive representation among candidates.
18For example, some women were given the vote in 1918 for the first time as well as all men




These results have wider implications beyond politics. They suggest that organisations
may be inclusive in their membership in response to failure, whether it be in their
hiring or selection of key decision makers. While organisations may be slow to learn,
this chapter provides some evidence that organisations may eventually learn to be




Passing on the Baton: Positive
Spillovers from the Olympics to
Female Representation in US
Politics
Abstract
Female representation in politics may be influenced by positive spillovers from the
success of women in other professions. I exploit the timing of the Summer Olympic
Games to isolate the spillover effect of female Olympic medallists on demand for female
representation in US state elections a few months after the Olympics. I estimate that
the female medals effect is around a 1 percent increase in female candidate vote shares
in the Olympian’s state of birth. This is driven entirely by the 3.8 percent increase for
female Democrat candidates, exacerbating existing polarisation between parties. I do
not find evidence of voters changing their attitudes about women in politics in response
to female Olympic success, but find evidence consistent with female representation
becoming a more important issue for Democrat voters. I estimate a 2.7 percent decrease
in female representation associated with the postponement of the 2020 Olympics.
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2.1 Introduction
The year 2020 marked a hundred years of women voting in presidential elections in
the United States. However, female representation in US politics remains low, even
by international standards. In 2018, only a quarter of elected US state politicians
were women (Center for American Women and Politics, 2018) with around the same
representation in the US Congress. Furthermore, women are under represented in other
professions, such as in business (Matsa and Miller, 2011). One potential factor that
may positively influence female representation in one profession may be spillover effects
from female representation in other professions or areas of public life. However, these
are generally difficult to measure.
For example, an increase in female representation in academia, law or business may
have a positive spillover effect on female representation in politics. Such spillovers may
influence both demand (from voters or parties) and supply (from parties or candidates)
of female representation. This effect may occur through a supply-side channel, for
example through the increased presence of women in professions that legislators often
originate from (such as law). This may also occur through a demand-side channel,
where parties and voters’ perceptions of gender roles may change as a result of observing
women succeeding in other arenas. Identifying these spillover effects from one arena
to another is therefore non-trivial, although fundamentally important: evidence of a
social multiplier effect across professions may have implications for policies encouraging
more female representation. I estimate a demand-side spillover effect by exploiting the
event of US women winning medals at the Summer Olympic Games (henceforth the
Olympics or Olympic Games1).
I estimate the effect of a woman winning an Olympic medal on the vote shares of female
candidates in her home state legislature, and find that the total effect is an increase of
around 1 percent, and 3.8 percent for female Democrat candidates. I exploit several
aspects of this setting. The first is the increase in attention to female athletes and
female participation in sport during the Olympic Games, which is a relative anomaly
within a sports media that is usually dominated by male athletes (Courtney et al.,
2020). The second is the timing of the Summer Olympic Games, which lies between
state primary and state general elections. I can therefore disentangle the decisions of
1I do not include Winter Olympic Games as they are often held during or even before primary
elections, which does not allow for clean identification of effects on voters’ decisions rather than on
both political parties’ and voters’ decisions.
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political parties and the decisions of voters, focusing on how a woman winning an
Olympic medal impacts the voters’ choice at the ballot box. The third is the localised
media attention on a woman winning an Olympic medal in the state of her birth, which
allows me to exploit variation between states in the number of medals won by women
who were born in a given state. The fourth is the non-political nature of the event,
which reduces concerns about potential reverse causality. Controlling for the number
of women competing at the Olympic from each state (as well as district and year fixed
effects), I argue that the conditional independence assumption is plausible in identifying
the female medals effect. I use state electoral and Olympic data concerning over 261,842
candidate-election pairs spanning almost fifty years between 1968 and 2016, as well as
6,187 athlete-Olympic pairs which includes 1,314 medals won by women.
I also find that this positive female medals effect increases polarisation in female
representation between political parties. The effect is an increase of around 3.8 percent
for female Democrat candidates, yet is not significantly different to zero for their
Republican counterparts in the same state. This widens the gulf in female representation
between the two parties, where the proportion of state Democrat politicians who are
women is almost double that of state Republicans. This has implications for other
positive shocks to female representation (and to other political movements) - the same
shock may be observed, yet may have heterogeneous effects on different groups.
I explore the potential causal mechanisms. I use text data from over 1,600 different
newspapers and find that an increase in the number of articles mentioning female
athletes in a state’s newspapers is associated with an increase in the number of articles
discussing female representation, or lack of, in politics. This provides evidence of a
spillover from sports to politics. However, using American National Election Study
data, I find no evidence of voters changing their gender role attitudes. This suggests
that the increase in female candidate vote shares is not driven by voters updating their
beliefs about female candidates and women in politics in response to female success in
sport.
Instead, I find evidence consistent with an asymmetric issue salience mechanism: I find
that more inclusive representation becomes a higher priority for Democrat voters. More
medals won by women, and more articles written about their successes, is associated
with an increase in the proportion of Democrat voters who believe that having greater
inclusion in political decisions is a priority over other goals. This may explain some
of the divergence between parties in female representation among their candidates.
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The same positive shock may be observed by different groups of voters, but only
respondents who are Democrat voters make more equal representation a higher priority,
exacerbating the existing gap in female representation in the two main political parties.
This evidence highlights a plausible mechanism, although it is not definitive.
Finally, I undertake a back-of-the-envelope estimation of the effect of postponing the
Olympic Games to 2021 on the elections in 2020, using Olympic Games from 1968
to 2016. I estimate that between 1 and 4 percent (average of 2.7 percent) of female
representation is associated with the female medals effect. Although this is relatively
small compared to quota interventions (Besley et al., 2017; Chattopadhyay and Duflo,
2004), the impact (and therefore postponement) of the Olympic Games on female
political representation is still substantial.
Contributions to the Literature: The literature that I primarily contribute to is
that of female representation in politics. I contribute to the literature that explore
the factors determining female representation, or lack of, in politics: why is female
representation so low? Citizen-candidate models, such as those of Osborne and Slivinski
(1996) and Besley and Coate (1997), suggest that if the political status quo produces a
policy outcome that women broadly disagreed with, they could enter politics and gain
sufficient support to contend the status quo. However, the political economy literature
suggests several barriers to entry into politics for women.
One potential reason for the under-representation of women in politics may be gender
bias, whether among voters or within political parties. The assessment of gender bias in
the empirical literature has led to mixed conclusions. For example, the fact that female
representation among candidates and female representation among elected officials
are similar does not rule out gender bias - it may be that both parties and voters
have similar biases against female candidates. Bhalotra et al. (2018) find evidence of
gender bias influencing both the number of female legislators and candidates among
socially conservative voters in India. Fulton (2012) finds that women tend to be
more qualified than men before running for office. Furthermore, Kahn (1996) and
Sanbonmatsu and Dolan (2009) find evidence of gender stereotyping in political
campaigning and party selection of candidates, mirrored by their lack of promotion
within parties (Folke and Rickne, 2016), even accounting for characteristics such as
experience. However, Anastasopoulos (2016) uses close primary elections of women
in US House of Representative elections and concludes that women do not receive
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significantly less of the vote at the general election or less financing through campaign
contributions.
This chapter adds to this literature with two main contributions. The first is exploiting
the timing of US elections and a novel non-political event of the Summer Olympic
Games to disentangle the effect on female representation of decisions made by voters
and decisions made by political parties (focusing on the former). I therefore do not
need to rely on close primary elections, as Anastasopoulos (2016) does. The second
contribution is that I find evidence of polarisation in female representation, even in
light of the same shock, rather than a homogeneous change across all voters and
candidates.
There is also a considerable literature highlighting the impact of female political
representation on policy, which motivates the further investigation of the factors that
cause the under-representation of women in politics. There is solid empirical evidence
that the inclusion of women in politics has a significant impact on policy. For example,
evidence from India suggests that the increased inclusion of women in politics, whether
through quotas (Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004) or through close elections (Clots-
Figueras, 2011) leads to more emphasis on policy outcomes concerning early education
or increased health spending. There is also evidence to support gender divides on
policy preferences, such as increased social spending (Aidt and Dallal, 2008; Bertocchi,
2011) or environmental spending (Funk and Gathmann, 2015). This difference in policy
preferences appears to have significant effects on outcomes, whether on child mortality in
response to female suffrage (Miller, 2008) or female representation in politics (Bhalotra
and Clots-Figueras, 2014), or on primary education completion (Clots-Figueras, 2012),
as well as less corruption (Brollo and Troiano, 2016). Furthermore, the inclusion of
more women in politics appears to have spillover effects to their male colleagues: Besley
et al. (2017) find gender quotas increase the quality of male politicians while parties
place more emphasis on gender equality issues (Catalano Weeks, 2019). It is clear that
female representation has a significant impact on politics, so therefore it is important
to understand the factors that explain why there is consistent under-representation of
women in politics.
There is relatively little work, in both strands of the political science and economics
literature, that investigates the effect of sporting events on political outcomes, and in
particular on female representation in politics. Recent work by Depetris-Chauvin et al.
(2020) suggests that sport can galvanise social ties across a nation that overcome other
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differences, while Baade and Matheson (2016) discusses the costs and benefits of a
country hosting the Olympic Games. Both suggest some sense of national or civic pride,
but do not explore its impact on female representation. The political science literature
provides support for focusing on the Olympic Games’ impact on female electoral
outcomes. For example, Capranica et al. (2005) and Delorme (2014) find that the
Olympic Games is a rare example of female athletes enjoying as much media attention
as their male counterparts. However, even cases of women garnering increased media
attention may not have a significant impact on female representation or voter attitudes
towards gender roles. Lake (2020) uses text data from newspapers and finds that
Virginia Wade’s victory at Wimbledon was portrayed as predominantly a nationalistic
success rather than that for female athletes. However, to the best of my knowledge,
there is no direct investigation of the effect of sporting events on female representation
in politics. In particular, I contribute to the literature by using information about
the electoral outcomes of 45,427 female candidate-election pairs over the course of
almost 50 years and 12 Summer Olympic Games. I investigate not only how sporting
events may or may not alter voter gender role attitudes or attitudes towards female
representation, but I estimate the direct impact of female success in sport on female
success in politics.
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows: Section 2.2 explains the potential
spillover effect from one arena to another, Section 2.3 provides context to female
representation in US politics as well as in the Summer Olympic Games, Section 2.4
presents the data, and Section 2.5 outlines the empirical identification strategy. Section
2.6 reports the baseline results, as well as heterogeneous effects between Democrat and
Republican candidates, and Section 2.8 explores the potential causal mechanism for a
positive female medals effect. Section 2.9 estimates a back-of-the-envelope counterfactual
scenario to measure the potential effect of the 2020 Olympic Games’ postponement to
2021. Section 2.10 concludes.
2.2 Spillover Effects into Female Representation
There are many ways that female representation or success in one arena may trigger
success in another arena, the latter being politics in the context of this paper. I describe
two potential causal mechanisms that have been discussed in the political science
literature that explain a spillover effect from the success of women in one domain
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to another. In the literature these domains include different sectors of work (such as
academia, politics or sport) or different levels of hierarchy, within firms or sectors
(such as among CEOs or lower-level managers), but not between sectors. There is some
empirical evidence of positive spillovers within firms, whether from the hiring of female
board members increasing the number of female lower-level managers (Matsa and
Miller, 2011), or other top to bottom spillovers (Kunze and Miller, 2017). In this paper,
I estimate the spillover effect of women succeeding in sport (by winning medals at the
Olympics) on women running for office in US state legislatures, and then investigate
potential causal mechanisms.
There may be supply-side effects: increased female representation among professions
such as law, academia, or business, may contribute to a greater supply of potential
female candidates. Furthermore, women may observe the success of women in other
sectors and update their beliefs about the likelihood of female success in their own
sector. These may contribute to an increase in female representation in politics. Given
the identification strategy, which focuses on the spillover effect’s impact on voter
decisions, I discuss two potential causal mechanisms that impact the demand for female
representation among voters.
One potential reason for this positive spillover is that increased female representation
in one area diminishes gender stereotypes, which increases female representation in
another area. In their model of social identity, Akerlof and Kranton (2000) suggest
associating men in leadership roles is an example of group stereotyping which has
implications for female representation across all professions. In the empirical literature,
Beaman et al. (2009) find that exposure to female leaders reduces gender stereotyping
in Indian village councils and increases the perceived ability of women in leadership
roles. In addition, men who are on boards with women reduces ‘role congruity-based
gender bias’ (Boutchkova et al., 2021), so those who do not conform to stereotypes
are not treated unfavourably. The empirical literature primarily focuses on spillovers
within sectors, but do not explore the spillover of female success in other areas on
female political success through the erosion of gender stereotypes. As Kahn (1996) and
Sanbonmatsu and Dolan (2009) suggest, these attitudes are often longstanding.
Another potential mechanism is one of issue salience: female representation in one
area may highlight the lack of women represented in another area. This theoretical
mechanism has been well-defined in the political psychology literature, which suggests
that the influence of a policy on their voting decisions depends on how much they
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are either affected by the policy personally or how much emphasis they place on
the policy relative to others (Brent and Granberg, 1982; Krosnick, 1988; Sherif and
Cantril, 1947). In the political economy literature, there has been more recent empirical
evidence to support this. Ansolabehere and Socorro Puy (2018) model issue salience as
the weighting voters place on different issues, and estimate that voters in the Basque
Country place as much as half as much importance on nationalism as they do traditional
left-right wing policy preferences. Other examples of theoretical and empirical work on
issue salience show that voters often need reminding about policy issues for them to
become salient, whether over taxation (Chetty et al., 2009) or spending (Huet-Vaughn,
2019).
The theoretical and empirical literature largely focuses on spillover effects within sectors.
I contribute to this literature by investigating spillover effects between sectors: in the
case of this chapter the positive spillover between high profile female success in sport
and the success of women in politics. I also find evidence suggesting that this spillover
effect is unlikely to be caused by a change in voters’ attitudes towards women running
for office. Instead, I find some evidence consistent with issue salience: voters are newly
convinced that the under-representation of women (among other groups) is a more
important issue than they previously believed.
2.3 Female Representation at the Olympics and
US Politics
The Nineteenth Amendment adopted in 1920 allowed women to vote for the first
time in a US presidential election, with 15 states having already granted equal voting
rights to women (Cascio and Shenhav, 2020). In addition, Women had been elected in
state legislatures since 1894 with the election of Clara Cressingham, Carrie Holly, and
Frances Klock in the Colorado House of Representatives (Center for American Women
and Politics, 2018). However, female representation in US politics, both at a federal
and state level, grew slowly in the first half of the twentieth century. For example,
in the US Congress, only a handful of women were elected even forty years after the
Nineteenth Amendment. As Figure 2.1 illustrates, the proportion of elected officials at
state level who are women increases from 5.5 percent in 1968 to 22.5 percent in 1992.
However, this increase slows into the twenty-first century, with just over a quarter
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(26.3 percent) in 2016, and remains some distance away from equality of representation
across gender in US politics.
Fig. 2.1 Representation of Women in US State Politics and Olympic Teams
Notes: This figure shows the percentage of candidates who are elected into state legislatures who are
women (solid line), as well as the percentage of US Olympians (dashed) and medallists (dotted) who
are women. The figure reports these variables every four years from 1968 to 2016, including 1980
when the United States boycotted the Moscow Olympics.
Meanwhile, female representation among US Olympians and Olympic medallists has
also been rising since the 1960s, with equality of representation reached in 2012 and
2000, respectively. Figure 2.1 shows that the proportion of US Olympians who were
women has risen from 23.2 percent in 1968 to a majority of 52.4 percent in 2016, while
the female proportion of US Olympic medallists follows a similar pattern from 27.7
percent in 1968 to 56.4 percent in 2016. This evidence is consistent with spillovers of
female success across different areas, particularly with equality of representation in US
Olympic teams, even though a great deal of both patterns is likely to be driven by factors
such as changing attitudes to gender roles away from traditional stereotypes.
Supporting a potential spillover effect, Figure 2.2 shows how the proportion of the aver-
age vote share won by female candidates increases in Olympic years. The distribution
clearly shifts to the right in Olympic years compared to non-Olympic years. Although
there may be other influences, such as the coincidence of Summer Olympic Games and
US presidential elections, Figure 2.2 suggests that there may be a positive influence of
the Olympic Games on female electoral outcomes.
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Fig. 2.2 Distribution of Female Candidate Vote Shares in Olympic and Non-Olympic
Years
Notes: This figure illustrates the distribution of female candidate vote shares in Olympic years and
non-Olympic years.
Another notable feature of female representation in US politics is the difference between
the major political parties in female representation. Figure 2.3 reports the percentage
of candidates in the Democrat and Republican parties in the sample who are women.
Women are more represented among Democrat candidates by around 5 percentage
points more than in the Republican party. A similar gap between parties exists in
the proportion of winning candidates who are women, and has grown since the late
1980s and early 1990s. Given the differences between parties, I investigate potential
differences in the female medals effect on female Democrat and Republicans.
This setting is ideal in testing the effects of positive shocks on female electoral outcomes
for several reasons. The impact of a non-political event on political outcomes is
more likely to be an exogenous shock, which I address in more detail in Section 2.5.
Furthermore, the Olympic Games attracts a different type of media attention compared
to most coverage of sport. Firstly, coverage tends to be more equal across genders in
Olympic Games compared to most coverage of sport in the United States, which consists
largely of male-dominated sports like American football, basketball and baseball. The
Olympic Games provide a unique setting where female sporting achievements are
appreciated in a similar manner to male achievements. Secondly, the media attention of
individual athletes tends to be geographically focused. While there are many athletes
who are household names across the whole of the United States, Figure 2.4 reports the
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Fig. 2.3 Female Representation Across Parties, 1968-2016
Notes: This figure compares the percentage of candidates in the Democrat and Republican parties
who are women across the sample from state legislature elections held between 1968 and 2016.
difference in Google search activity for female medallists in the 2016 Summer Olympic
Games. It illustrates that attention to an athlete may be localised and heightened in
their state of birth, more than three times so than in other states. As a result, I am able
exploit geographical variation in the number of medals won by athletes between states,
as the impact of a woman winning an Olympic medal is likely to be more focused on
their home state.
The political setting also presents some advantages, the most important being the
timing of US state elections and the Summer Olympic Games. Almost all US state
primary elections are held in the first half of the year, where the parties select their
candidates for the state general elections2. Furthermore, the outcomes of the state
primary elections are often known well before the primary elections. The Summer
Olympic Games tend to be held between June and September (inclusive), and are held
before the state general elections in November where voters choose between the selected
candidates. This timing is ideal as it allows for a clean identification of the impact of
medals won by women on the decisions of voters in the medallists’ home states. This
timing disentangles voter and party decisions, and focuses on the former, as the latter
has already happened. In addition, the regularity of state elections (held every two
2There is some variation in the processes used to select candidates depending on the state and the
party, but this is somewhat inconsequential for the purposes of empirical identification of the impact
of female medals on voters’ decisions in November.
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Fig. 2.4 Localised Attention of Female Medallists, 2016 Olympics
Notes: This figure compares the Google Trends Index for female Olympic medallists at the 2016
Olympics in their state of birth and in the other states. The index is a value between 0 and 100, where
100 is assigned to the state with the most Google search activity for a particular medallist.
years in most state legislatures) allows for variation within a state of elections held
in Olympic and non-Olympic years, as well as variation in the number of medals in
Olympic years. Finally, the US state elections also provide a wealth of elections and
candidates, with over 260,000 candidate-election pairs between 1968 and 2016.
2.4 Data
I combine two data sources. The first is state electoral data from Klarner et al. (2018),
which provides information about state general elections held in all fifty U.S. states
between 1967 and 2016. Importantly this excludes primary elections. There are 261,842
such candidate-election pairs, which is the unit of observation. There are also 9,787
districts in the sample: districts within a state are treated as different between different
stages of redistricting, where a district may be geographically different to the "same"
district a decade ago. The most pertinent information from the state electoral data for
each candidate-election is the name of the candidate, the party that they are standing
for in the election, and the percentage of the total votes won by the candidate in
the district that they are running in. The gender of candidates is determined using
the candidate’s name and US census data compiled by Howard (2016). I use the
candidate’s first name from the electoral data and match them with the US census
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data, which indicates whether the name is more likely to be associated with a man or
a woman.
Table 2.1 State Election Vote Shares
Vote Share Mean SD Candidates Percent.
All Candidates 45.9 27.8 261,842 100.0
Female Candidates 45.1 27.6 45,427 17.3
Male Candidates 46.4 27.8 216,415 82.7
Female Democrat Candidates 49.1 27.0 23,535 9.0
Female Republican Candidates 45.8 25.9 15,279 5.8
Male Democrat Candidates 51.6 27.0 100,159 38.3
Male Republican Candidates 47.1 26.0 96,381 36.8
Notes: This table illustrates the mean vote shares won by candidates from several groups within the
sample. The average vote share for female candidates is not a weighted average of female Democrat
and Republican candidates as they also include candidates from other parties who tend to win a small
proportion of votes (likewise for male candidates).
Table 2.1 illustrates the distribution of candidates across gender and political party.
Female candidates receive between one to two percentage points fewer of total votes
compared to their male counterparts for both parties, and make up 17.3 percent of all
candidates.
The second data source concerns US Olympians. I scrape data from Olympedia.org
to find information about US athletes who competed in any Olympics between 1968
and 2016. Profiles about each US Olympian contains their name, their sex, their date
and place of birth, their college affiliations, and sporting achievements at the Olympic
Games. The data includes 6,187 athlete-Olympics pairs, within which there are 4,472
athletes competing at 12 Summer Olympic Games (the United States boycotted the
Moscow Olympics of 1980). The US have also won more medals at the Olympics than
any other country winning 2,877 between 1968 and 2016, and 1,314 of those won
by women (this includes team sports where the same medal is awarded to multiple
medallists).
I combine this data with the electoral data. The mean number of female and male
Olympians from a state in the sample is 4.9 and 7.4, respectively, while the mean
number of medals won by women and men from the state is 3.1 and 2.6, respectively.
The number of medals won by women is positively skewed (as illustrated in Figure B.3)
and as Appendix B.3 shows, there is considerable variation between states and across
time. One limitation is the presence of a few states (North Dakota, New Hampshire,
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Idaho, and Alaska) where no medals are won by woman who were born in those states.
In addition, California averages around 25 of these medals at each Olympics, more
than twice the average of any other state. In the appendix I reproduce the analysis,
firstly excluding the states with no variation in female medals, and secondly excluding
the undisputed outlier of California. The results are robust to omitting these outliers.
Another limitation are the 149 athletes where information about their state of birth
is not available, while 293 athletes were born outside of the United States. I exclude
both of these groups from the sample. The former is more potentially problematic, but
only accounts for 3 percent of athletes.
2.5 Identification Strategy
I test whether a medal won by a female Olympian has a significant effect on female can-
didate vote shares in their home state. The baseline identification strategy implements
a reduced-form specification:
FemaleV oteShareidt = αd+γt+β1FemaleMedalsst+β2FemaleCompetitorsst+X ′itδ+ϵidt,
(2.1)
where the outcome variable is FemaleV oteshareidt is the share of the vote won by
female candidate i in district d at election t, as a percentage of total votes cast in the
district’s election. FemaleMedalsst is the number of medals won by women who were
born in state s in the summer a few months before election t, where district d is in
state s. FemaleCompetitorsst is the number of female competitors from state s. Xit
is a vector of controls, which include dummy variables indicating the candidate’s party,
whether they are an incumbent, and whether the election is held in an Olympic year,
as well as the candidate’s experience in the legislatures, in years. I also include district
(where districts are treated as distinct between different redistricting cycle3) and year
fixed effects, while the standard errors are clustered at the state level.
The coefficient of interest is β1, the effect of a medal won by a woman on female vote
shares in her home state. However, a naive estimate of β1 without any fixed effects or
controls is likely to have a positive bias. A state whose population is in favour of the
3Redistricting often radically changes the geographical boundaries of state legislature districts as a
result of population changes and political gerrymandering: for example the boundaries of the fourth




gender equality may be more likely to have more female medallists as they encourage
gender equality in participation in sport in general. In addition, that state may also
have a smaller gender bias against women running for office. This would suggest a naive
estimate would have a significant positive bias. To address this, I include district fixed
effects (as even within states there may be significant variation in characteristics such
as gender role attitudes). However, there may still exist a bias. Even with district and
year fixed effects, the change in gender attitudes may differ between districts and states.
For example, a state that responds more positively to the women’s liberation movement
in the 1970s may change its gender role attitudes more rapidly than other states. This
time-variant heterogeneity (it seems unlikely that gender role attitudes in a district or
state do not change between 1968 and 2016) may influence both female participation
in sport and also the vote shares received by women in state elections.
Defining the connection between athlete and state by the athlete’s state of birth,
rather than the state of their college, somewhat reduces the bias. The time-variant
heterogeneity of gender role attitudes changing at different rates may influence their
participation in sport at a younger age, but less so when they go to college, which is
mostly outside of their state of birth. On one extreme, if high school athletes were
randomly allocated across colleges across the United States, the influence of changing
gender role attitudes in their home states have less of an impact on their ability to
compete at the Olympics. On the other extreme, if high school athletes only went
to college in their home states, then changing gender role attitudes in their home
states may have a significant impact, such as through supporting female college teams4.
Although one suspects the reality is between the two, this still opens the possibility of
time-variant heterogeneity causing some bias.
As a result, I further reduce the potential bias by including FemaleCompetitorsst,
the number of female competitors (who competed at the Olympics in the summer
just before the election in year t and were born in state s), to the specification. This
controls for much of the time-variant heterogeneity that may influence both female
electoral outcomes and the number of female medallists from the state from the above
discussion. Therefore the interpretation of β1 is the effect of a medal won by a woman
4Although Title IX of the Education Amendments Act (1972) requires colleges to equally support
male and female athletes, there is still scope for more or less support of potential female Olympians.
For example, if a state has changed its gender role attitudes more quickly, it may divert more financial
assistance to colleges that is renowned for one of its female sports programs, which is more likely to
impact female student athletes at the highest level (those who are potential future future Olympians).
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on vote shares of female candidates in her home state, controlling for the number of
women competing at the Olympics from that state (as well as district and year fixed
effects). In addition, I also control for other important candidate characteristics (party,
incumbent status, experience) for more precise estimation.
To summarise, the conditional independence assumption I make in the baseline specifi-
cation is that changes to the vote share of female candidates is independent of women
from the same state winning medals at the Olympic Games, having controlled for the
number of women from the state competing at the Olympic Games. There is a ubiquity
of professional and student athletes in the United States and the vast support they
receive (the NCAA system provides over 180,000 sports scholarships a year5), from
which Olympians make up a tiny group - 555 men and women at the 2016 Rio Olympic
Games. It seems unlikely that factors determining whether female athletes making
the step up from competing at the Olympics to winning a medal is linked to a factor
that also influences female electoral outcomes in their home state (especially as many
leave their home state to become professional or student athletes). Furthermore, given
the widespread support hundreds of thousands of athletes receive, the level of support
that Olympians and Olympic medallists receive may be very similar (especially given
the likely diminishing returns to financially supporting an athlete). In other words,
even if there was a significant difference in the support that a female medallist receives
compared to a female Olympian, it is questionable whether this difference is linked to
female electoral outcomes once I account for the number of female athletes from the
state who make the step up to becoming Olympians in the first place.
2.6 Results
In this section I present the results of the baseline specification that estimates the
female medals effect on female candidate vote shares in the medallists’ state of birth.
In addition, I undertake two falsification tests. The first is to check whether male
Olympians winning medals has an effect on female candidate vote shares, and the
second to check whether female medallists are associated with more female candidates
(which they should not given the timing of the Olympics after the state primary
elections).





Table 2.2 presents the estimates of the baseline specification outlined in the previous
section. It shows a significant relationship between the number of medals won by
women at the Olympics and the vote share of female candidates in their home state.
Columns 1 and 2 present the results of the baseline specification without and with
controls, which report a significant female medal effect of 0.181 and 0.151, respectively.
The mean number of medals won by women from a state in an Olympic year is 3.1,
so the preferred specification in Column 2 implies a total effect is an increase of 0.47
percentage points (0.151 × 3.1) for female candidates. This around 1 percent of the
average female vote share (45.1 percent).
Columns 3 and 4 replicate the specification of Columns 1 and 2, but also include a
dummy variable (Female Medals > 0) that takes a value of one if at least one woman
born in the state won an Olympic medal in the summer before the election (and zero
otherwise). This is to test whether the effect of the first medal won by a woman from
the state dominates the overall female medal effect. This could occur if there was
decreasing marginal media attention for every additional female medallist: if there is
only one female medallist they may be given full attention, while the twentieth may be
relegated to a footnote. However, I find that the female medal effect is not dominated
by the ‘extensive margin’ of treatment, as the estimated impact of an additional female
medal is still significant (albeit slightly lower) at the five percent significance level.
Finally, the coefficient estimates of the controls are significant (besides the Olympic year
dummy), and of expected magnitude and direction. The incumbency advantage implied
(around 15 percent) is similar to that of the regression discontinuity design literature
measuring the incumbency advantage (Hainmueller et al., 2015; Lee, 2008), while there
is a significant association between more experience in the legislature and vote shares.
Finally, Table 2.2 suggests that there is a significant difference between parties in the
vote shares won by female candidates, female Democrat candidates winning around
5.8 percentage points more of the vote than their Republican counterparts. This is
consistent with the general divide in female representation between the two major
political parties, as illustrated earlier in Figure 2.5. Finally, the female medals effect
appears not to diminish in light of medals won by men. Table B.2 suggests that there
is no evidence of a crowding out effect.
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Table 2.2 Baseline Results: Vote Share of Female Candidates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female Medals (State) 0.181∗∗ 0.151∗∗ 0.173∗∗ 0.141∗∗
(0.0767) (0.0715) (0.0703) (0.0665)
Female Medals > 0 (State) 0.178 0.242
(0.646) (0.544)
Female Competitors (State) -0.0443 -0.0476 -0.0440 -0.0470
(0.0267) (0.0304) (0.0266) (0.0305)
Incumbent 15.42∗∗∗ 15.42∗∗∗
(1.233) (1.232)
Experience, Years 0.551∗∗∗ 0.551∗∗∗
(0.0782) (0.0784)
Democrat Candidate 5.830∗∗∗ 5.831∗∗∗
(1.211) (1.211)
Olympic Year 0.0951 -0.0117
(1.208) (1.181)
District Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Controls N Y N Y
Adjusted R2 0.507 0.609 0.507 0.609
Observations 45427 45427 45427 45427
Notes: This table reports the estimates using the specification outlined in (2.1). The unit of observation
is the female candidate-election. The dependent variable is the votes won by the female candidate
as a percentage of total votes cast in the election in the district. Female Medals is the number of
medals won in the summer before the election by women who were born in the state that the district
is in, while Female Competitors is the number of female competitors who were born in the state that
the district is in. Female Medals > 0 is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if at least one
woman from the state won a medal in the summer before the election, and zero otherwise. Incumbent,
Democrat Candidate, and Olympic Year are dummy variables that take value one if the candidate is
an incumbent legislator, a candidate selected by the Democrat party, and whether the election is held
in an Olympic year, respectively, and zero otherwise. Experience, Years is the number of years that
the candidate has been a member of the legislature (which may also include years in another chamber
within the legislature). All specifications include district and year fixed effects, while standard errors
are clustered at the state level and are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical
significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
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To check the validity of this result, I implement a procedure outlined by Oster (2019). I
estimate δ, the coefficient of proportionality, and find that δ = −1.73 for the preferred
specification in Column 26. This means that, in order for β1 to be incorrectly estimated
such that the true value is β1 = 0, the selection (for treatment) on unobservables would
have to be at least 1.73 times as important as selection on observables. In the context of
Table 2.2, this suggests that, in order for the true value of β1 to be equal to zero, there
would have to exist some omitted variable (beyond those already specified including
year and district fixed effects) that is both negatively correlated with the treatment
(and positively correlated with female candidate vote shares), and is 1.73 as important
in explaining the number of medals won by women in the state as the control variables
and the fixed effects. Given the discussion of the conditional independence assumption
in Section 2.5, it seems unlikely on both counts.
2.6.2 Falsification Tests: Male Medallists and Candidate Se-
lection
I also test whether the effect of men winning medals has an effect on female candidate
vote shares in their home state. More men winning medals may crowd out the media
attention that female medallists may enjoy. Equally male success may attract more
attention from the state’s news media towards the Olympics in general. Media attention
towards female Olympians may increase as male success increases total attention to
local sporting heroes at the Olympics (rather than just national household names) - so
the success of a female athlete from the state may have greater coverage as a result of
their male counterparts. To identify whether the net effect is significant, I undertake
this falsification test by using the baseline specification and replacing the number of
female medallists and female competitors from the state with the number of male
medallists and male competitors from the state.
Table 2.3 provides the main results from this altered specification. In all four specifi-
cations the number of medals won by men from the state has no significant effect on
the vote share won by female candidates in the state. The effects are negative, but
they are both statistically insignificant and an order of magnitude smaller than the
estimates effects of female medallists in Table 2.2. Furthermore, the binary variable of
whether any men from the state win medals or not appears to have an significant effect.
6As recommended by Oster (2019), I estimate δ using Rmax = 1.3 × R̃, where R̃ is the estimated
R-squared from the specification in Column 2.
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Table 2.3 Falsification Test: Male Medallists and Female Candidate Vote Shares
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Male Medals (State) -0.0328 -0.0315 -0.0386 -0.0408
(0.0394) (0.0405) (0.0389) (0.0397)
Male Competitors (State) 0.0592 0.0461 0.0523 0.0380
(0.0388) (0.0355) (0.0411) (0.0383)
Male Medals > 0 (State) 0.532 0.779
(0.561) (0.618)
District Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Controls N Y N Y
Adjusted R2 0.507 0.609 0.507 0.609
Observations 45427 45427 45427 45427
Notes: This table reports the estimates using the specification outlined in (2.1). The unit of observation
is the female candidate-election. The dependent variable is the votes won by the female candidate as a
percentage of total votes cast in the election in the district. Male Medals is the number of medals won
in the summer before the election by men who were born in the state that the district is in, while Male
Competitors is the number of male competitors who were born in the state that the district is in. Male
Medals > 0 is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if at least one woman from the state won a
medal in the summer before the election, and zero otherwise. Columns 2 and 4 include controls, which
are incumbent, Democrat candidate, Olympic year dummy variables, and the candidate’s experience
in the legislature, in years. All specifications include district and year fixed effects, while standard
errors are clustered at the state level and are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical
significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
This evidence is supported by Table B.2, which interacts the number of medals won by
women from the state with the number of medals won by men from the state. There
also appears to be no effect of the number of medals won by men on the effect that
medals won by women has on female candidate votes shares in their home state.
Another falsification test is to estimate the effect of medals won by women on female
candidacy. According to the Olympic-election timeline, there should not be an effect of
female medallists on female candidacy, as candidates are selected before the Summer
Olympic Games. However, there may be an anticipation effect: part of the effect of
female medallists on female candidate vote shares that occurs when female athletes
win medals may also occur before the Olympic Games, as some may identify certain
athletes as favourites to win a medal.
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Table 2.4 Falsification Test: Female Candidacy and Female Medallists
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female Medals (State) 0.0414 0.0491 0.0578 0.0612
(0.0440) (0.0438) (0.0491) (0.0481)
Female Medals > 0 (State) -0.420 -0.334
(0.256) (0.259)
Female Competitors (State) -0.0181 -0.0216 -0.0182 -0.0221
(0.0284) (0.0278) (0.0274) (0.0273)
District Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Controls N Y N Y
Adjusted R2 0.151 0.158 0.151 0.158
Observations 261842 261842 261842 261842
Notes: This table reports the estimates using the specification outlined in (2.1), but replaces the
dependent variable with a dummy variable which takes a value of one if the candidate is female, and
zero otherwise. The unit of observation is the candidate-election, and notably includes female and
male candidates. Female Medals is the number of medals won in the summer before the election by
women who were born in the state that the district is in, while Female Competitors is the number of
female competitors who were born in the state that the district is in. Female Medals > 0 is a dummy
variable that takes a value of one if at least one woman from the state won a medal in the summer
before the election, and zero otherwise. Columns 2 and 4 include controls, which are incumbent,
Democrat candidate, Olympic year dummy variables, and the candidate’s experience in the legislature,
in years. All specifications include district and year fixed effects, while standard errors are clustered
at the state level and are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1, 5,
and 10 percent level, respectively.
I replicate the baseline specification, but replace the outcome variable with a dummy
variable: is the candidate a woman (value of one) or not (zero)? As a result, I also
include all candidates in the sample, both female and male, as opposed to the baseline
specification which only includes female candidates. Table 2.4 reports the results of
this adapted specification, and confirms that there is no significant impact of medals
won by women on female candidacy in their home state. This finding is robust across
the same specifications.
2.7 Party Polarisation
As discussed in Section 2.4, there are significant differences between the Democrat
and Republican parties in female representation, whether as elected officials or as
candidates. The political science literature highlights long-running differences in female
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representation between parties (Adams, 1997; Carmines and Woods, 2002; Carroll and
Sanbonmatsu, 2013), potentially linked to their policy platforms. Further, there has
been a divergence in female representation since the late 1980s and early 1990s, as
illustrated in Figure 2.5.
Fig. 2.5 Party Differences in Female Representation
Notes: This figure reports the changes in female representation among state legislature candidates
(female candidates as a percentage of all candidates) across time, as well as the differences between
the major political parties.
Figure 2.5 shows that the proportion of Democrat candidates who are women has
continued to increase since the beginning of the sample in the late 1960s. This is only
true among Republican candidates until the early 1990s, at which point there is even a
small decrease in female representation among Republican candidates. While I do not
claim to explain this polarisation, I investigate whether heterogeneity between parties
in their female medal effects are consistent with this divergence. I do this by testing
whether the female medal effects is significantly larger for either female Democrat
candidates or female Republican candidates.
I supplement the baseline specification with an interaction term between medals won
by women from the state and a dummy variable that takes value of one if the candidate
has been selected by the Democrat party. The results of the adapted specification,
including a Democrat candidate dummy variable interaction with female medals, are
reported in Table 2.5. Most notably, the positive female medal effect is driven almost
entirely by an increase in the vote share of female Democrat candidates. The first
row effectively presents coefficient estimates of the effect of female medals on female
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Table 2.5 Party Polarisation: Democrat and Republican Candidates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female Medals (State) -0.110 -0.0990∗ -0.0511 -0.0511
(0.0799) (0.0546) (0.0453) (0.0453)
Democrat Candidate 5.638∗∗∗ 5.214∗∗∗ 4.954∗∗∗ 4.954∗∗∗
(1.877) (1.068) (1.030) (1.030)
Female Medals (State) × Democrat Candidate 0.672∗∗∗ 0.559∗∗∗ 0.455∗∗∗ 0.455∗∗∗
(0.209) (0.156) (0.160) (0.160)
Female Medals > 0 (State) -0.753 -0.753
(0.964) (0.964)
Female Medals > 0 (State) × Democrat Candidate 1.518 1.518
(1.079) (1.079)
District Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Controls N Y N Y
Adjusted R2 0.518 0.611 0.611 0.611
Observations 45427 45427 45427 45427
Notes: This table reports the estimates using the specification outlined in (2.1), and includes interactions
between . The unit of observation is the female candidate-election. The dependent variable is the
votes won by the female candidate as a percentage of total votes cast in the election in the district.
Female Medals is the number of medals won in the summer before the election by women who were
born in the state that the district is in. Democrat Candidate is a dummy variable that takes value
of one if the candidate is selected by the Democrat party for the general election. Female Medals >
0 is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if at least one woman from the state won a medal
in the summer before the election, and zero otherwise. Columns 2 and 4 include controls, which are
incumbent and Olympic year dummy variables, and the candidate’s experience in the legislature, in
years. All specifications include the number of female competitors from the state, as well as district and
year fixed effects, while standard errors are clustered at the state level and are reported in parentheses.
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
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Republican candidate (as well as independent candidates). The estimates are much
smaller than the baseline estimates in Table 2.2 and insignificant (with the exception
of Column 2). In contrast, the effect for female Democrat candidates is between 0.4
and 0.7 percentage points for each medal won by a woman. Taking the estimate from
the preferred specification in Column 2, the total effect of the average treatment of 3.1
medals won by women from the state is around 1.7 percentage points, or equivalently
an increase of 3.8 percent from the average female candidate vote share. This suggests
that there is divergence between candidates of different parties in response to the same
shock in a given state. Furthermore, this divergence is exacerbating an already wide
gap between parties in female candidate vote shares of around 5 percentage points, as
reported in the second row of Table 2.5. These results are robust to including a binary
variable of whether any medals were won by women from the state at all in Columns 3
and 4. Columns 3 and 4 also suggest the importance of the first medal, although the
estimates are noisier despite the point estimate being far larger than the effect for each
medal.
Although Table 2.5 provides evidence of a positive shock creating more divergence
in female representation between the Republican and Democrat parties, there are
potential issues with interpreting the causal mechanism. This effect may well occur
due to voters switching parties (for example from a male Republican candidate to a
female Democrat candidate). However, this effect may also be a result of would-be
Democrat voters choosing to vote instead of staying at home on election day. In the
absence of information regarding these choices at a state legislature level, one cannot
conclude definitively what the causal mechanism may be that links female success in
sport and female success in politics.
2.8 Causal Mechanism
In this section, I explore the causal mechanism behind the female medals effect that
I observe in the previous sections, as well as its heterogeneity between candidates
of different parties. To further provide evidence of a spillover effect, I test whether
there is also spillover effect from female success at the Olympics and women in politics
through newspaper reporting. I then test how this spillover effect affects voters, and
whether it likely to be either one of two potential causal mechanisms, which I discuss
in Section 2.2. The first mechanism that I test is whether voters observe female success
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at the Olympics, and as a result update their beliefs about women in politics, or their
attitudes towards gender roles. The second mechanism is one of issue salience. Voters
may be reminded of the lack of women in politics by the news media (in light of
reporting on female Olympic success), and as a result prioritise female representation
in politics more highly at the upcoming election. This would be the case even if voters
do not change their beliefs about women in politics.
2.8.1 From the Back Pages to the Front Pages
I investigate the causal mechanism that links female success in sport to politics. I first
do this by identifying the link between discussion of female Olympians and discussions
of female representation. I scrape data from newspapers.com, which includes 1,608
different newspapers across the United States between 1968 and 2016, for all state-year
pairs where a state election was held. The minimum number of newspapers for a state
is 3 in Rhode Island, while the maximum is California with 115.
Fig. 2.6 Discussion of Women in Politics and Women at the Olympics
Notes: This figure illustrates the average number of articles written in a state’ newspapers in each
three month period that include key phrases ‘women in politics’, ‘female representation’, and ‘under-
representation of women’ (or similar variations), in non-Olympic and Olympic years.
Figure 2.6 presents the average number of articles that a state’s newspapers mention key
phrases ‘women in politics’, ‘female representation in politics’, ‘under-representation
of women in politics’, and similar variations, across the three quarters leading up to
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the elections in a non-Olympic and Olympic year. There are two notable features of
Figure 2.6. The first is the level increase in the discussion of female representation in
Olympic years compared to non-Olympic years. The second is the increase in discussion
of female representation from the first two quarters of the year to the third, which is
significantly larger in Olympic years than in non-Olympic years. These two features
may be somewhat explained by the coincidence of Olympic years and US presidential
elections: this may generally increase discussion about politics in newspapers (and
potential about female representation in politics), as well as a further increase as the
election looms closer. However, the large increase in discussion of female representation
in politics that occurs after July also coincides with the Summer Olympic Games.
Despite this, Figure 2.6 provides some motivation of a link between reporting on women
in sport and politics.
To identify the effect of female Olympians on the discussion of female representation
in politics, I use the following specification:
PoliticsMentionsJSst = αs+γt+β1OlympianMentionsJSst+β2PoliticsMentionsAJst+ϵst
(2.2)
The unit of observation is the state-year. The outcome variable, PoliticsMentionsJSst,
is the natural logarithm of the number of articles in a state’s newspapers mentioning
female representation (or other related phrases) in the third quarter of the year (July to
September). The treatment variable, OlympianMentionsJSst, is the natural logarithm
of the number of articles in the state’s newspapers mentioning a female Olympian
who was born in the state. I also include PoliticsMentionsAJst, the logarithm of the
number of articles in a state’s newspapers mentioning female representation in the
second quarter of the year (April to June). Finally, I include state and year fixed effects,
while the standard errors are clustered at the state level.
The estimates of this specification are reported in Table 2.6. Columns 1 and 2 include all
state-election pairs. However, it may not be reasonable to assume that the counterfactual
of a state in an Olympic year having fewer mentions of its female Olympians is similar
as the same state in a non-Olympic year. Therefore the specifications estimated in
Columns 3 and 4 only include elections held in Summer Olympic years. The first row
presents the estimated effect of the number of articles mentioning female Olympians
on the discussion of female representation in politics. The effect of female Olympian
mentions on the discussion of female representation is significant across all specifications.
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Table 2.6 Newspapers: Discussion of Female Olympians and Women in Politics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female Olympian Mentions (July-September) 0.0653∗∗∗ 0.0753∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗
(0.0178) (0.0265) (0.0356) (0.0351)
Male Olympian Mentions (July-September) -0.0159 0.0507
(0.0224) (0.0371)
Women in Politics Mentions (April-June) 0.285∗∗∗ 0.285∗∗∗ 0.205∗∗ 0.201∗∗
(0.0847) (0.0846) (0.0807) (0.0783)
State Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Year Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y
Olympic Years Only N N Y Y
Adjusted R2 0.837 0.837 0.803 0.804
Observations 1754 1754 763 763
Notes: The unit of observation is the state-election. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm
of the number of articles in a state’s newspapers mentioning female representation (or other related
phrases). Female and Male Olympian Mentions (July-September) is the natural logarithm of the
number of articles in the state’s newspapers mentioning a female and male Olympian who was born
in the state, respectively. Women in Politics Mentions (April-June) is the logarithm of the number
of articles in a state’s newspapers mentioning female representation between April and June of the
election year. Columns 1 and 2 include all state-elections in the sample, whereas 3 and 4 only include
elections in Olympic years. All specifications include state and year fixed effects, while standard errors
are clustered at the state level and are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical
significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
Doubling the number of articles mentioning female Olympians increases the number
of articles mentioning female representation by 6.5 to 10.6 percent. For the average
state in an Olympic year, this increases the number of articles written about female
representation from 75 a month to between 80 and 83. Given that there are on average
32 newspapers for each state in the newspaper data, this means a reader of one
newspaper may read an article about female representation from once every 12.8 days
to once every 11.5 days. While the effect I find is not particularly large, it provides
evidence of a link between the reporting of women in sport and female representation.
In Columns 2 and 4 I also include the number of mentions of male Olympians as a
falsification test. As expected, the reported estimates in the second row of Table 2.6 do
not suggest they have a significant effect on discussions of female representation.
This suggests that newspapers write more about female representation in politics
when they write more about female Olympians. This link may be an editorial one or
from individual journalists, linking the then topical theme of female success in sport
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(which is largely concentrated to the Olympics) to female representation, or lack of,
in politics. Overall, the newspaper data supports the causal mechanism of a spillover
from discussions in sport to politics through discussions in the media.
2.8.2 Voter Gender Role Attitudes
To further investigate the causal mechanism, I test the effect of the positive shock
on attitudes towards gender. I use survey data from the American National Election
Study to test whether observing female medallists alters attitudes towards gender roles
among voters. The American National Election Study collected 27,045 responses to the
following question across 16 election years between 1972 and 2008 (some in presidential
election years and some in other election years): ‘Recently there has been a lot of talk
about women’s rights. Some people feel that women should have an equal role with men
in running business, industry, and government (1). Others feel that a woman’s place is
in the home (7). And of course, some people have opinions somewhere in between, at
2,3,4,5, and 6. Where would you place yourself on this scale or haven’t you thought
much about this?’ Figure 2.7 illustrates the distribution of answers across time. While
around 44 percent of respondents indicated a preference of total equality, an additional
22 percent were in favour but less strongly. Furthermore a large minority of over 17
percent indicated some preference against equality of gender roles.
Fig. 2.7 Gender Role Attitudes
Notes: This figure reports the distribution of answers (from all years) to the American National
Election Study question about women’s roles in public life. For example, an answer of one represents
those who ‘feel that women should have an equal role with men in running business, industry, and
government’, while an answer of seven represents those who ‘feel that a woman’s place is in the home’.
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To test whether there is any meaningful changes to votes I estimate the effect of medals
won by women in the state on the gender role attitudes of voters from that state.
These estimates are reported in Table 2.7. Columns 1 and 2 estimate the effect of
women winning medals on gender attitudes. Including state and year fixed effects, the
estimated effect of all sporting success (male or female) appears to be insignificant.
Furthermore, these estimates are orders of magnitude smaller than what one would
expect to be an observable change in gender attitudes. This is confirmed in Columns 3
and 4 where I use the number of articles mentioning female Olympians at the time and
immediate aftermath of the Olympics (controlling for the number of articles mentioning
them earlier on in the year). In addition, the gender of the respondent appears to be
far less significant than differences between states and years.
Table 2.7 Gender Role Attitudes and Female Medallists
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female Medals (State) 0.000576 0.000419
(0.00287) (0.00261)
Female Competitors (State) 0.000886 0.000787
(0.00111) (0.00103)
Female Olympian Mentions (July-September) 0.00131 0.00412
(0.0227) (0.0230)
Female Olympian Mentions (April-June) 0.00421 0.000426
(0.0239) (0.0239)
State Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Year Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y
Controls N Y N Y
Adjusted R2 0.0787 0.0791 0.0787 0.0791
Observations 25454 25297 25454 25297
Notes: This table reports the estimates of the effect of female medals and related reporting on gender
role attitudes. The dependent variable is the answer that the respondent, which is between 1 (equal
role) and 7 (women’s place is in the home). Female Medals is the number of medals won in the
summer before the election by women who were born in the state that the district is in, while Female
Competitors is the number of female competitors. Female Olympian Mentions (July-September) and
Female Olympian Mentions (April-June) are the natural logarithm of the number of articles in the
state’s newspapers mentioning a female Olympian who was born in the state between July-September
and April-June, respectively. Columns 2 and 4 include controls which include categorical variables
concerning the respondent’s ethinicity and gender. All specifications include state and year fixed effects,
while standard errors are clustered at the state level and are reported in parentheses. Columns 1 and
3 have more observations than Column 2 and 4 due to a smaller number of missing respondents with
missing control variable data, such as ethnicity or party affiliation. ***, **, and * denote statistical
significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
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There appears to be no change in attitudes towards gender in response to women
winning medals at the Olympics. This discounts the explanation that female success in
sport translates to female success in politics as voters update their beliefs away from
traditional gender stereotypes. To some extent this is somewhat expected: attitudes such
as these are often formed from voters’ family backgrounds and other long-term factors.
The survey evidence suggests that these attitudes do not change in a significant manner
in the time between the summer Olympics and elections in November. Furthermore, a
voter observing a woman from their state win an Olympic medal against other women
may not change their belief of a female candidate’s ability against a male one. Table
2.6 provides evidence that the causal mechanism is unlikely to involve voters updating
their gender role attitudes or gender biases. This is supported by evidence presented
in Table B.1 that reports no persistent female medals effect on female candidate vote
shares in elections two years after an Olympic Games: one would expect changes to
gender role attitudes to be relatively long-lasting.
2.8.3 Issue Salience
The causal mechanism between medals being won by women and female electoral
success appears not to be driven by changing gender biases. The increase in discussion
about female representation that occurs from women winning medals at the Olympics
attracts may attention to the lack of women in politics. As discussed in Section 2.2, one
may also assume that voters have a limited selection of issues that they are particularly
concerned about when they go to the ballot box, for example the level of income tax. In
the context of this paper, voters may be newly convinced that the under-representation
of women in politics is a more important issue than they previously believed. This may
lead to an increase in votes for female candidates.
I test this using the American National Election Survey data. Another question that
the Survey asks relates to how highly do voters prioritise equality in influence over
policy. The question asked (every four years from 1972 to 1992) ‘For a nation, it is
not always possible to obtain everything one might wish. On this page, several different
goals are listed. If you had to choose among them, which one would seem most desirable
to you?
1. Maintaining order in the nation.
2. Giving more people more say in important political decisions.
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3. Fighting rising prices
4. Protecting freedom of speech’
While the second option is not a perfect measure of issue salience of female repre-
sentation, it does illustrate whether voters prioritise equality in political decisions
(over other policy issues), of which gender equality is a key component. I test whether
observing women winning medals, or newspapers discussing their success, impacts
whether voters prioritise equality in political decisions. The outcome I use is the binary
variable that indicates whether the respondent selects the second issue as their main
priority7 and implement previous specifications. To test whether there is an asymmetric
issue salience effect, I include a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent
identifies with the Democrat party and an interaction effect between that dummy
variable and the number of medals won by women who were born in the respondent’s
state.
Table 2.8 presents the results. Columns 1 and 2 report the effect of medals won by female
Olympians on whether voters from their home state prioritise equality of representation
above other issues, with and without controls, respectively. There appears to be a
positive female medals effect of around 0.32 percentage points. Given that the average
number of medals won by women for a given state in the sample is 3.1, the total
effect is around 0.99 percentage points (0.32 × 3.1), or an increase of 3.9 percent from
the average probability of a respondent prioritising equality of representation of 25.5
percent. However, the estimates in Columns 1 and 2 are relatively noisy. Columns 3
and 4 split interact the number of medals won by women from the respondent’s state
with whether the respondent is a Democrat voter. I include this interaction as Table 2.5
shows that Democrat voters respond differently to the female medals effect compared
to Republican voters, and this occur through differences in an issue salience mechanism.
Columns 3 and 4 report a significant difference between Democrat and Republican
voters. The first row effectively reports the estimated effect on Republican voters,
which is positive but insignificant. However, the second row shows that Democrats are
more influenced by a female medals effect when it comes to prioritising equality of
representation.
While the results in Table 2.8 is only evidence consistent with an issue salience mecha-
nism and not direct evidence, it is also consistent with the asymmetric female medals
7I assign value 100 to illustrate percentage point effects in the coefficient estimates.
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Table 2.8 Female Medallists and Issue Salience (Equality of Representation)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female Medals 0.319∗ 0.322∗ 0.235 0.231
(0.163) (0.165) (0.176) (0.177)
Female Medals × Democrat Voter 0.199∗∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗
(0.0387) (0.0370)
State Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Controls N Y N Y
Adjusted R2 0.0299 0.0328 0.0315 0.0340
Observations 9136 9102 9136 9102
Notes: This table reports the estimates of the effect of female medals on the likelihood of a respondent
prioritising equality of representation above the other suggested national priorities. The dependent
variable is a dummy variable that takes value 100 if the respondent chooses option 2 in answer to the
question outlined above (so that the coefficients can be interpreted as the effect on the percentage
probability of choosing option 2), and zero otherwise. Female Medals is the number of medals won
in the summer before the election by women who were born in the state that the district is in,
while Democrat Voter is a dummy variable that takes value one if the respondent feels affiliated to
the Democrat party. Columns 2 and 4 include controls, which consist of the categorical variables
concerning the respondent’s ethnicity and gender. All specifications include also Female Competitors
and Democrat Voter, as well as state and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the
state level and are reported in parentheses. Columns 1 and 3 have more observations than Column 2
and 4 due to a smaller number of missing respondents with missing control variable data, such as
ethnicity or party affiliation. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent level,
respectively.
effect that is observed in Table 2.5. Further research would explore this asymmetric
issue salience effect with more direct evidence, as well as explaining why there exists
such a divergence between political parties. A similar argument may be that Democrat
voters read more of the discussions about women in politics. In addition to this evidence,
Table B.1 suggests that this issue salience mechanism may be fleeting and that voters
need to be reminded again - the effect is non-existent on the next elections two years
later.
2.9 Counterfactual Simulation
I estimate a back-of-the-envelope counterfactual scenario describing the case where the
Olympic Games are not held, and therefore the positive shock to female representation
is not realised. The results of this scenario may be relevant in evaluating the US
boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics and the postponement of the 2020 Tokyo
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Olympics to 2021. Given the noticeable difference between the two parties in the female
medal effects, I assume heterogeneous female medal effects between the Democrat and
Republican parties (using the estimates of the preferred specification in Column 2 of
Table 2.5).
Fig. 2.8 Counterfactual Simulation, Female Medal Effect (Percentage of Female Win-
ners)
Notes: This figure illustrates the results of the counterfactual scenario that removes the female medal
effect. It reports the percentage of successful female candidates that hypothetically would have lost
removing the estimated female medal effect from their vote share.
I estimate the lost vote share for women in the absence of an Olympic games and
therefore no women winning medals from the state. This loss will therefore be homoge-
neous among female candidates within the state. I calculate this using the number of
medals won by female Olympians from a given state and a given Olympic year, and
the estimated effect as reported in Column 2 of Table 2.5. I calculate the proportion of
successful female candidates who hypothetically would have lost their election with-
out the estimated female medal effect. Figure 2.8 illustrates these estimates across
different Olympic years (the United States boycotted the Moscow Olympics of 1980).
The estimated proportion of female candidates that are associated with the female
medal effect is between 1 and 4 percent between 1968 and 2016, with an average
of 2.68 percent. Although these estimations are not particularly sophisticated, these
counterfactual scenarios suggest that the postponement of the Tokyo Olympics to 2021
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(and therefore not in the election year of 2020) may have a non-negligible effect on
female representation in US politics.
2.10 Concluding Remarks
I find that a non-political event, a woman winning a medal at the Summer Olympic
Games, has significant spillover effects on female electoral outcomes. I estimate that the
total effect of medals won by women is around an increase of 1 percent of the average
female candidate vote share in the Olympians’ state of birth. I also find that this event
has a polarising effect: this effect is around 3.8 percent for female Democrat candidates,
whereas it is not significantly different to zero for female Republican candidates. This
difference exacerbates an already wide gap in female candidate vote shares between the
Democrat and Republican parties. More generally, these results illustrate the impact
of high-profile events on voting outcomes.
Data from newspapers suggests that there is a spillover from the increased discussion
of female Olympians in light of their Olympic success to the discussion of female
representation (or the lack of) in politics. Medals won by women appear to not have
an effect on gender role attitudes for voters, which suggests that they do not increase
female candidate vote shares by changing updating voters’ beliefs concerning gender
in comparing female politicians to male politicians. I find evidence consistent with an
issue salience mechanism. Women winning medals increases the probability that voters
prioritise more inclusivity in political decisions, but only so for those who identify as
Democrat voters. These results suggest that events that may be described as positive
shock may also lead to increased polarisation, even within the same state. A woman
winning an Olympic medal is associated with a divergence in vote shares between
female Democrat and Republican candidates in her home state.
These results may have three main implications for more equal representation (whether
on gender, racial, or other dimensions) in politics and beyond. The first is that positive
spillovers in more equal representation may exist, even between areas that are seemingly
unrelated. The second is that these positive spillovers may actually lead to increased
polarisation within groups, such as between Republican and Democrats within the same
state. An event that all voters observe, for example the police killing of George Floyd,
may at the same time be positive for the Black Lives Matter movement and BAME
representation in politics yet also increase polarisation, in attitudes and outcomes,
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as the same shock observed has heterogeneous effects on voters. Further work would
investigate other spillovers, as well as more cleanly identify the reasons for polarisation
in the face of observing a common shock. The final implication is that the impact of
celebrating the success of under-represented groups in one field is not only to encourage
more participation of those under-represented, but also to highlight issues of their





Spillovers in Female Political
Representation
Abstract
The election of a significant female politician is often followed by discussions of a
potential trailblazing effect for women in other elections. I estimate both temporal
and geographical spillover effects of a woman being elected to office on future female
representation. I use an instrument that exploits the close election of women as a quasi-
random treatment, and the results of state legislature elections covering over 143,000
district-election pairs from all fifty US states from 1968 to 2016. I find a significant and
persistent temporal spillover: the election of a woman increases female representation
among candidates and elected politicians in the district in future elections. The short-
term effect is driven by incumbency advantage of elected women, but I also identify a
longer-term increase in the proportion of new candidates who are women. Similarly,
the geographical spillover effect across a given state increases female representation,
but the shift from incumbents to new candidates is less marked.
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3.1 Introduction
As motivated in the previous chapter, women have persistently been under-represented
in many high-profile professions, and in particular in politics. While the previous chapter
focused on spillover effects from one profession to another, this final chapter focuses on
spillovers within politics. Significant elections and candidacies of female politicians often
lead to discussions about their influence on future female representation. For example,
what may be the effect of the recent elections of Kamala Harris as vice-president
and prominent Congresswomen such as Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez on future female
representation in US politics?
In this chapter I estimate the spillover effect of a woman being elected to office on
future female representation in politics. The election of a woman may influence future
female representation through two channels. One may be a temporal spillover: for
example, female representation among candidates or elected officials in a given district
and a given election may be influenced by the election of a woman in the same district
in a previous election. Another may be a geographical spillover, where the election
of a woman in one district may influence female representation in future elections in
other districts, such as other districts in the same state legislature.
I estimate the effect of a woman winning an election through these two channels on
future female representation among both all candidates and successful candidates
(winners). To do this in a plausibly causal manner, I exploit the close election or
non-election of women, as only correlating the election of women in a given election
with future female representation may suffer from a positive bias from unobserved
heterogeneity, such as voters’ attitudes to gender stereotypes.
Within a small margin (whether a winner or losing margin), I assume that whether
a candidate is elected or not is quasi-random. In doing so, I am able to calculate the
‘expected number’ of women elected to office by a small margin1, following the example
of (Hyytinen et al., 2018). I exploit variation between the observed number of women
winning by a small margin and this ‘expected number’. Using this difference as an
instrument captures variation in the number of women elected to office in a given
district-election pair that arises from the random outcomes for candidates within these
1This ‘expected number’ for a given district-election pair is calculated using the number of women




small margins. I use US state legislature election returns from Klarner et al. (2018),
which constitutes over 143,000 district-election pairs in the 99 state chambers across
the 50 states2 I am able to compare both the short-term and long-term effect as the
data covers almost 50 years from 1968 to 2016.
I find a considerable short-term impact within a given district: the election of a woman
increases female representation among candidates in the district at the next election by
24.0 percentage points and the likelihood that an elected winner is a woman by 44.4
percentage points. This short-term effect is driven by female incumbents running for
re-election, which is expected given a well-documented incumbency advantage in US
politics. Further, the positive spillover is not restricted to the short run. In the long run
there is a similarly positive and significant effect that is driven by an increase the female
proportion of candidates and winners who are not incumbents running for re-election.
These results suggest a substantial ‘multiplier effect’ in political representation as new
female candidates replace female incumbents.
I also find positive and significant geographical spillovers. I measure these geographical
spillovers by exploiting variation in the close election of women across the state chamber
(for example, the New York State House of Representatives), and estimating the impact
of these election of women on female representation in future elections within the state
chamber. There is a positive, significant, and persistent temporal spillover effect that
only somewhat fades four elections after the ‘treatment’ election. For example, the
election of a woman in a district increases the probability that a candidate is a woman
in subsequent elections by around 2.4 to 3.7 percent. The estimated spillover effect
on new female candidates across the state is consistent with the overall effect being
initially driven by incumbents, and then by new female candidates, although not as
clearly supported as the evidence at the district level.
These results are relevant to economists as there is evidence that female representation,
and therefore under-representation, may have a significant effect on policy choices.
Citizen-candidate models such as those of Osborne and Slivinski (1996) and Besley
and Coate (1997) suggest that, conditional on the existence of differences in policy
preferences between genders, an increase in female political participation and repre-
sentation should alter collective policy choices. In terms of empirical work, there is a
broad body of evidence from India suggesting that the gender of a politician has a
2For example, the data includes over over 5,200 candidate-election pairs who win or lose by less
than 0.5 percent of total votes cast.
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significant effect on policy. Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) found that when a third
of village council head positions were randomly reserved for women in West Bengal
and Rajasthan, councils with a female head invested more in drinking water than men
who generally invested more in infrastructure such as roads. Clots-Figueras (2011)
used close elections between women and men in 16 Indian states (between 1967 and
2000), and found that female representatives were associated with greater investment
in health and early education, along with support for more gender equality (such as
the Hindu Succession Act).
There is also evidence of a gender difference in policy preferences: Aidt and Dallal
(2008) found an increase in social spending attributable to women’s suffrage in Western
Europe between 1869 and 1960, which Bertocchi (2011) also finds in other countries in
a similar time frame. Svaleryd (2009) uses survey data from Swedish municipalities and
finds differences in policy preferences across gender, and greater female representation
is therefore associated with greater spending on childcare and education. More recently,
Funk and Gathmann (2015) presented data from Switzerland (and its direct democratic
system) between 1981 and 2003 that indicated that women were 10 percentage points
more likely to support environmental spending and 6 percentage points less likely
to support military spending, although these results from Europe are less obviously
found in the U.S. (for example, Ferreira and Gyourko (2014)). Focusing on 1970 to
2000, Koch and Fulton (2011) find that female legislative representation decreases
defence spending (although female executive representation increased defence spending),
although they do not totally eliminate potential endogeneity bias from cross-country
comparisons.
Furthermore, there is evidence suggesting that female representation has an effect
on policy outcomes. Clots-Figueras (2012) found that female representation increases
probability of completing primary education in India. In the U.S. women’s suffrage
led to 8 to 15 percentage decreases in child mortality between 1869 and 1920 (Miller,
2008), and this is supported by evidence in India (Bhalotra and Clots-Figueras, 2014).
The use of gender quotas in party candidate lists (especially in Scandinavian countries),
with recent empirical evidence suggesting that they have a positive effect on the quality
of male politicians (Besley et al., 2017) and cue parties to prioritise gender equality
issues (Catalano Weeks, 2019) (although (Geys and Sørensen, 2019) found that in the
case of Norway’s 1992 quota there was no significant effect on policy). Finally, Brollo
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and Troiano (2016) suggests that female mayors are less prone to corruption than male
ones in Brazil.
Contributions to the Literature I address two strands of the political economy
literature concerned with political representation: exploring the reasons for inequality
in representation in politics, and more specifically spillover effects in the representation
of historically under-represented groups.
This chapter contributes to a body of work that debates why women have been
persistently under-represented in politics, some of which is also outlined in the previous
chapter. Much work in this literature focuses on gender bias - Bhalotra et al. (2018)
find evidence of gender bias that influences female representation (both the number of
female legislators and female candidates) from socially conservative Indian electorates.
However, the effects of gender bias on female representation in the U.S. is less obvious
empirically. Even if one were to find the probability of election being similar between
female and male candidates, this does not rule out voter gender bias, as Fulton (2012)
notes. Using surveys of local political activists as a measure of political ability, she
concludes that women tend to be more qualified than men before choosing to run for
office and that this implies a voter bias. Kahn (1996) argues that gender stereotypes are
significant in political campaigns, and Sanbonmatsu and Dolan (2009) finds in survey
data that gender stereotypes are prevalent in both of the major U.S. political parties.
However, using close primary election of women3 in the U.S. House of Representatives
between 1982 and 2002, Anastasopoulos (2016) conclude that women do not receive less
of the vote at the general election or receive less campaign contributions than their male
counterparts. Outside of the U.S., Folke and Rickne (2016) finds that female politicians
in Sweden are less likely to be promoted within political parties even accounting for
characteristics such as experience. The introduction of term limits to some legislatures
has been posited as an opportunity for more women to replace long-incumbent men
(the literature summarised by Labonne et al. (2021)), but there is no consensus that the
introduction of term limits aids female representation, for example beyond furthering
family political dynasties, as found in the Philippines (Labonne et al., 2021).
In exploring inequalities in representation between men and women, I also contribute to
the wider literature concerning inequalities in representation in other dimensions. This is
relevant to other settings, such as in business, where there is evidence of discrimination
3Where the primary election of a woman is the case a political party votes to choose a female
candidate to represent them in the general election for certain district.
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or bias (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004). Within politics, there is empirical evidence
that minorities can have different policy preferences (Beach and Jones, 2017; Bhalotra
et al., 2018), for example black mayors of U.S. cities hire more black police officers
(Hopkins and McCabe, 2012), which is especially pertinent given their chronic under-
representation in the police force. In particular, political representation of groups that
are traditionally under-represented can reduce inequality (Beach et al., 2019). As with
the literature concerned about under-representation of women in politics, there is
mixed evidence about the existence of a virtuous circle in politics for other minorities
(Banducci et al., 2004; Bhalotra et al., 2018).
This chapter most closely contributes to the literature concerned with a spillover effect
of representation of a historically under-represented group: for example, women in
politics. Women winning elections in the present could increase women running for
and winning elections in the future: a ‘virtuous cycle’ (Iyer, 2019). Evidence for such
a virtuous cycle is mixed across the world. Empirical studies from India suggest that
female representation, whether as a result of quotas (Beaman et al., 2009) or close
election of women (Bhalotra et al., 2018), increases female representation in the future,
although Bhalotra et al. (2018) finds that female incumbents crowd out potential
newcomers. I find similar results in the short term, but this crowding out fades in the
long term as new female candidates appear.
There are similarly positive results from Germany, where Baskaran and Hessami (2018)
uses close elections of female mayors in Germany (between 2001 and 2016) to illustrate
a trickle-down effect: female mayors lead to more female candidates and winners in
local councils and neighbouring municipalities. In the U.S. however, there is scant
evidence of a spillover effect from the election of women, whether using data from
state legislatures between 2002-2008 (Broockman, 2014) or mayoral elections between
1950-2005 (Ferreira and Gyourko, 2014). In particular, Broockman (2014) finds no
significant effect on female turnout. Although he identifies a positive (and significant)
effect on the probability of a woman running for office in that particular district in
the next election, he concludes this is largely driven by female incumbents running for
re-election. Further, he finds no spillover effect on nearby districts on female candidacy,
but this may be driven by an incumbency advantage. While I confirm that the short-
term spillover is largely driven by the re-election of female incumbents, I contribute
to the literature by finding that the positive long-term spillover is also driven by new
female candidates.
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I extend this analysis in several ways. Firstly, my analysis allows for the comparison
of short-term and long-term spillover effects: both across time within a district and
across the state, whereas (Broockman, 2014) restricts the analysis to the impact on the
next election. Although this identifies the short-term influence of female incumbents
running for re-election, it may miss a longer-term increase in female representation due
to new female candidates who replace the incumbents. Secondly, rather than focusing
on neighbouring districts, I test for a statewide spillover effect. Thirdly, and most
obviously, I extend the sample from 3,813 elections between 2002 and 2008 to 143,149
elections between 1968 to 2016. This allows me to test long-term impacts of a woman
being elected to office for future female representation. Fourthly, I am also able to
analyse 40 times as many elections as the identification strategy in this chapter does not
solely rely on variation in close elections between one man and one woman. Applying
an instrument variable approach of Hyytinen et al. (2018) to the US political system, I
am able to use variation in women winning or losing by small margins in a wider range
of elections.
Chapter Layout The chapter follows with Section 3.2 outlining the institutional
context of the data within US state legislatures; Section 3.3 explains the empirical
strategy; Section 3.4 presents the results estimating temporal spillovers; Section 3.5
discusses potential transmission mechanisms; Section 3.6 presents the results estimating
geographical spillovers; Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 US State Legislatures: Institutional Context and
Data
Each of the fifty U.S. states has its own state legislature: with the exception of Nebraska
all of them have a bicameral legislature (two chambers) - a larger/lower chamber usually
labelled the House of Representatives and a smaller/upper chamber usually labelled
the Senate, which mirrors the US Congress in Washington DC. As a result, there are a
total of 99 state chambers. These state legislatures have control over a variety of policy
areas, such as spending on education, health, transport, and utilities (Aidt and Shvets,
2012).
The 19th Amendment of 1920 prohibited the denial of the right to vote in federal
and state elections on the basis of sex, although a few women had been elected to
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office previously (Jeanette Rankin was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives
in 1916 and three women were elected to the Colorado House of Representatives in
1894). However, female representation in U.S. politics generally grew slowly in the first
half of the twentieth century, with only a handful of women being elected even forty
years after women were given the right to vote. This would change in the late 1960s
and early 1970s, where the time period of the data in this chapter begins.
The data used is the state election returns collected by Klarner et al. (2018), which
reports information on state legislative election results from 1967 to 2016, which
includes 261,842 candidate-election pairs. This includes state election returns from all
99 state chambers, although some state returns are not available until the mid-1970s.
Out of the 143,149 district-election pairs, 132,519 (92.6 percent) concern single-member
districts (one candidate is elected into office), and the rest are multi-member districts
(where multiple candidates are elected for the district). Most importantly it provides
(among other information) names, political affiliation, date of election, votes cast for
a candidate, whether they were an incumbent, and whether they won election, and
information about the district (such as redistricting regime, state chamber, and the
number elected into office). However, they do not report the gender of the candidates,
so I use a dataset of over 95,000 different US first names assigned to gender by Howard
(2016) to estimate the gender of the candidates. This dataset is created using data
from the Social Security Administration which provided genders and first names for
any names that appeared more than 5 times in a year from 1930 to 2015.
The proportion of candidates and winners who are female is 18.1 percent and 18.3
percent, respectively. However, these averages mask a general positive trend in female
representation from the start of the sample in the late 1960s, which is illustrated by
Figure 3.1 - an increase in female representation is also seen across all fifty states’
state legislatures in Figure 3.2. While all fifty states see an increase, there remains
considerable variation: states’ female proportion of candidates since 2000 varies between
7.4 and 33.9 percent.
Figure 3.1 shows that the female proportion of candidates and winners has grown from
between 5 and 10 percent in the early 1970s to over 20 percent by the end of the sample.
On the other hand, this growth has stagnated towards the end of the sample: it is
unclear whether increases in female representation appear to lead to further increases,
despite women remaining significantly under-represented.
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Fig. 3.1 Female Representation Across Time
3.3 Empirical Strategy
In this section I outline the OLS specification, introduce the salient variables and
estimated parameters, and explain potential endogeneity problems with the specification.
I then propose an IV strategy that exploits the close election and non-election of women,
which is the preferred identification strategy for the remainder of the paper.
3.3.1 OLS Specification
I test whether the election of a woman influences female representation in the following
election. The OLS specification takes the following form:
Femid,t+1 = α + βFemWindt + ϵid,t+1 (3.1)
The unit of observation is the candidate-district-election. The explanatory variable,
FemWindt is the number of women who won (were elected) in district d in election t. I
assume that a district d is distinct to a similarly named or numbered district in another
redistricting regime. Every decade after the US Census, state legislatures redraw the
boundaries of state senate and house districts, so the decade in between each change is
a redistricting regime. The result of this redistricting is that a district, such as the 1st
District of the Texas State House of Representatives, in one year, such as 1980, may
have significantly different geographical boundaries to the similarly named district in
the present day. There is considerable variation in redistricting changes across time
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Fig. 3.2 Female Representation Across States (Percentage of all Winners)
and across states, such as what the specified guidelines are. For example, as Forgette
et al. (2009) note, states such as Washington and Arizona require that the redrawing
of boundaries encourage electoral competitiveness, while others states such as South
Carolina prioritise keeping a district’s population ‘core’, such as an urban area, when
redrawing its boundaries. As a result, I choose to define the observational unit of a
district as distinct between redistricting regimes4.
I normalise FemWindt by the total number of winners in the district-election pair dt,
Windt, to avoid heteroskedasticity as I include multi-member districts where multiple
winners are elected. Therefore the variable FemWindt can be interpreted as the
proportion of winners who are women between (and including) zero and one. In a
single-member district it is effectively a binary variable indicating whether a woman
won or not.
The variable Femid,t+1 is a binary variable that denotes whether candidate i running
in district d at the next election t + 1 is a woman (value of one) or not (value of zero).
The coefficient of interest is β, which represents the effect of a woman winning in
4An example of district boundaries changes in the Wisconsin State Senate between 2008




election t on the likelihood that a candidate running in the district’s next election t + 1
is female.
The interpretation of β differs depending on the sample of candidates included. If
the sample includes all candidates, then β1 can be interpreted as the effect on the
future proportion of candidates who are female. If the sample only includes winning
candidates, then β can be interpreted as the effect on the future proportion of winners
who are female.
However, this OLS specification may suffer from a selection bias. For example, the
election of a woman in election t and more female candidates in election t + 1 may
both be linked to voters’ preferences concerning female representation. This is likely to
bias the OLS estimates of β upwards, and overestimate the impact of the election of a
woman on female representation at the next election. Further, even if geographical fixed
effects (for example state fixed effects) are included, the preferences of the voters may
change at different rates between geographical units. For instance, some states’ voters
may have responded to the women’s liberation movement of the 1970s differently, as
the Equal Rights Amendment that sought guarantee equal legal rights regardless of sex
was followed by polarisation (Miller, 2015) that has led to its continued non-ratification.
These differences may exacerbate the bias in the OLS estimation.
3.3.2 Instrumental Variable Specification
Instrument Variable: I construct an instrument variable that exploits quasi-random
variation in the election of female candidates that arises from close elections. Applying
the method that Hyytinen et al. (2018) use to majoritarian/first-past-the-post elections,
the instrument is the difference between the number of women elected by a small
margin and the expected number of women elected by a small margin, in a given
election in a district. The instrument, NetCloseFemWindt is defined as follows, where
the unit of observation is the district-election pair:
NetCloseFemWindt = CloseFemWindt − ExpCloseFemWindt (3.2)
CloseFemWindt is the number of women who won by a close margin in district d
at election t I define the (vote) margin of candidate as being the percentage of total
votes cast that would need to be taken away from the candidate to alter their outcome.
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For a successful candidate, this would be the difference in their vote share and the
vote share of the candidate with the greatest vote share among the unsuccessful votes:
this would be positive. For an unsuccessful candidate, it is the difference in vote share
between the candidate with the smallest vote share among the successful candidates
and the candidate’s: this would be negative. This definition, and the calculation of
the instrument, allow for the wider use of variation in female election beyond the
case of one woman winning or losing an election against one man for one seat in the
state chamber. I further define a winning or losing by a small margin as the absolute
vote margin being smaller than a certain percentage of total votes cast (for example 2





CloseFemdt is the number of women who won or lost by a small margin in district d
at election t; Closedt is the number of candidates (both male and female) who won
or lost by a small margin; CloseWindt is the number of candidates (both male and
female) who won by a close margin. The variable ExpCloseFemWindt calculates the
expected number of female winners by taking the number of women won or lost by a
small margin, and multiplying it by the proportion of all candidates (male and female)
involved in close races who won. Importantly, I assume that once a candidate is involved
in a close race, their assignment as a successful or unsuccessful candidate is as good as
random, with the probability of their election CloseWindt/Closedt.
This instrument can be illustrated by an example. Suppose that in an election, there
are three marginal candidates (win or lose by a small margin): Candidate A is female
and is successful, Candidate B is male and successful, and Candidate C is female and
unsuccessful. The expected number of women winning by a small margin according to
(3.3) is 23 × 2 =
4
3 , as there are two women and three candidates in total winning or
losing by a small margin, and there are two seats ‘available’ (there may be another
successful candidate D who has won by a large margin, and there may be another
unsuccessful candidate E who has lost by a large margin). Therefore NetCloseFemWin,
the instrument as defined by (3.2), is equal to 1 − 43 = −
1
3 . As Hyytinen et al. (2018)
suggest, if NetCloseFemWin is positive, women in those close races are relatively
‘lucky’ and if it is negative, women in those close races are relatively ‘unlucky’.
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First-Stage Specification: The first-stage specification identifies variation in female
election that is driven by differences between the number of women who are elected by
a small margin and how many one would expect to see elected in by a small margin.
The reason why that difference is necessary, as opposed to just using the number of
women elected by a small margin, is that it accounts for the female proportion of these
marginal candidates, as well as the number of these marginal candidates. If they were
not accounted for, then the very same unobserved heterogeneity that may bias the
OLS estimates may also be correlated to both the number of women getting elected
by small margins (as there needs to be a female candidate for this to happen in the
first place) and future female representation. As a result, the first-stage specification is
defined as:
FemWindt = γs + γt + δNetFemCloseWindt + +udt (3.4)
The unit of observation is the district-election pair, state and year fixed effects are
included, and the errors are clustered at the district level. As with the OLS specification,
the district d is distinct between redistricting regimes. In addition, both variables are
normalised by the number of winners in the election in district d at election t, similarly
to the OLS specification.
Second-Stage Specification: The second-stage specification which takes predicted
values from the first stage, is the following:
Femid,t+1 = αs + αt + β ̂FemWindt + ϵid,t+1 (3.5)
Predicted values of FemWindt are taken from the first-stage specification and denoted
as ̂FemWindt. Just as in the first-stage specification, state and year fixed effects are
included, and the errors are clustered at the district level. The specification defined in
(3.5) is the preferred specification for the empirical analysis.
3.3.3 Instrument: Net Close Female Elections
The conditional independence assumption is that differences between the number and
expected number of women elected by a small margin in election t is independent to
female representation in the next election in t + 1. This assumption is satisfied if the
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assignment of winning/losing elections (given a candidate is within a small margin) is
as good as random - this is more likely to be fulfilled the smaller one defines a ‘small
margin’.
Fig. 3.3 Balance Tests
This figure illustrates the coefficient of the instrument when regressing different characteristics on the
instrument. Previous Legislature and Previous Chamber Incumbent indicate whether the candidate
was previously an incumbent of the legislature or the specific chamber that the district lies in, while
Current Legislature and Chamber Incumbents are current incumbents who are running for re-election.
Other Party, Republican, and Democrat dummies indicate whether the candidate is running as a
candidate for one of those parties, and the Senate dummy indicates whether the district is part of the
state senate (value of one) or the state house (value of zero).
To test whether this assumption is likely to hold, I run a balance test on election
characteristics. I test whether variation in the instrument is correlated to these charac-
teristics, and I present the results in Figure 3.3. Figure 3.3 does not appear to provide
any evidence that the instrument is correlated to any of the observed characteristics.
For example, there do not appear to be more women than expected winning in close
state senate races compared to close state house races, and women do not appear to
be more likely than expected to win close elections when an incumbent is running for
election.
Further, evidence from Figure 3.4 suggests the instrument is symmetric around zero, as
one would expect. This is important, as an asymmetric distribution of the instrument
around zero would imply that the number of women winning by a small margin is
either systematically higher or lower than the expected number. The symmetry found
in Figure 3.4 supports the assumption of random assignment of victory conditional on
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Fig. 3.4 Instrument Distribution - Zeroes Omitted
This figure illustrates the distribution of the instrument, with values of zero omitted to focus on the
symmetry between the left and right hand sides. Each panel defines a ‘small margin’ by a certain
margin or bandwidth - for example, Panel D. defines a small margin as an absolute vote margin of
less than half a percent of total votes cast.
a small margin/close race. In addition, the first stage regressions, which are presented
in Panel A of Table C.1, suggest that an additional woman elected in by a small margin
increases the the number of women winning in a one-to-one relationship, which one
would expect (the estimated coefficient, which is δ in (3.4), is not significantly different
to zero). Further, the F-statistics from the first-stage results range between 83 and 210,
suggesting the instrument’s validity. Finally, I estimate the baseline specification across
a number of small margins. These margins are 10 percent (23.6 percent of observations),
5 percent (13.8 percent), 2 percent (6.5 percent), 1 percent (3.5 percent), and 0.5
percent (1.8 percent). I find that the results are robust to different assumptions.
3.4 Temporal Spillovers
I present the results of the baseline specification in Table 3.1. Panel A displays the
impact of a woman getting elected on the likelihood that a candidate in the next
election is female, while Panel B shows the impact on the likelihood that a winner at
the next election is female. Column 1 presents the estimate from the OLS specification,
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while Columns 2 to 6 present estimates from the second-stage specification for different
definitions of a ‘small margin’.
Table 3.1 Impact of Female Candidate Election on Future Female Candidacy
Dependent variable:
Future Female Representation Outcome
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Female Proportion of Future Candidates
Female Winners 0.438∗∗∗ 0.283∗∗∗ 0.269∗∗∗ 0.286∗∗∗ 0.266∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.009) (0.011) (0.017) (0.024) (0.036)
Bandwidth (+/-) N/A 10 percent 5 percent 2 percent 1 percent 0.5 percent
Observations 206,154 206,154 206,154 206,154 206,154 206,154
Adjusted R2 0.191 0.039 0.036 0.034 0.033 0.033
Panel B: Female Proportion of Future Winners
Female Winners 0.764∗∗∗ 0.571∗∗∗ 0.519∗∗∗ 0.503∗∗∗ 0.458∗∗∗ 0.444∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.013) (0.018) (0.027) (0.038) (0.056)
Bandwidth (+/-) N/A 10 percent 5 percent 2 percent 1 percent 0.5 percent
Observations 111,483 111,483 111,483 111,483 111,483 111,483
Adjusted R2 0.514 0.066 0.053 0.047 0.044 0.043
Notes: This table reports the estimated impact of the election of a woman in a district on female
representation in the district at the next election. The unit of observation is the candidate-district-
election. The dependent variable is a binary variable that takes a value of one if the candidate is a
woman, and a value of zero otherwise. The specifications in Panel A include all candidates, whereas
in Panel B the sample is restricted to candidates who are elected into office at that election. Column
1 reports the OLS estimates, while Columns 2 to 6 report the IV estimates across a range of different
definitions of a ‘small margin’, or bandwidths, for the first stage specification. All specifications
included year and state fixed effects. Standard errors, which are clustered at the district level, are
reported in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted as follows: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
.
Table 3.1 suggests that there is a positive spillover effect into the next election. The
difference between the OLS estimates of Column 1 and the IV estimates of the other
Columns support the argument made previously that the OLS estimates suffer from
a positive bias. Nonetheless, the preferred estimates are significant at the 1 percent
level, positive, and robust across different definitions of a small margin. For the ease of
interpretation, assume a single-member district: the election of a woman is estimated
to increase the proportion of candidates who are female at the next election by 24.0 to
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28.3 percentage points5. This is the equivalent of more than doubling (132 percent)
the likelihood of a female candidate in the average district. An even greater effect is
found for female representation among those elected at the next election (44.4 to 57.1
percentage points).
I investigate the longer-term impact of the election of a woman to office on female
candidacy and election in subsequent elections. The results are shown in Figure 3.5,
and I assume for the remainder of the chapter the definition of a small margin as being
less than 0.5 percent.
Fig. 3.5 Effect of Female Election on Future Female Representation
This figure shows the longer-term effect of the election of a woman in election t on future female
representation among candidates (Panel A) and among winners (Panel B) in the district. The coefficient
estimates and their corresponding 95 percent confidence intervals are presented. The accompanying
results can be found in Table C.2.
The impact on female representation is similar for future female candidacy and for
female winners. The positive spillover remains significant at the 5 percent level across
time, even four elections after the initial election of a woman. However, for the first
three elections the positive spillover effect appears to somewhat fade to around half
the initial impact: 24.0 to 12.8 percentage points by the third election after for female
candidacy, and 44.4 to 19.5 percentage points for female winners. Despite this, the
5If the district elects two candidates to a state chamber, then this would be the effect if the two
successful candidates were women, as the explanatory variable is normalised by the total number of
winners.
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long-term impact after four elections appears to pick up after a few election cycles of
decline6. After four election cycles the influence of the original election of a woman
increases around the same magnitude as the short-term or one-election impact. These
trends do not appear to be significantly different between the two major political
parties as shown in Table C.5.
As a falsification test, I test the correlation of female election with female representation
at previous elections. I present the estimated effects before and after the ‘treatment’ of
an woman being elected at election t in Figure 3.6.
Fig. 3.6 Pre-Treatment and Post-Treatment Effect
This figure presents the pre- and post-treatment effect of a woman being elected to office in a given
district, which is the treatment at election t (pre-treatment ranges from four to one election before,
post-treatment one to four elections after). The coefficient estimates and their respective 95 percent
confidence intervals are estimated using the baseline specification.
Reassuringly, there appears to be no significant effect before the treatment period
at election t. This suggests that there are no anticipation effects and that the close
of election of a woman (compared to the expected number of women winning by
a close margin) is not correlated to past female representation in the district. One
6I do not estimate longer-term effects due to there being relatively few cases where the same
district has had many more than four elections before redistricting.
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would not expect either to be the case if variation in the instrument was indeed
quasi-random.
3.5 Transmission Mechanisms: Incumbents and New
Candidates
Among others, there may be two important transmission mechanisms through which
the election of a woman may increase female representation in future elections in the
district. The first is simply an incumbency advantage: once a woman is elected they,
like their male colleagues, may enjoy an incumbency advantage at future elections
that is well documented, for example by Hainmueller et al. (2015). As a result, the
increase in female representation in the future may be partly due to the same woman
running for re-election, and in addition being more likely to win re-election due to an
incumbency advantage.
A second transmission mechanism may be the influence of a woman getting elected on
new female candidates. This mechanisms may influence every part of the ‘supply chain’
of female representation. For example, the election of a woman to office may encourage
other potential female candidates to run for office. In addition, it may influence political
parties’ choice of candidates, and be more likely to choose female candidates in the
future when it selects new candidates. Finally, it may influence voter attitudes towards
female candidates, and make them more likely to vote for a female candidate.
This spillover effect onto new candidates has several interpretations, which I am not
able to disaggregate between. One explanation may be that a woman serving her term
in office results in candidates, parties, and voters updating their beliefs about women’s
ability to serve in office (Beaman et al., 2009). The effect described by this explanation
could be positive or negative, depending on attitudes toward the female incumbent’s
performance in office, although Beaman et al. (2009) suggest that the election of a
woman may have, on average, a positive effect as it dampens voters’ risk aversion
concerning female candidates. Another explanation may be that having more women
elected increases the likelihood of a woman being selected as a new candidate as women
may be more likely to suggest that their party selects more female candidates for the
next election. For instance, incumbent who decides not to run for re-election may have
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some influence in suggesting a replacement to run for their party in the district that
she has served in.
Additionally, one explanation may be an increase in the perceived ‘electability’ of women
- this might mean that female candidates (and the parties that select) believe that they
have a more realistic chance of election and therefore run (or select them). However,
I place less emphasis on this explanation due to the chosen empirical specification
which exploits variation in the close election or non-election of women. The variation
in the instrument comes from small margins: one may not believe that women are
significantly more ‘electable’ upon observing a woman win by 0.5 percent of the vote
compared to the case where they observe that woman losing by 0.5 percent.
Although I am unable to separate the various explanations concerning new candidates,
I am able to disaggregate the effect of a electing a woman between the incumbency
advantage mechanism and the new candidate mechanism7. I define a ‘new candidate’
as one who is not currently an incumbent in the same state chamber8.
Figure 3.7 illustrates the impact on new candidates. Panel A presents the impact of on
the proportion of new candidates who are female, while Panel B shows the effect on
the proportion of new winners who are women. Both Panel A and Panel B suggest that
for three election cycles there is no significantly positive effect on female representation
among these new candidates and winners. In fact, there appears to be a negative effect
in the short run. In a simplistic case of elections between one Democrat candidate and
one Republican candidate, where the woman elected in election t runs for re-election
in election t + 1, these results suggest that there is no evidence of a positive spillover
effect across party lines. However, there appears to be a positive long-term effect four
election cycles after the initial election of a woman. This long-term increase in female
representation among new winners is greater than the increase in female representation
among new candidates, which suggests that the probability of a given female candidate
winning an election increases in the long run. This would be consistent with political
agents (voters, parties, and candidates) updating their beliefs about the ability of
women as elected officials, as found by Beaman et al. (2009).
7I use the latter as a catch-all term for the various explanations concerning new candidates.
8This takes into account incumbents who are in office at the end of a redistricting regime who run
for re-election in the same state chamber at the beginning of the next redistricting regime. I would
miss these cases I were to only include those who were an incumbent in the district at the previous
election, as I treat the same numbered/named district as distinct between redistricting regimes.
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Fig. 3.7 Impact on New Female Candidates
This figure illustrates the impact of a woman being elected on female representation among candi-
dates who are not incumbents up to four elections afterwards. The coefficient estimates and their
corresponding 95 percent confidence intervals are presented. The regression results can be found in
Table C.3.
This relatively long ‘response time’ may be driven by two factors. On one hand, newly-
inspired prospective candidates may take time preparing to run for office and get more
experience in campaigning (such as volunteering for another candidate), especially if
the political party requires them to do so. A second factor may be that newly-interested
female candidates may choose to wait until the current incumbent does not run for
re-election, given a considerable incumbency advantage in US politics. Separating
these preparation and waiting factors would be difficult, even with primary election
data.
These results suggest that in the short run, the temporal spillover effect is driven by
the same female incumbent running for re-election, but that in the long run it is driven
by an increase in new female candidates.
3.6 Geographical Spillovers
Alongside temporal spillovers in female representation, within a given district, I also
investigate geographical spillovers. I test whether the election of a woman in a district
at election t influences the likelihood that a given candidate or winner in other districts
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within the same state chamber are women. While Broockman (2014) focuses on nearby
districts, I test whether increases in female representation within the state chamber
influences female representation for a given district within that state chamber.
The election of a woman in a district may influence female representation in neighbouring
districts, but may also influence female representation across the state. This may be
due to the centralised influence of political parties in the state legislature in selecting
and aiding candidates. Members of the political party may use their influence to
endorse primary candidates across their state legislature, while the political party
committee may use its financial resources for election campaigns within the state
legislature to win a majority (Hogan, 2007). As a result, the election of a woman in
one district may influence whether women run for office or win in other districts within
the legislature beyond neighbouring districts. Furthermore, the geographical spillover
from news media coverage may cover an area beyond neighbouring districts, as the
consumption of local news coverage has declined in recent decades (Moskowitz, 2021).
The election of women across the state may be reported across a wider audience than
their respective neighbouring districts.
The first stage specification of (3.4) is altered so that the unit of observation is the
state chamber (for example the Texas State Senate), and the variables are normalised
by the total number of winners in the state chamber at that election9. The second-stage
specification is defined as the following:
Femid,t+k = αs + αt + βk ̂FemWinct + ϵid,t+k (3.6)
Where ̂FemWinct is the first-stage predicted value of the number of women winning
elections in state chamber c at election t, normalised by the total number of winners
in the state chamber at election t. Given that variation of the treatment is at the
state chamber level, the errors are clustered also at the level of the state chamber.
Therefore the coefficient βk represents the effect of more women being elected in state
chamber c on female representation in k elections’ time in the districts within the state
chamber.
9I remove chamber-election pairs where fewer than 10 percent of the seats are up for election to
ensure that an election that consists of small number of by-elections does not have a disproportionate
influence on the estimates.
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Fig. 3.8 Geographical Spillovers: All Candidates
This figure depicts the results of the second-stage specification outlined in (3.6), for four elections after
the treatment election t. Panels A and B present the impact on future female representation among
candidates and winners, respectively, along with 95 percent confidence intervals. The corresponding
regression results can be found in Table C.4.
Figure 3.8 illustrates the results across future elections. Panel A suggests that there
is a positive and significant geographical spillover effect within the state chamber.
The estimated coefficient is around 0.5 (between 0.487 and 0.520) for the next three
elections, falling to 0.331 at the fourth election. Given that the explanatory variable
̂FemWinct is normalised by the total number of winners in the chamber-election
pair, the interpretation of the estimates is different to the interpretation of coefficient
estimates in previous sections - it is the increase in future female representation if all
the elections at election t in chamber c were won by women.
Therefore, to estimate the average impact of one woman being elected in a district on
other districts in the state chamber, one would divide the coefficient by the average
number of districts in a state chamber (75.4). As a result, the geographical spillover
of one district electing a woman is an increase of between 0.65 and 0.67 percentage
points in female representation among candidates in the next three elections, which
falls to 0.44 by the fourth. Female representation among candidates is on average
18.1 percent in the sample, so these effects are the equivalent to an increase of 3.6-3.7
percent initially, falling to 2.4 percent.
Panel B suggests an even greater geographical spillover effect for female representation
among future election winners. This follows a similar trend to Panel A: for the next
three elections there is a positive and significant effect of 1.17 to 1.31 percentage points
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Fig. 3.9 Geographical Spillovers: New Candidates
This figure depicts the results of the second-stage specification outlined in (3.6), for four elections
after the treatment election t. Panels A and B present the impact on future female representation
among candidates and winners who are not incumbents, respectively, along with 95 percent confidence
intervals. The corresponding regression results can be found in Table C.4.
(equivalent to an increase of 6.4 and 7.2 percent), which falls by around half to 0.58
percentage points (3.2 percent) by the fourth election. Figure 3.8 suggest that there is
a significant, even if slightly fading, geographical spillover effect.
Figure 3.9 presents the results for candidates and winners who are not incumbents.
Both Panels A and B suggest that there is a positive effect two and four elections
afterwards, and this may be somewhat reflective of term limits introduced in 1990,
where many states enacted term limits of an even number of terms. In Panel A, there
is only a significant spillover effect in the long run (four elections’ time) for female
candidacy. Figures 3.8 and 3.9 are consistent with the temporal spillover effects found
in previous sections in that initially the positive spillover is driven by incumbents, and
then eventually by new candidates.
3.7 Concluding Remarks
These results have potential implications for policy that seeks to address inequality in
representation across a range of inequalities and professions. In particular, the temporal
and geographical spillovers estimated suggest that a given intervention to increase
female representation, whether in politics or in other professions, may have far-reaching
and long-lasting impacts on future female representation. Female incumbents drive
94
3.7 Concluding Remarks
on the spillover effect in the short run, and then new female candidates continue
this temporal spillover into the long run. However, US politics and its significant
incumbency advantage may not be representative of other democracies, or of other
professions.
Further work could be undertaken to disaggregate the transmission mechanisms that
were discussed in previous sections. One such avenue could be to evaluate ‘supply’ and
‘demand’ factors. It is unclear to what extent the spillover is driven by demand-side
factors (such as changes in voter attitudes), supply-side factors (such as more women
being inspired to run for office), or intermediary factors (such as political parties
observing changes in voter attitudes). Understanding the relative significance of these
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Appendix for Chapter 1
A.1 Definitions, Sources, and Descriptive Statistics
A.1.1 Description of Characteristics
Unless otherwise stated, the characteristics listed below are coded as binary variables:
taking a value of one if the candidate has that attribute or characteristic, and a value
of zero otherwise.
Titles
• Honorary Title: The candidate has been awarded an honorary title, such as an
OBE, an MBE or a knighthood. This includes the investiture of peerages where
the title has not been inherited from family members.
• Hereditary Title: The candidate has inherited a title from a family, most commonly
their father or brother. This includes titles such as Earl, Lord, Baron, and Baronet.
• Military Title: The candidate has been given a significant military honour. This
includes both the appointment to a high-ranking military position such as Colonel
or General and awards for notable military service such as the Victoria Cross.
• Title: The written name of the candidate on the ballot includes a title beyond
‘Mr.’. This includes titles such as Sir, Dr., Lord, Viscount, and Reverend.
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• Family Hereditary Title: A member of the candidate’s family holds a title that
is inherited - this does not necessarily mean that the candidate themselves ever
inherits this title (for example it may be held by their uncle who passes the title
down to their son, the candidate’s cousin).
Education
• Eton: The candidate attended Eton School.
• Public School: The candidate attended one of the schools included in the Public
Schools Act 1868. The schools (Charterhouse, Eton, Harrow, Rugby, Shrewsbury,
Westminster, Winchester) are among the most elite fee-paying schools.
• Fee Paying School: The candidate attended a school that required fees for
attendance. This would not be the case for grammar or local state schools.
• Oxbridge: The candidate attended at least one of the University of Cambridge
and the University of Oxford.
• University: The candidate attended university, whether in the United Kingdom
or abroad.
Occupations
• Family Occupations: These include the notable occupations (as mentioned in the
biographies) of the candidate’s family members. In most cases this will include the
occupation(s) of their father, but in addition may also include the occupation(s)
of other family members such as their grandparents or uncles/aunts.
• Previous Occupations: These include the candidate’s previous occupations before
running for office, and therefore may include more than one occupation. In some
cases the timing of some employment is unclear so the author’s judgement was
used to determine whether such employment was before or after their candidacy.
Occupational Groups
• Professionals: These include the professions below, primarily consisting of white-
collar workers or administrators.
– Academia: One is defined as being part of academia if they hold an academic
or teaching post, for example a Fellow or Lecturer at a university. In addition,
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this may include those with no formal post but are notable for their prolific
publications, for example literary writers.
– Civil Service: The civil service includes most appointed public office, whether
in an administrative or managerial capacity. Recurring examples include
diplomats or high-ranking non-partisan Whitehall advisers.
– Journalism: This includes work as a journalist or editor for a newspaper.
Notably this excludes those who are newspaper proprietors, who are classified
as involved in business.
– Law: Working in the legal profession whether as a barrister or a solicitor.
– Church: Religious occupations, the vast majority of these cases are local
vicars or priests.
• Business and Finance: This is the collective term for those who work in business
or finance.
– Business: This includes any management or ownership of a company from
any sector/industry.
– Finance: This is defined as the work in the financial sector, such as investment
banking.
• Working Class: This is the collective term for working-class or blue collar occu-
pations.
– Engineering: A catch-all term for more technical blue-collar work, such as
foremen or technicians.
– Manual Labour: For example manual work in factories.
– Trade Union: Activity in supporting or running a trade union, whether
locally or nationally.
• Military: Any military occupation at any level in the army or navy.
• Politics: Involvement in politics at either a local or national level.
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– Local Politics: Examples include being on the board of a local school or
committee, or local council. In many cases not this work is not necessarily
affiliated with a political party.
– Politics/Party Politics: This includes work in party politics, whether in the
organisation of a political party or in the aid of MPs at Westminster (such
as an assistant).
Social Connections
• Number of Clubs: The number of social clubs the candidate is a member of as
listed in their biographies. Social clubs played a significant role in not only the
social lives of those in the upper/upper-middle class, but also their political lives.
• Brooks, Carlton, National Liberal, Reform: These constitute the social clubs who
are most represented among politicians. For example, the National Liberal and
Reform clubs include central members of the Liberal Party, while the Brooks
and Carlton those of the Conservative Party. Membership is not automatic, so
inclusion in one of these is a good marker of social and political status.
• Inner Temple, Middle Temple, Lincoln’s Inn, Gray’s Inn: Membership of the
London law houses. The vast majority of lawyers in the sample are a member of
one of these, with the exception of practising in Scotland.
• School Connections: The number of connections to other candidates via the
school that they attended.
• University Connections: The number of connections to other candidates via the
university that they attended.
• Legal Connections: The number of connections to other candidates via the law
house they practised in.
• JP: Whether the candidate was appointed as a Justice of the Peace. A local legal
occupation, but the appointment itself indicates local political influence.
108
A.1 Definitions, Sources, and Descriptive Statistics
A.1.2 Data Sources
Fig. A.1 Sample Extract: Who’s Who of British Members of Parliament: 1886-1918
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Oxford Dictionary of National Biography entry removed for copyright reasons. Copyright
holder is the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography.
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A.1.3 Election Results 1900-1910
Fig. A.2 Conservative Margin of Defeat in the 1906 UK Election
This figure illustrates the distribution of the Conservative loss margin (the proportion of the vote won
by the Conservatives minus the proportion of the vote won by the most successful other party in the
constituency) across constituencies in 1906.
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A.1.4 Summary Statistics
Table A.1 Summary Statistics: Education, Titles and Family Backgrounds (All Candi-
dates)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Whole Sample 1906 (Jan.) 1910 (Dec.) Difference
mean mean mean mean
Honorary Title 48.9 49.4 44.9 -9.2
Hereditary Title 20.0 21.8 16.0 -26.3
Military Title 10.4 9.8 10.0 2.3
Title 22.0 23.0 20.1 -12.9
Family Hereditary Title 25.7 26.2 23.9 -8.7
Eton 15.5 16.3 14.4 -11.4
Public School 28.0 29.3 26.0 -11.2
Fee Paying School 81.3 81.2 79.9 -1.6
Oxbridge 34.7 35.5 32.1 -9.5
University 51.4 52.4 48.7 -7.1
Professional (Family) 28.8 30.4 27.6 -9.4
Academia (Family) 9.1 9.9 9.3 -6.3
Civil Service (Family) 3.8 3.9 3.9 -2.1
Journalism (Family) 0.4 0.6 0.3 -45.8
Law (Family) 6.2 6.3 6.3 0.1
Church (Family) 12.8 13.5 11.5 -14.8
Business and Finance (Family) 17.7 17.6 16.7 -5.2
Business (Family) 14.5 14.1 13.8 -1.9
Finance (Family) 3.8 4.2 3.1 -26.0
Working Class (Family) 10.1 10.4 10.6 1.4
Engineering (Family) 2.2 2.1 2.2 3.5
Labourer (Family) 8.1 8.5 8.6 1.1
Trade Union (Family) 0.0 0.0 0.0 .
Military (Family) 14.4 14.5 14.4 -0.9
Politics and Local Politics (Family) 27.8 28.6 26.4 -7.6
Local Politics (Family) 15.1 15.4 14.9 -3.1
Politics (Family) 13.9 14.5 12.3 -14.7
Observations 3938 1038 957 905
This table reports summary statistics for a range of characteristics for all candidates in the
sample, which are explained in more detail in Appendix A.1.1. Columns 2 and 3 focus on the
the 1906 and December 1910 (the last election in the sample) elections, and Column 4 reports
the percentage change in the proportion from 1906 to December 1910.
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Table A.2 Summary Statistics: Education, Titles and Family Backgrounds (Conservative
Candidates)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Whole Sample 1906 (Jan.) 1910 (Dec.) Difference
mean mean mean mean
Honorary Title 50.9 54.5 45.1 -17.2
Hereditary Title 29.3 34.3 23.0 -32.7
Military Title 14.7 14.3 14.2 -0.3
Title 25.3 32.4 18.3 -43.4
Family Hereditary Title 34.0 35.0 31.2 -11.1
Eton 24.5 26.4 23.2 -12.4
Public School 40.0 42.2 37.1 -12.2
Fee Paying School 91.6 91.1 91.3 0.2
Oxbridge 41.4 41.0 39.2 -4.5
University 55.2 54.7 53.1 -3.0
Professional (Family) 28.4 29.9 27.6 -7.8
Academia (Family) 8.7 9.4 9.5 0.5
Civil Service (Family) 3.8 3.3 3.8 15.6
Journalism (Family) 0.4 0.6 0.2 -65.8
Law (Family) 6.0 6.1 6.5 6.2
Church (Family) 12.9 13.7 11.8 -14.1
Business and Finance (Family) 14.2 14.3 12.2 -14.9
Business (Family) 11.4 11.1 10.1 -8.7
Finance (Family) 3.5 3.9 2.3 -40.5
Working Class (Family) 3.3 2.7 3.6 34.3
Engineering (Family) 1.8 1.6 1.7 2.7
Labourer (Family) 1.5 1.0 1.9 84.9
Trade Union (Family) 0.0 0.0 0.0 .
Military (Family) 19.4 18.9 20.2 7.2
Politics and Local Politics (Family) 27.5 28.3 24.6 -12.9
Local Politics (Family) 15.2 15.4 14.5 -5.5
Politics (Family) 14.0 14.5 11.4 -21.9
Observations 1973 488 475 459
This table reports summary statistics for a range of characteristics for Conservative candidates
in the sample, which are explained in more detail in Appendix A.1.1. Columns 2 and 3 focus
on the the 1906 and December 1910 (the last election in the sample) elections, and Column 4
reports the percentage change in the proportion from 1906 to December 1910.
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Table A.3 Summary Statistics: Previous Occupations and Social Connections (All
Candidates)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Whole Sample 1906 (Jan.) 1910 (Dec.) Difference
mean mean mean mean
Professional 55.5 56.3 52.2 -7.1
Academia 15.7 17.1 14.4 -15.9
Civil Service 32.5 33.6 27.8 -17.3
Journalism 3.5 4.1 3.6 -14.2
Law 24.7 24.0 24.2 1.1
Church 1.3 1.5 1.1 -25.4
Business and Finance 29.4 29.7 27.9 -6.0
Business 26.2 26.2 24.7 -5.9
Finance 5.5 5.6 5.5 -0.9
Working Class 8.0 8.5 8.3 -2.6
Engineer 2.4 2.2 2.5 13.2
Labourer 5.1 5.8 5.0 -13.2
Trade Union 5.5 6.4 5.9 -8.0
Military 24.4 24.8 23.7 -4.2
Politics and Local Politics 36.0 36.6 34.5 -5.8
Local Politics 34.9 35.6 33.0 -7.4
Politics 1.5 1.4 2.2 51.8
Number of Clubs 1.6 1.7 1.5 -6.5
Athenaeum Club 6.4 6.8 5.4 -20.6
Brooks Club 7.6 8.3 6.6 -20.5
Carlton Club 29.1 27.5 27.9 1.6
National Liberal Club 17.0 18.8 16.1 -14.3
Reform Club 17.1 18.8 15.2 -19.3
Inner Temple 8.5 8.6 7.6 -11.0
Middle Temple 4.3 4.0 4.5 11.0
Lincoln’s Inn 3.4 3.9 2.9 -24.1
Gray’s Inn’ 0.8 0.3 1.1 297.7
School Connections 61.3 64.0 57.2 -10.6
University Connections 135.2 138.4 126.2 -8.8
Legal Connections 20.9 21.0 19.2 -8.6
JP 36.6 37.9 31.6 -16.8
Observations 3938 1038 957 905
This table reports summary statistics for a range of characteristics for all
candidates in the sample, which are explained in more detail in Appendix
A.1.1. Columns 2 and 3 focus on the the 1906 and December 1910 (the
last election in the sample) elections, and Column 4 reports the percentage
change in the proportion from 1906 to December 1910.
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Table A.4 Summary Statistics: Previous Occupations and Social Connections (Conser-
vative Candidates)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Whole Sample 1906 (Jan.) 1910 (Dec.) Difference
mean mean mean mean
Professional 52.3 53.5 48.0 -10.3
Academia 11.1 12.7 9.5 -25.4
Civil Service 30.9 33.2 24.6 -25.8
Journalism 1.9 2.9 1.7 -41.3
Law 24.6 22.7 25.1 10.1
Church 0.9 1.0 0.4 -58.9
Business and Finance 24.8 25.2 21.5 -14.8
Business 21.4 21.3 18.3 -14.1
Finance 5.0 4.9 4.4 -10.1
Working Class 2.6 1.4 2.9 105.5
Engineer 1.7 1.0 1.5 43.8
Labourer 0.9 0.4 1.3 208.2
Trade Union 0.7 0.4 0.8 105.5
Military 35.6 36.7 34.5 -5.9
Politics and Local Politics 35.4 36.7 31.2 -15.1
Local Politics 34.1 35.2 29.7 -15.8
Politics 1.9 2.0 2.3 13.0
Number of Clubs 1.8 1.8 1.8 -4.2
Athenaeum Club 7.3 8.4 5.5 -34.8
Brooks Club 4.7 4.9 3.8 -22.9
Carlton Club 56.6 56.8 54.3 -4.3
National Liberal Club 0.7 0.8 0.8 2.7
Reform Club 1.6 1.8 0.4 -77.2
Inner Temple 10.2 9.6 9.3 -3.8
Middle Temple 3.3 3.1 4.0 30.1
Lincoln’s Inn 3.3 3.9 2.7 -29.7
Gray’s Inn’ 0.7 0.2 1.3 516.4
School Connections 92.8 98.6 87.6 -11.2
University Connections 158.4 157.9 150.7 -4.6
Legal Connections 22.8 22.0 21.5 -2.6
JP 37.6 39.1 31.1 -20.5
Observations 1973 488 475 459
This table reports summary statistics for a range of characteristics for
Conservative candidates in the sample, which are explained in more detail
in Appendix A.1.1. Columns 2 and 3 focus on the the 1906 and December
1910 (the last election in the sample) elections, and Column 4 reports the
percentage change in the proportion from 1906 to December 1910.
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A.2 Classification: Aggregation Methods
This section illustrates the correlation between different characteristics and the group
classification that the two machine learning sorting algorithms undertake. Correlations
between characteristics and membership of different groups match prior expectations
in the vast majority of cases.
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This table illustrates the characteristics of the elite index, reporting the coefficient results of simply
regressing the characteristic variable on the elite index created by the Support Vector Machine.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the constituency level. ***, **, and *
denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
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This table illustrates the characteristics of the political elite group as defined by Latent Dirichlet
Allocation, reporting the coefficient results of simply regressing the characteristic variable on the
probability that the Latent Dirichlet Allocation defines the candidate as being part of the political
elite. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the constituency level. ***, **,
and * denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
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This table illustrates the characteristics of the working-class/political outsiders group as defined by
Latent Dirichlet Allocation, reporting the coefficient results of simply regressing the characteristic
variable on the probability that the Latent Dirichlet Allocation defines the candidate as being part of
the working class/political outsiders. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered
at the constituency level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent level,
respectively.
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A.3 SVM/LDA Variables: Regression Tables and
Figures
A.3.1 Falsification Test
Table A.8 Comparing Political Parties
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Elite (SVM) Elite (LDA) Middle (LDA) Working (LDA)
Other Parties × 1906 Loss Margin 0.035 0.005 -0.015 0.016
(0.081) (0.063) (0.063) (0.059)
Conservatives × 1906 Loss Margin -0.271∗∗ -0.216∗∗ 0.057 0.155∗
(0.121) (0.094) (0.094) (0.087)
Adjusted R2 0.303 0.376 0.237 0.413
N 1038 1040 1040 1040
This table reports the estimates of the effects of the 1906 loss margin in a constituency on the type of
candidate select in 1910, across different political parties (not just the Conservatives). The dependent
variable in Column 1 is the probability that the candidate is a member of the political elite as defined
by the Support Vector Machine. In Columns 2, 3, and 4, the dependent variable is the probability
that the candidate is a member of the political elite, middle class, and working class, respectively,
as defined by the Latent Dirichlet Allocation. The explanatory variables reported are the 1906 loss
margin interacted with whether the candidate is from Other Parties (besides the Conservatives)
and another interaction with whether candidate is from the Conservatives. The 1906 loss margin is
the Conservative loss to the winning party, as a percentage of total votes cast in the constituency
(negative if the Conservatives won). Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered
at the constituency level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent level,
respectively.
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A.3.2 Don’t Lose, Don’t Learn?
Table A.9 Incumbents and Losing Candidates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Elite (SVM) Elite (LDA) Middle (LDA) Working (LDA)
1906 Loss Margin 0.188 0.140 -0.071 -0.087
(0.267) (0.239) (0.220) (0.174)
1906 Conservative Defeat × 1906 Loss Margin -0.649∗∗ -0.577∗∗ 0.213 0.400∗∗
(0.298) (0.268) (0.247) (0.194)
1906 Conservative Defeat -0.639 1.911 -1.282 -0.886
(5.636) (5.031) (4.640) (3.667)
Adjusted R2 0.096 0.212 0.106 0.168
N 468 468 468 468
This table reports the estimates of the effects of the 1906 loss margin in a constituency on the
type of candidate the Conservatives select in 1910, for different outcomes in 1906. The dependent
variable in Column 1 is the probability that the candidate is a member of the political elite as
defined by the Support Vector Machine. In Columns 2, 3, and 4, the dependent variable is the
probability that the candidate is a member of the political elite, middle class, and working class,
respectively, as defined by the Latent Dirichlet Allocation. The explanatory variables reported are
the 1906 loss margin and the 1906 loss margin interacted with whether the Conservatives lost in
1906. The 1906 loss margin is the Conservative loss to the winning party, as a percentage of total
votes cast in the constituency (negative if the Conservatives won). The lagged dependent variables
are the values of the dependent variables in 1906. The 1900 loss margin and lagged dependent
variable are also included, as well as a dummy variable that takes value of one if the Conservatives
lost in that constituency in 1906. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at
the constituency level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent level,
respectively.
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A.3.3 Conservative Strongholds
Table A.10 Conservative Strongholds
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Elite (SVM) Elite (LDA) Middle (LDA) Working (LDA)
1906 Loss Margin -0.209 -0.247∗∗ 0.178∗ 0.060
(0.131) (0.117) (0.106) (0.085)
Conservative Stronghold × 1906 Loss Margin -0.174 0.039 -0.338∗∗ 0.331∗∗
(0.199) (0.177) (0.160) (0.129)
Adjusted R2 0.087 0.205 0.123 0.171
N 468 468 468 468
This table reports the estimates of the effects of the 1906 loss margin in a constituency on the type
of candidate the Conservatives select in 1910, for different types of constituencies. The dependent
variable in Column 1 is the probability that the candidate is a member of the political elite as
defined by the Support Vector Machine. In Columns 2, 3, and 4, the dependent variable is the
probability that the candidate is a member of the political elite, middle class, and working class,
respectively, as defined by the Latent Dirichlet Allocation. The explanatory variables reported are
the 1906 loss margin interacted with whether the constituency is a Conservative stronghold and
the 1906 loss margin interacted with whether the constituency is one of the other constituencies.
The 1906 loss margin is the Conservative loss to the winning party, as a percentage of total votes
cast in the constituency (negative if the Conservatives won). The lagged dependent variables
are the values of the dependent variables in 1906. The 1900 loss margin and lagged dependent
variable are also included. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the
constituency level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent level,
respectively.
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A.3.4 Working-Class Constituencies
Table A.11 Working Class Constituencies
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Elite (SVM) Elite (LDA) Middle (LDA) Working (LDA)
1906 Loss Margin -0.074 -0.162 0.094 0.082
(0.123) (0.111) (0.102) (0.080)
Working Class × 1906 Loss Margin -0.478∗∗∗ -0.205 -0.056 0.245∗∗
(0.165) (0.149) (0.137) (0.108)
Adjusted R2 0.103 0.206 0.106 0.169
N 468 468 468 468
This table reports the estimates of the effects of the 1906 loss margin in a constituency on
the type of candidate the Conservatives select in 1910, for different types of constituencies.
The dependent variable in Column 1 is the probability that the candidate is a member
of the political elite as defined by the Support Vector Machine. In Columns 2, 3, and 4,
the dependent variable is the probability that the candidate is a member of the political
elite, middle class, and working class, respectively, as defined by the Latent Dirichlet
Allocation. The explanatory variables reported are the 1906 loss margin interacted with
whether the constituency is a defined as a working-class constituency and the 1906 loss
margin interacted with whether the constituency is one of the other constituencies. The
1906 loss margin is the Conservative loss to the winning party, as a percentage of total
votes cast in the constituency (negative if the Conservatives won). The lagged dependent
variables are the values of the dependent variables in 1906. The 1900 loss margin and
lagged dependent variable are also included. Standard errors are reported in parentheses
and are clustered at the constituency level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance
at 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
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A.3.5 A Winning Strategy? Implications for the 1910 Elec-
tions
Table A.12 Baseline Results
(1) (2)
Win Margin 1910 Win Margin 1910
Elite (SVM) × Upper-Class Constituency 4.923∗∗∗
(1.120)
Elite (SVM) × Middle-Class Constituency -5.554∗∗∗
(0.961)
Elite (SVM) × Working-Class Constituency -6.902∗∗∗
(1.025)
Elite (LDA) × Upper-Class Constituency 5.340∗∗∗
(1.294)
Elite (LDA) × Middle-Class Constituency -6.672∗∗∗
(1.264)
Elite (LDA) × Working-Class Constituency -7.611∗∗∗
(1.341)
Adjusted R2 0.391 0.377
N 348 348
This table reports the effect of increasing the probability that a candidate
is a member of the political elite by one standard deviation on the Con-
servative win margin, as outlined in Section 1.9. The signs are different to
those of Figure 1.8, as Figure 1.8 illustrates the effect of decreasing the
probability that a candidate is a member of the political elite, rather than
increasing.
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A.4 All Characteristics: Regression Tables and Fig-
ures
Fig. A.4 Baseline Results
This figure illustrates baseline coefficient estimates (and 95 per cent confidence intervals) of the 1906
loss margin on whether the Conservative candidate in 1910 has a given characteristic.
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A.5 Results Excluding Controls
This section reproduces the results from the main paper excluding controls: which are
the candidate characteristics from 1906 and the loss margin from 1900.
Table A.13 Baseline Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Elite (SVM) Elite (LDA) Middle (LDA) Working (LDA)
1906 Loss Margin -0.101∗ -0.229∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗ 0.050
(0.060) (0.058) (0.049) (0.042)
Adjusted R2 0.002 0.017 0.015 0.000
N 821 821 821 821
This table reports the estimates of the effects of the 1906 loss margin in a
constituency on the type of candidate the Conservatives select in 1910.
The dependent variable in Column 1 is the probability that the candidate
is a member of the political elite as defined by the Support Vector Machine.
In Columns 2, 3, and 4, the dependent variable is the probability that the
candidate is a member of the political elite, middle class, and working class,
respectively, as defined by the Latent Dirichlet Allocation. The 1906 loss
margins are the Conservative losses to the winning party, as a percentage
of total votes cast in the constituency (negative if the Conservatives won).
Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the
constituency level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1, 5,
and 10 percent level, respectively.
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Table A.14 Falsification Test
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Elite (SVM) Elite (LDA) Middle (LDA) Working (LDA)
Other Parties × 1906 Loss Margin 0.010 -0.063 0.099∗ -0.036
(0.069) (0.054) (0.052) (0.053)
Conservatives × 1906 Loss Margin -0.111 -0.166∗∗ 0.080 0.086
(0.096) (0.076) (0.073) (0.074)
Adjusted R2 0.087 0.183 0.015 0.131
N 1623 1624 1624 1624
This table reports the estimates of the effects of the 1906 loss margin in a constituency
on the type of candidate select in 1910, across different political parties (not just the
Conservatives). The dependent variable in Column 1 is the probability that the candidate
is a member of the political elite as defined by the Support Vector Machine. In Columns
2, 3, and 4, the dependent variable is the probability that the candidate is a member
of the political elite, middle class, and working class, respectively, as defined by the
Latent Dirichlet Allocation. The explanatory variables reported are the 1906 loss margin
interacted with whether the candidate is from Other Parties (besides the Conservatives)
and another interaction with whether candidate is from the Conservatives. The 1906 loss
margin is the Conservative loss to the winning party, as a percentage of total votes cast
in the constituency (negative if the Conservatives won). Standard errors are reported in
parentheses and are clustered at the constituency level. ***, **, and * denote statistical
significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
Table A.15 Don’t Lose, Don’t Learn?
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Elite (SVM) Elite (LDA) Middle (LDA) Working (LDA)
1906 Loss Margin 0.378∗∗∗ 0.340∗∗ 0.003 -0.343∗∗∗
(0.140) (0.134) (0.114) (0.098)
1906 Conservative Defeat × 1906 Loss Margin -0.723∗∗∗ -0.905∗∗∗ 0.293∗∗ 0.612∗∗∗
(0.173) (0.165) (0.140) (0.121)
1906 Conservative Defeat -2.956 -1.747 0.081 1.666
(3.651) (3.482) (2.964) (2.554)
Adjusted R2 0.021 0.050 0.018 0.029
N 821 821 821 821
This table reports the estimates of the effects of the 1906 loss margin in a constituency on the
type of candidate the Conservatives select in 1910, for different outcomes in 1906. The dependent
variable in Column 1 is the probability that the candidate is a member of the political elite as
defined by the Support Vector Machine. In Columns 2, 3, and 4, the dependent variable is the
probability that the candidate is a member of the political elite, middle class, and working class,
respectively, as defined by the Latent Dirichlet Allocation. The explanatory variables reported are
the 1906 loss margin and the 1906 loss margin interacted with whether the Conservatives lost in
1906. The 1906 loss margin is the Conservative loss to the winning party, as a percentage of total
votes cast in the constituency (negative if the Conservatives won). A dummy variable that takes
value of one if the Conservatives lost in that constituency in 1906 is included. Standard errors
are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the constituency level. ***, **, and * denote
statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
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Table A.16 Conservative Strongholds
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Elite (SVM) Elite (LDA) Middle (LDA) Working (LDA)
1906 Loss Margin -0.049 -0.235∗∗ 0.263∗∗∗ -0.028
(0.101) (0.096) (0.081) (0.071)
Conservative Stronghold × 1906 Loss Margin -0.013 0.131 -0.250∗∗ 0.119
(0.133) (0.127) (0.106) (0.093)
Adjusted R2 0.003 0.025 0.029 0.000
N 821 821 821 821
This table reports the estimates of the effects of the 1906 loss margin in a constituency on the type
of candidate the Conservatives select in 1910, for different types of constituencies. The dependent
variable in Column 1 is the probability that the candidate is a member of the political elite as
defined by the Support Vector Machine. In Columns 2, 3, and 4, the dependent variable is the
probability that the candidate is a member of the political elite, middle class, and working class,
respectively, as defined by the Latent Dirichlet Allocation. The explanatory variables reported are
the 1906 loss margin interacted with whether the constituency is a Conservative stronghold and
the 1906 loss margin interacted with whether the constituency is one of the other constituencies.
The 1906 loss margin is the Conservative loss to the winning party, as a percentage of total
votes cast in the constituency (negative if the Conservatives won). Standard errors are reported
in parentheses and are clustered at the constituency level. ***, **, and * denote statistical
significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
Table A.17 Working-Class Constituencies
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Elite (SVM) Elite (LDA) Middle (LDA) Working (LDA)
1906 Loss Margin -0.085 -0.219∗∗∗ 0.214∗∗∗ 0.005
(0.076) (0.073) (0.061) (0.053)
Working Class × 1906 Loss Margin -0.042 -0.025 -0.092 0.117
(0.119) (0.115) (0.096) (0.084)
Adjusted R2 0.001 0.016 0.015 0.002
N 821 821 821 821
This table reports the estimates of the effects of the 1906 loss margin in a constituency on
the type of candidate the Conservatives select in 1910, for different types of constituencies.
The dependent variable in Column 1 is the probability that the candidate is a member
of the political elite as defined by the Support Vector Machine. In Columns 2, 3, and 4,
the dependent variable is the probability that the candidate is a member of the political
elite, middle class, and working class, respectively, as defined by the Latent Dirichlet
Allocation. The explanatory variables reported are the 1906 loss margin interacted with
whether the constituency is a defined as a working-class constituency and the 1906 loss
margin interacted with whether the constituency is one of the other constituencies. The
1906 loss margin is the Conservative loss to the winning party, as a percentage of total
votes cast in the constituency (negative if the Conservatives won). Standard errors are
reported in parentheses and are clustered at the constituency level. ***, **, and * denote
statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
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A.6 Classification Robustness
A.6.1 Support Vector Machine: Different Initial Labels
This section reproduces the Support Vector Machine results in the main paper, but
illustrates the robustness of the findings by altering the initial labelling. I instead
initially label the unambiguously elite as those whose families have hereditary titles
and also attend a public school, while the unambiguous outsiders or working are those
whose families are labourers. These results are reported in Table A.18 below.
Table A.18 Baseline Results: Different Initial Labels (SVM)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1906 Loss Margin -0.401∗∗ 0.101 0.383 -0.272 0.00825
(0.198) (0.164) (0.539) (0.236) (0.346)
Conservative × 1906 Loss Margin -0.508∗
(0.282)
Conservative Defeat × 1906 Loss Margin -1.112∗
(0.602)
Conservative Stronghold × 1906 Loss Margin -0.343
(0.345)
Working Class × 1906 Loss Margin -0.832∗∗
(0.418)
Adjusted R2 0.103 0.294 0.107 0.103 0.152
N 468 1038 468 468 238
This table reproduces results from the main paper, with the probabilities of the
candidate being part of the political elite defined by a different Support Vector




Another potential method of clustering is k-means clustering, which has been used
for classification in the economics literature, for example by Crone (2005). For a
given number of groups (such as three), k-means clustering minimises the within-
cluster variances in the space of candidate characteristics. The three groups that are
summarised in Figure A.5, which illustrates a clear political elite, working class, and
middle class.
Fig. A.5 Characteristics of Candidates in Different K-Mean Clusters
I replicate the results in the main paper, replacing the Latent Dirichlet Allocation
variables for the political elite and the working class with indicators from the k-means
clustering method, and they are reported in Tables A.19 and A.20.
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Table A.19 Baseline Results: K-Means Clustering (Upper Class)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1906 Loss Margin -1.121∗∗∗ -0.454 -0.414 -0.926∗∗∗ -0.301
(0.231) (0.325) (0.637) (0.256) (0.440)
Conservative × 1906 Loss Margin -0.676
(0.510)
Conservative Defeat × 1906 Loss Margin -1.100
(0.718)
Conservative Stronghold × 1906 Loss Margin -0.760∗
(0.430)
Working Class × 1906 Loss Margin -1.099∗∗
(0.498)
Adjusted R2 0.168 0.230 0.171 0.171 0.172
N 641 1242 641 641 317
This table reproduces the key results from the main paper, but defines the dependent
variable as the probability that the candidate is a member of the political elite/upper
class as defined by the K-means clustering method.
Table A.20 Baseline Results: K-Means Clustering (Working Class)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1906 Loss Margin 7.552∗∗∗ -1.701 -0.991 8.075∗∗∗ 2.618
(1.566) (1.045) (4.286) (1.738) (3.960)
Conservative × 1906 Loss Margin 7.059∗∗∗
(1.641)
Conservative Defeat × 1906 Loss Margin 12.45∗∗∗
(4.815)
Conservative Stronghold × 1906 Loss Margin -2.032
(2.921)
Working Class × 1906 Loss Margin 10.72∗∗
(4.472)
Adjusted R2 0.0308 0.0286 0.0412 0.0300 0.0593
N 641 1253 641 641 317
This table reproduces the key results from the main paper, but defines the dependent
variable as the probability that the candidate is a member of the working class as defined
by the K-means clustering method.
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A.6.3 Latent Dirichlet Allocation: Different Number of Groups
I reproduce the results in the main paper using the Latent Dirichlet Allocation for
different number of defined groups. The main paper focuses on three groups, and
the following reports the results for two, four, five, and six groups. While the results
regarding the political elite are not particularly robust, the results regarding the
increasing in working-class representation are consistently positive.
Table A.21 Baseline Results: (LDA) 2 Clusters - Political Elite
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1906 Loss Margin -0.337∗∗∗ 0.220∗∗∗ -0.0296 -0.189 -0.285∗
(0.0879) (0.0632) (0.238) (0.124) (0.159)
Conservative × 1906 Loss Margin -0.286∗∗∗
(0.106)
Conservative Defeat × 1906 Loss Margin -0.499∗
(0.267)
Conservative Stronghold × 1906 Loss Margin -0.245∗
(0.146)
Working Class × 1906 Loss Margin -0.159
(0.191)
Adjusted R2 0.209 0.394 0.216 0.212 0.156
N 468 1040 468 468 238
This table reproduces the key results from the main paper, but defines the dependent
variable as the probability that the candidate is a member of the political elite/upper
class when clustering for two groups using the LDA.
Table A.22 Baseline Results: (LDA) 4 Clusters - Political Elite
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1906 Loss Margin -0.221∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗ 0.284 -0.251∗∗ -0.0663
(0.0821) (0.0513) (0.222) (0.116) (0.148)
Conservative × 1906 Loss Margin -0.179∗∗
(0.0867)
Conservative Defeat × 1906 Loss Margin -0.738∗∗∗
(0.249)
Conservative Stronghold × 1906 Loss Margin 0.0494
(0.137)
Working Class × 1906 Loss Margin -0.272
(0.180)
Adjusted R2 0.253 0.376 0.268 0.251 0.158
N 468 1040 468 468 238
This table reproduces the key results from the main paper, but defines the dependent
variable as the probability that the candidate is a member of the political elite/upper
class when clustering for four groups using the LDA.
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Table A.23 Baseline Results: (LDA) 4 Clusters - Working Class
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1906 Loss Margin 0.0995∗∗∗ -0.148∗∗∗ -0.0117 -0.0228 -0.00711
(0.0377) (0.0400) (0.102) (0.0527) (0.0754)
Conservative × 1906 Loss Margin 0.0818
(0.0677)
Conservative Defeat × 1906 Loss Margin 0.219∗
(0.114)
Conservative Stronghold × 1906 Loss Margin 0.204∗∗∗
(0.0620)
Working Class × 1906 Loss Margin 0.293∗∗∗
(0.0895)
Adjusted R2 0.0487 0.472 0.0669 0.0684 0.0817
N 468 1040 468 468 238
This table reproduces the key results from the main paper, but defines the dependent
variable as the probability that the candidate is a member of the working class when
clustering for four groups using the LDA.
Table A.24 Baseline Results: (LDA) 5 Clusters - Political Elite
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1906 Loss Margin -0.175∗∗ 0.0865∗ 0.267 -0.121 -0.0314
(0.0777) (0.0477) (0.211) (0.110) (0.138)
Conservative × 1906 Loss Margin -0.128
(0.0812)
Conservative Defeat × 1906 Loss Margin -0.616∗∗∗
(0.237)
Conservative Stronghold × 1906 Loss Margin -0.0887
(0.130)
Working Class × 1906 Loss Margin -0.302∗
(0.168)
Adjusted R2 0.216 0.315 0.225 0.215 0.135
N 468 1040 468 468 238
This table reproduces the key results from the main paper, but defines the dependent
variable as the probability that the candidate is a member of the political elite/upper
class when clustering for five groups using the LDA.
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Table A.25 Baseline Results: (LDA) 5 Clusters - Working Class
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1906 Loss Margin 0.103∗∗∗ -0.120∗∗∗ 0.0178 -0.0142 0.0152
(0.0308) (0.0333) (0.0832) (0.0429) (0.0641)
Conservative × 1906 Loss Margin 0.0987∗
(0.0567)
Conservative Defeat × 1906 Loss Margin 0.175∗
(0.0930)
Conservative Stronghold × 1906 Loss Margin 0.195∗∗∗
(0.0505)
Working Class × 1906 Loss Margin 0.245∗∗∗
(0.0765)
Adjusted R2 0.0510 0.486 0.0698 0.0787 0.0913
N 468 1040 468 468 238
This table reproduces the key results from the main paper, but defines the dependent
variable as the probability that the candidate is a member of the working class when
clustering for five groups using the LDA.
Table A.26 Baseline Results: (LDA) 6 Clusters - Political Elite
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1906 Loss Margin -0.166∗∗ 0.0745∗ 0.222 -0.0809 -0.0272
(0.0723) (0.0443) (0.197) (0.102) (0.128)
Conservative × 1906 Loss Margin -0.129∗
(0.0755)
Conservative Defeat × 1906 Loss Margin -0.534∗∗
(0.220)
Conservative Stronghold × 1906 Loss Margin -0.141
(0.120)
Working Class × 1906 Loss Margin -0.281∗
(0.155)
Adjusted R2 0.263 0.343 0.270 0.263 0.190
N 468 1040 468 468 238
This table reproduces the key results from the main paper, but defines the dependent
variable as the probability that the candidate is a member of the political elite/upper
class when clustering for six groups using the LDA.
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Table A.27 Baseline Results: (LDA) 6 Clusters - Working Class
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1906 Loss Margin 0.143∗∗∗ -0.0646∗∗∗ 0.0201 0.0402 0.0694
(0.0263) (0.0231) (0.0713) (0.0367) (0.0501)
Conservative × 1906 Loss Margin 0.154∗∗∗
(0.0396)
Conservative Defeat × 1906 Loss Margin 0.188∗∗
(0.0797)
Conservative Stronghold × 1906 Loss Margin 0.171∗∗∗
(0.0432)
Working Class × 1906 Loss Margin 0.184∗∗∗
(0.0605)
Adjusted R2 0.0995 0.412 0.112 0.127 0.148
N 468 1040 468 468 238
This table reproduces the key results from the main paper, but defines the dependent
variable as the probability that the candidate is a member of the working class when
clustering for six groups using the LDA.
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A.6.4 Missing Data Assumptions
Missing Biographical Data
This section provides robustness checks concerning missing biographical data on certain
candidates. For example, those with missing biographical data may be more likely to
come from working-class backgrounds, as they are less likely to appear in the Oxford
Dictionary of National Biography if their sole activity in public life was to run for a
seat in Parliament. Although it is not immediately clear in what direction the bias due
to the missing data goes, I make a range of assumptions about the type of candidates
these missing candidates may be, and find that the results are similar to those in the
main paper.
As shown in Table A.28, there are a non-negligible percentage of observations where
there is incomplete biographical data. Table A.29 replicate the baseline results using the
SVM estimates across different assumptions about those with incomplete biographical
data, while Tables A.30, A.31, A.32, and A.33 do so for the LDA estimates.
Table A.28 Missing Biographical Data (Percentage of Observations)
Conservatives Independents Labour Liberals Average
1900 Election 6.5 66.7 10.0 11.7 8.9
1906 Election 10.9 25 8.2 6.3 8.8
January 1910 Election 14.5 10 7.1 11.0 12.5
December 1910 Election 14.1 40 2.2 11.6 12.5
Average 11.5 26.7 6.3 10 10.7
This table reports the percentage of candidates from each party-election where there is
incomplete biographical information.
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Table A.29 Missing Biographical Data: SVM Baseline Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Missing=0 Missing=10 Missing=20 Missing=30
1906 Loss Margin -0.368∗∗∗ -0.341∗∗∗ -0.314∗∗∗ -0.288∗∗∗
(0.095) (0.090) (0.085) (0.081)
1900 Loss Margin -0.102 -0.087 -0.073 -0.059
(0.104) (0.098) (0.093) (0.088)
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.204∗∗∗ 0.212∗∗∗ 0.219∗∗∗ 0.225∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.039) (0.039) (0.038)
Adjusted R2 0.080 0.081 0.082 0.082
N 641 641 641 641
This table replicates the baseline results assuming different percentage probabilities
that the candidates who have incomplete biographical data are from the political elite,
where those who have complete biographical data have their probabilities estimated
by the SVM. For example, in Column 1, the dependent variable is assumed to be 0
where there is incomplete biographical data.
Table A.30 Missing Biographical Data: SVM Baseline Results - Scenario 1
(1) (2) (3)
Elite (LDA) Middle (LDA) Working (LDA)
1906 Loss Margin -0.345∗∗∗ 0.020 0.346∗∗∗
(0.077) (0.066) (0.084)
1900 Loss Margin -0.037 0.015 0.061
(0.083) (0.072) (0.091)
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.329∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.041) (0.041)
Adjusted R2 0.155 0.053 0.078
N 641 641 641
This table replicates the baseline results assuming Scenario 1: that all of those
who have incomplete biographical data are 100 percent likely to be in the
working class, and 0 percent likely to be in the political elite or the middle
class. Those with complete biographical have their probabilities calculated by
the LDA, as in the main paper.
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Table A.31 Missing Biographical Data: SVM Baseline Results - Scenario 2
(1) (2) (3)
Elite (LDA) Middle (LDA) Working (LDA)
1906 Loss Margin -0.345∗∗∗ 0.045 0.317∗∗∗
(0.077) (0.063) (0.077)
1900 Loss Margin -0.037 0.025 0.044
(0.083) (0.068) (0.084)
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.329∗∗∗ 0.269∗∗∗ 0.224∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.040) (0.040)
Adjusted R2 0.155 0.063 0.084
N 641 641 641
This table replicates the baseline results assuming Scenario 2: that all of those
who have incomplete biographical data are 90 percent likely to be in the working
class, 10 percent likely to be in the middle class, and 0 percent likely to be in
the political elite. Those with complete biographical have their probabilities
calculated by the LDA, as in the main paper.
Table A.32 Missing Biographical Data: SVM Baseline Results - Scenario 3
(1) (2) (3)
Elite (LDA) Middle (LDA) Working (LDA)
1906 Loss Margin -0.319∗∗∗ 0.045 0.289∗∗∗
(0.073) (0.063) (0.070)
1900 Loss Margin -0.025 0.025 0.027
(0.079) (0.068) (0.076)
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.346∗∗∗ 0.269∗∗∗ 0.243∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.040) (0.039)
Adjusted R2 0.164 0.063 0.092
N 641 641 641
This table replicates the baseline results assuming Scenario 3: that all of those
who have incomplete biographical data are 80 percent likely to be in the working
class, 10 percent likely to be in the middle class, and 10 percent likely to be in
the political elite. Those with complete biographical have their probabilities
calculated by the LDA, as in the main paper.
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Table A.33 Missing Biographical Data: SVM Baseline Results - Scenario 4
(1) (2) (3)
Elite (LDA) Middle (LDA) Working (LDA)
1906 Loss Margin -0.319∗∗∗ 0.069 0.262∗∗∗
(0.073) (0.060) (0.064)
1900 Loss Margin -0.025 0.035 0.012
(0.079) (0.065) (0.070)
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.346∗∗∗ 0.281∗∗∗ 0.264∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.040) (0.039)
Adjusted R2 0.164 0.073 0.101
N 641 641 641
This table replicates the baseline results assuming Scenario 4: that all of those
who have incomplete biographical data are 70 percent likely to be in the working
class, 20 percent likely to be in the middle class, and 10 percent likely to be in
the political elite. Those with complete biographical have their probabilities




The baseline analysis in the main paper excludes observations where the Conservative
candidate in either the 1900 or the 1906 election ran uncontested, as the 1900 Loss
Margin and the 1906 Loss Margin are not unambiguously defined. As a robustness
check, I reproduce the baseline results in Table 1.2, but also code 1900 and 1906
Loss Margins as -100 if the Conservative candidate ran unopposed (a 100 per cent
majority), and 100 if no Conservative candidate ran. The results are reported in Table
A.34. Although the magnitudes are a little smaller than in the main analysis, they
still provide significant evidence of an association between a greater loss margin and
switching candidates from the political elite to the working class.
Table A.34 Baseline Results: Including Uncontested Elections
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Elite (SVM) Elite (LDA) Middle (LDA) Working (LDA)
1906 Loss Margin -0.102∗ -0.110∗∗ 0.026 0.081∗
(0.062) (0.056) (0.048) (0.041)
1900 Loss Margin -0.022 -0.057∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ -0.001
(0.028) (0.026) (0.022) (0.019)
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.355∗∗∗ 0.488∗∗∗ 0.465∗∗∗ 0.439∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.032) (0.035) (0.031)
Adjusted R2 0.133 0.260 0.211 0.208
N 744 744 744 744
This table replicates the baseline results in the main paper, but assumes that the loss margin
in an election where the Conservative Party ran unopposed is -100, and 100 if the Conservative
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B.1 Institutional Context
Fig. B.1 Localised Attention of Female Medallists, 2016 Olympics
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B.2 Data Summary and Sources
B.2.1 Olympic Medals
Fig. B.2 Olympic Medal Data Example
Notes: This figure presents an example of information provided about US Olympians, as presented on
olympedia.org
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B.3 Variation in Female Medals
This section outlines the variation in medals won by women across the U.S. states and
across Summer Olympic Games, from 1968 to 2016. Figure B.3 illustrates the positive
skew in the distribution of medals won by women across states and Olympic Games.
Figures B.4, B.5, B.6, B.7, and B.8 show the variation in female medals across time for
each of the 50 states.
Fig. B.3 Distribution of Female Medals across State-Olympic Pairs
Notes: This figure illustrates the distribution of medals won by women born from a state across
state-Olympic pairs. This includes all states from 1968 to 2016.
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B.4 Persistence of Female Medal Effect
B.4 Persistence of Female Medal Effect
Table B.1 Persistence: Female Medal Effect Two Year Later
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female Medals (State) 0.270 0.152 0.243 0.126
(0.169) (0.162) (0.163) (0.156)
Female Medals > 0 (State) 1.268 1.218
(1.699) (1.711)
Female Competitors (State) -0.0782 0.00305 -0.0666 0.0142
(0.152) (0.111) (0.154) (0.113)
Incumbent 16.44∗∗∗ 16.45∗∗∗
(1.473) (1.471)
Experience, Years 0.421∗∗∗ 0.420∗∗∗
(0.0915) (0.0917)
Democrat Candidate 4.672∗∗∗ 4.665∗∗∗
(1.109) (1.110)
District Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Controls N Y N Y
Adjusted R2 0.494 0.601 0.494 0.601
Observations 15208 15208 15208 15208
Notes: This table reports the estimates using the specification outlined in (2.1), but on female
candidate votes shares in elections two years after the Olympics. The unit of observation is the female
candidate-election. The dependent variable is the votes won by the female candidate as a percentage
of total votes cast in the election in the district. Female Medals is the number of medals won in
the summer two years before the election by women who were born in the state that the district is
in, while Female Competitors is the number of female competitors who were born in the state that
the district is in. Female Medals > 0 is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if at least one
woman from the state won a medal in the summer two years before the election, and zero otherwise.
Incumbent, Democrat Candidate, and Olympic Year are dummy variables that take value one if the
candidate is an incumbent legislator, a candidate selected by the Democrat party, and whether the
election is held in an Olympic year, respectively, and zero otherwise. Experience, Years is the number
of years that the candidate has been a member of the legislature (which may also include years in
another chamber within the legislature). All specifications include district and year fixed effects, while
standard errors are clustered at the state level and are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote
statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
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B.5 Male Medals Crowding Out Female Medals?
Table B.2 Crowing Out? Male Medals and the Female Medals Effect
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female Medals (State) 0.213∗∗ 0.167∗ 0.207∗∗ 0.150∗
(0.0922) (0.0853) (0.0832) (0.0806)
Female Medals (State) × Male Medals (State) -0.00214 -0.000806 -0.00170 -0.0000105
(0.00215) (0.00182) (0.00224) (0.00195)
Female Medals > 0 (State) 0.280 0.577
(0.622) (0.523)
Female Medals > 0 (State) × Male Medals (State) -0.284 -0.385
(0.333) (0.396)
Female Competitors (State) -0.0727 -0.106 -0.0665 -0.0955
(0.105) (0.0916) (0.106) (0.0936)
District Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Controls N Y N Y
Adjusted R2 0.507 0.609 0.507 0.609
Observations 45427 45427 45427 45427
Notes: This table reports the baseline specification outlined in (2.1), and includes the interaction of
the number of medals won by men from the state with the number of medals won by women. The unit
of observation is the female candidate-election. The dependent variable is the votes won by the female
candidate as a percentage of total votes cast in the election in the district. Female and Male Medals
are the number of medals won in the summer before the election by women and men who were born
in the state that the district is in, respectively, while Female Competitors is the number of female
competitors who were born in the state that the district is in. Female Medals > 0 is a dummy variable
that takes a value of one if at least one woman from the state won a medal in the summer before
the election, and zero otherwise. Incumbent, Democrat Candidate, and Olympic Year are dummy
variables that take value one if the candidate is an incumbent legislator, a candidate selected by the
Democrat party, and whether the election is held in an Olympic year, respectively, and zero otherwise.
Experience, Years is the number of years that the candidate has been a member of the legislature
(which may also include years in another chamber within the legislature). All specifications include
district and year fixed effects, while standard errors are clustered at the state level and are reported




B.6.1 Omitting Large States
Table B.3 Main Results without California
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female Medals (State) 0.228∗∗ 0.201∗ 0.229∗∗ 0.192∗
(0.113) (0.106) (0.104) (0.102)
Female Medals > 0 (State) -0.0202 0.139
(0.655) (0.528)
Female Competitors (State) -0.0411 -0.0730 -0.0409 -0.0740
(0.0735) (0.0818) (0.0756) (0.0826)
Incumbent 15.27∗∗∗ 15.27∗∗∗
(1.252) (1.252)
Experience, Years 0.548∗∗∗ 0.548∗∗∗
(0.0784) (0.0785)
Democrat Candidate 5.397∗∗∗ 5.397∗∗∗
(1.142) (1.142)
Olympic Year 0.0607 0.00944
(1.244) (1.212)
District Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Controls N Y N Y
Adjusted R2 0.511 0.610 0.511 0.610
Observations 44300 44300 44300 44300
Notes: This table reports the estimates using the specification outlined in (2.1). The unit of observation
is the female candidate-election, but without observations from California. The dependent variable
is the votes won by the female candidate as a percentage of total votes cast in the election in the
district. Female Medals is the number of medals won in the summer before the election by women
who were born in the state that the district is in, while Female Competitors is the number of female
competitors who were born in the state that the district is in. Female Medals > 0 is a dummy variable
that takes a value of one if at least one woman from the state won a medal in the summer before
the election, and zero otherwise. Incumbent, Democrat Candidate, and Olympic Year are dummy
variables that take value one if the candidate is an incumbent legislator, a candidate selected by the
Democrat party, and whether the election is held in an Olympic year, respectively, and zero otherwise.
Experience, Years is the number of years that the candidate has been a member of the legislature
(which may also include years in another chamber within the legislature). All specifications include
district and year fixed effects, while standard errors are clustered at the state level and are reported
in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
153
Appendix for Chapter 2
B.6.2 Omitting States with No Female Medallists
Table B.4 Main Results without States with No Female Medallists
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female Medals (State) 0.218∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗ 0.195∗∗ 0.162∗∗
(0.0811) (0.0765) (0.0759) (0.0719)
Female Medals > 0 (State) 0.694 0.423
(0.649) (0.639)
Female Competitors (State) -0.0499∗ -0.0555∗ -0.0488∗ -0.0544∗
(0.0265) (0.0310) (0.0267) (0.0311)
Incumbent 16.62∗∗∗ 16.62∗∗∗
(0.856) (0.856)
Experience, Years 0.597∗∗∗ 0.598∗∗∗
(0.0830) (0.0831)
Democrat Candidate 6.956∗∗∗ 6.956∗∗∗
(1.216) (1.216)
Olympic Year 2.842∗∗∗ 2.599∗∗
(0.992) (1.176)
District Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Controls N Y N Y
Adjusted R2 0.482 0.606 0.482 0.606
Observations 38432 38432 38432 38432
Notes: This table reports the estimates using the specification outlined in (2.1). The unit of observation
is the female candidate-election, but excludes states from which no woman ever wins a medal in the
sample. The dependent variable is the votes won by the female candidate as a percentage of total votes
cast in the election in the district. Female Medals is the number of medals won in the summer before
the election by women who were born in the state that the district is in, while Female Competitors is
the number of female competitors who were born in the state that the district is in. Female Medals >
0 is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if at least one woman from the state won a medal in
the summer before the election, and zero otherwise. Incumbent, Democrat Candidate, and Olympic
Year are dummy variables that take value one if the candidate is an incumbent legislator, a candidate
selected by the Democrat party, and whether the election is held in an Olympic year, respectively, and
zero otherwise. Experience, Years is the number of years that the candidate has been a member of the
legislature (which may also include years in another chamber within the legislature). All specifications
include district and year fixed effects, while standard errors are clustered at the state level and are
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C.1 First-Stage Regressions
Table C.1 First-Stage Regression
Dependent variable:
Female Proportion of Winners
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: District Level
Female Close Winners 0.971∗∗∗ 0.999∗∗∗ 1.027∗∗∗ 1.013∗∗∗ 0.989∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.010) (0.016) (0.023) (0.032)
Bandwidth (+/-) 10 percent 5 percent 2 percent 1 percent 0.5 percent
F-Statistic 210.16 146.66 106.8 91.28 83.96
Observations 143,149 143,149 143,149 143,149 143,149
Adjusted R2 0.126 0.092 0.068 0.059 0.054
Panel B: State Chamber Level
Female Close Winners 0.845∗∗∗ 0.985∗∗∗ 0.931∗∗∗ 1.007∗∗∗ 1.072∗∗∗
(0.099) (0.140) (0.139) (0.222) (0.252)
Bandwidth (+/-) 10 percent 5 percent 2 percent 1 percent 0.5 percent
F-Statistic 40.14 38.84 36.35 35.9 35.53
Observations 2,290 2,290 2,290 2,290 2,290
Adjusted R2 0.715 0.708 0.694 0.691 0.689
Notes: This table reports estimates from the first-stage specification. The unit of observation in Panel
A is the district-election, while in Panel B it is the state chamber-election. The dependent variable is
the number of women elected divided by the total number elected. The explanatory variable is the
constructed instrument: Net Close Female Winners. Column 1 assumes that the definition of a small
margin is 10 percent of total votes cast, 5 percent for Column 2, 2 percent for Column 3, 1 percent
for Column 4, and 0.5 percent for Column 5. All specifications included year and state fixed effects.
Standard errors, which are clustered at the district level in Panel A and at the state chamber level in






Table C.2 Impact on Female Representation Across Future Elections
Dependent variable:
Outcome (t+1) Outcome (t+2) Outcome (t+3) Outcome (t+4)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Female Proportion of Future Candidates
Female Winners 0.240∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗ 0.279∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.047) (0.061) (0.080)
Bandwidth (+/-) 0.5 percent 0.5 percent 0.5 percent 0.5 percent
Observations 206,154 129,648 70,353 33,303
Adjusted R2 0.033 0.026 0.023 0.019
Panel B: Female Proportion of Future Winners
Female Winners 0.444∗∗∗ 0.304∗∗∗ 0.195∗∗ 0.489∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.068) (0.093) (0.126)
Bandwidth (+/-) 0.5 percent 0.5 percent 0.5 percent 0.5 percent
Observations 111,483 70,173 38,342 17,713
Adjusted R2 0.043 0.035 0.028 0.024
Notes: This table reports the estimated impact of the election of a woman in a district on female
representation in the district in the following four elections. The unit of observation is the candidate-
district-election. The dependent variable is a binary variable that takes a value of one if the candidate
is a woman, and a value of zero otherwise. The specifications in Panel A include all candidates, whereas
in Panel B the sample is reduced to candidates who are elected into office at that election. Column 1
reports the estimated effect on the next election, Column 2 the impact on the second election after
the treatment, and so on. All specifications included year and state fixed effects. Standard errors,
which are clustered at the district level, are reported in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted as
follows: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Future Female Proportion of Candidates (New Candidates)
Female Winners −0.231∗∗∗ 0.034 0.010 0.213∗∗
(0.044) (0.057) (0.073) (0.091)
Bandwidth (+/-) 0.5 percent 0.5 percent 0.5 percent 0.5 percent
Observations 117,801 73,548 39,500 19,033
Adjusted R2 0.030 0.024 0.020 0.020
Panel B: Future Female Proportion of Winners (New Candidates)
Female Winners −0.351∗∗∗ 0.156 0.008 0.714∗∗∗
(0.086) (0.121) (0.153) (0.220)
Bandwidth (+/-) 0.5 percent 0.5 percent 0.5 percent 0.5 percent
Observations 28,706 17,316 9,327 4,385
Adjusted R2 0.034 0.021 0.009 0.002
Notes: This table reports the estimated impact of the election of a woman in a district on female
representation in the district in the following four elections. The unit of observation is the candidate-
district-election. The dependent variable is a binary variable that takes a value of one if the candidate
is a woman, and a value of zero otherwise. The specifications in Panel A include candidates who
are not incumbents in the chamber, whereas in Panel B the sample further restricts the sample to
candidates who are not incumbents and are elected at that election. Column 1 reports the estimated
effect on the next election, Column 2 the impact on the second election after the treatment, and so
on. All specifications included year and state fixed effects. Standard errors, which are clustered at the





Table C.4 Geographical Spillovers
Dependent variable:
Outcome (t+1) Outcome (t+2) Outcome (t+3) Outcome (t+4)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Future Female Proportion of Candidates (All Candidates)
Female Winners 0.759∗∗∗ 0.746∗∗∗ 0.740∗∗∗ 0.699∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.038) (0.045) (0.046)
Bandwidth (+/-) 0.5 percent 0.5 percent 0.5 percent 0.5 percent
Observations 285,162 271,629 258,076 244,413
Adjusted R2 0.036 0.032 0.029 0.027
Panel B: Future Female Proportion of Candidates (New Candidates)
Female Winners 0.548∗∗∗ 0.537∗∗∗ 0.504∗∗∗ 0.489∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.056) (0.060) (0.056)
Bandwidth (+/-) 0.5 percent 0.5 percent 0.5 percent 0.5 percent
Observations 166,690 158,304 149,684 141,241
Adjusted R2 0.032 0.029 0.027 0.025
Panel C: Future Female Proportion of Winners (All Candidates)
Female Winners 1.010∗∗∗ 0.990∗∗∗ 1.009∗∗∗ 0.941∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.021) (0.030) (0.043)
Bandwidth (+/-) 0.5 percent 0.5 percent 0.5 percent 0.5 percent
Observations 153,401 146,270 139,113 132,073
Adjusted R2 0.048 0.043 0.038 0.035
Panel D: Future Female Proportion of Winners (New Candidates)
Female Winners 0.803∗∗∗ 0.792∗∗∗ 0.771∗∗∗ 0.754∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.050) (0.051) (0.057)
Bandwidth (+/-) 0.5 percent 0.5 percent 0.5 percent 0.5 percent
Observations 42,991 40,532 37,781 35,363
Adjusted R2 0.039 0.032 0.026 0.024
Notes: This table reports the estimated impact of the election of women in the chamber on female
representation in future elections. The unit of observation is the candidate-district-election. The
dependent variable is a binary variable that takes a value of one if the candidate is a woman, and
a value of zero otherwise. The specifications in Panel A include all candidates, Panel B includes all
candidates who are not incumbents, whereas in Panel C the sample is restricted to candidates who are
elected into office at that election, and Panel D includes canddiates who are elected into office and are
not incumbents when they run. Column 1 reports the estimated effect on the next election, Column 2
the impact on the second election after the treatment, and so on. All specifications included year and
state fixed effects. Standard errors, which are clustered at the state chamber level, are reported in
parentheses. Significance levels are denoted as follows: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
.
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Table C.5 Impact by Political Party
Dependent variable:
Outcome (t+1) Outcome (t+2) Outcome (t+3) Outcome (t+4)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Future Female Democrat Candidates
Female Winners 0.214∗∗∗ 0.124 0.163∗ 0.318∗∗
(0.061) (0.076) (0.093) (0.144)
Bandwidth (+/-) 0.5 percent 0.5 percent 0.5 percent 0.5 percent
Observations 95,227 59,826 32,430 14,832
Adjusted R2 0.062 0.053 0.045 0.037
Panel B: Future Female Republican Candidates
Female Winners 0.330∗∗∗ 0.214∗∗∗ 0.105 0.299∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.065) (0.078) (0.107)
Bandwidth (+/-) 0.5 percent 0.5 percent 0.5 percent 0.5 percent
Observations 85,527 53,994 29,754 14,044
Adjusted R2 0.018 0.012 0.009 0.006
Panel C: Future Female Democrat Winners
Female Winners 0.360∗∗∗ 0.190∗ 0.246∗ 0.546∗∗∗
(0.085) (0.112) (0.137) (0.210)
Bandwidth (+/-) 0.5 percent 0.5 percent 0.5 percent 0.5 percent
Observations 61,062 38,357 20,737 9,256
Adjusted R2 0.077 0.067 0.058 0.052
Panel D: Future Female Republican Winners
Female Winners 0.240∗∗∗ 0.224∗∗∗ 0.138 0.192
(0.036) (0.065) (0.122) (0.159)
Bandwidth (+/-) 0.5 percent 0.5 percent 0.5 percent 0.5 percent
Observations 206,154 30,890 13,866 5,325
Adjusted R2 0.033 0.040 0.036 0.023
Notes: This table reports the estimated impact of the election of a woman in a district on female
representation in the district in the following four elections, split by political party. The unit of
observation is the candidate-district-election. The dependent variable is a binary variable that takes a
value of one if the candidate is a woman, and a value of zero otherwise. The specifications in Panel A
include all Democrat candidates, whereas in Panel B the sample is reduced to Democrat candidates
who are elected into office at that election. Panel C includes all Republican candidates, and Panel D
includes all Republican candidates who are elected into office at that election. Column 1 reports the
estimated effect on the next election, Column 2 the impact on the second election after the treatment,
and so on. All specifications included year and state fixed effects. Standard errors, which are clustered
at the district level, are reported in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted as follows: ∗p<0.1;
∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
.
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